Compromise and threats of violence<\/p>\n
By J. Soedjati Djiwandono<\/p>\n
JAKARTA (JP): The minutes are ticking away toward the end of
\nthe month, the day the House of Representatives will convene its
\nplenary session, while the whole nation is on tenterhooks and
\npoliticians continue to make so much fuss about the possibility
\nof a meeting among the top leadership.<\/p>\n
Will they agree to reconciliation through compromise? A
\nmeeting maybe, but a compromise? And what kind of compromise?<\/p>\n
The signs do not seem promising. Abdurrahman \"Gus Dur\" Wahid
\nhas indicated -- again -- when saying that he would present his
\naccountability report to the People's Consultative Assembly in
\n2004, that he really wants to carry on to the end of his term as
\nPresident.<\/p>\n
He claimed that Vice President Megawati Soekarnoputri had
\npledged to support his presidency until 2004, and that she wanted
\nto remain Vice President. This, however, has been denied by her
\nparty, the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI
\nPerjuangan).<\/p>\n
The President has also warned of a \"nationwide rebellion\"
\nagainst the House if its attempts to oust him continue. This must
\nbe a special kind of rebellion, for a rebellion is normally
\nunderstood to be staged against a government.<\/p>\n
Previously he also warned that Aceh, Irian Jaya and,
\nridiculously, even the small island of Madura would declare
\nindependence should he step down.<\/p>\n
What are the possible implications? Gus Dur seems to remain
\nself-confident, if not overconfident. He does not seem to realize
\nthe gravity of the crucial, even dangerous, situation. He does
\nnot seem to realize the real threat to national unity.<\/p>\n
One would rightly wonder whether his self-confidence,
\nparticularly his reference to a possible \"rebellion\" against the
\nHouse, has anything to do with the tens of thousands of jihad
\nwarriors being formed by self-proclaimed \"Defenders of Truth\" in
\nEast Java and Medan, North Sumatra, in support of the President,
\nto defend him against attempts to impeach him.<\/p>\n
By definition, any compromise never satisfies anyone. Yet it
\nis the best and the most that can result from a negotiation
\nbetween the parties involved.<\/p>\n
A compromise, and thus reconciliation, may be possible only if
\nthe four leaders are motivated by common concern with the
\ninterest of the nation as a whole as its foundation. And the
\nimmediate interest of the nation at this crucial and dangerous
\nstage is the prevention of escalating social conflicts that pose
\na real threat to national unity, and thus the nation's very
\nsurvival.<\/p>\n
A compromise is possible also if all the parties involved are
\nready and willing to make sacrifices in the pursuit of their
\ncommon interests. They must be prepared to sacrifice their
\npersonal interests and those of their groups, however defined, at
\nleast for the time being.<\/p>\n
In fact, they would be able to serve these interests precisely
\nin their efforts to serve their common interests, which are the
\ninterests of the nation as a whole. Surely, however, personal and
\ngroup interests are valid as long as they form part of the wider
\ninterest of the nation, at least not contrary to the general
\ninterest.<\/p>\n
Otherwise, such interests that may be contrary to humanity or
\nuniversal human values like equality, justice and basic human
\nrights, may not be pursued by abusing democratic process and
\ndemocratic mechanism.<\/p>\n
The top national leadership should realize the gravity of the
\ncurrent situation. The country is on the verge of collapse and
\ndestruction. Thus the stakes of the current crisis are so great
\nas to be worth the sacrifices. Otherwise, it is always the common
\npeople, especially the poor, the weak and the marginalized, who
\npay the price.<\/p>\n
Fear of the threat or use of violence, however, should not
\ndictate a compromise. It should not be a compromise reached under
\nduress. Such a compromise would have no lasting value, for once
\nthe threat of force or violence was gone, the compromise would be
\ndiscarded.<\/p>\n
Moreover, a compromise under the threat of force would
\nvirtually mean justifying and giving way to the use or threat of
\nviolence. Democratic process should not knuckle under the threat
\nof force, for the threat or use of force is against democratic
\nideals.<\/p>\n
On the other hand, politicians should be honest enough to
\nrealize that either directly or consciously or otherwise, in one
\nway or another, they also play a part in encouraging the use of
\nviolence by their unwise remarks and behavior. Therefore, they
\nshould also share the responsibility for the current tendency to
\nresort to mass violence.<\/p>\n
Indeed, the whole nation is still in the early process of
\ndemocratization through a long, rough and winding road.
\nIndonesians are still learning to listen to criticism, to differ
\nwith one another, and to accept political defeat with grace, and
\nto win political victory with magnanimity.<\/p>\n
We have opted for a democratic system despite its high price
\nand its inefficiency, because the system respects human rights.
\nA political compromise among the top leadership would not in
\nitself be a guarantee for a quick recovery from the crisis.<\/p>\n
Given the absence of violence or a serious threat of violence,
\nhowever, it would ensure the continuation of the reform process
\ntoward a healthier democratic life and good governance, which
\nwould lead eventually to recovery from the crisis.<\/p>\n
The apparent threat of violence posed by the formation of
\nspecial forces in support and in defense of President Abdurrahman
\nshould not constitute pressure on his political opponents.<\/p>\n
On the contrary, it may bring pressure to bear on the
\nPresident himself toward his realization of the acute danger the
\nturn of events poses to the nation, not just to his position.<\/p>\n
Therefore the most important form of compromise should be
\nincumbent upon the President's own initiative to step down for
\nthe sake of the unity, integrity and the survival of the nation.<\/p>\n
This scenario, however, as many that have come to know him
\nwould probably agree, is the least likely.<\/p>\n
The second best option would be the strengthening of the
\nposition and powers vested in Vice President Megawati. The
\noverpowering President may likely hinder even this.<\/p>\n
Under a parliamentary system, a prime minister would dissolve
\nparliament and decide on a fresh election to win a new mandate of
\nthe people. Under the 1945 Constitution of this country, this
\nshould be a decision made by the Assembly.<\/p>\n
That choice would be very costly in a number of ways. However,
\nan election would be the proper entry point into further process
\nof democratization.<\/p>\n
It would be a choice better understood by the international
\ncommunity. This would better ensure Indonesia's credibility,
\nwhich the nation badly needs for recovery, than resorting to
\nnarrow nationalistic slogans.<\/p>\n
And the whole process, hopefully, would help our politicians
\nrealize the urgent need for a constitutional change. Otherwise,
\nthe vague and ambiguous nature of the current Constitution would
\nagain lead to continuous bickering among politicians.<\/p>\n
The writer is a political analyst based in Jakarta.<\/p>", "url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/compromise-and-threats-of-violence-1447893297", "image": "" }, "sponsor": "Okusi Associates", "sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com" }