{
    "success": true,
    "data": {
        "id": 1677834,
        "msgid": "commentary-aseans-energy-crisis-is-not-about-energy-1776207042",
        "date": "2026-04-15 04:58:00",
        "title": "Commentary: ASEAN\u2019s energy crisis is not about energy",
        "author": "",
        "source": "CNA",
        "tags": "Commentary ,Asia",
        "topic": "Energy",
        "summary": "The blockade of the Strait of Hormuz by the United States against Iran has disrupted ASEAN's energy supplies, exposing the region's lack of influence over global security decisions that affect its trade-dependent economy. While ASEAN countries like Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam have implemented pragmatic measures such as subsidies, rationing, and reactivating coal plants to mitigate the crisis, these responses highlight a deeper structural vulnerability rooted in dependence on external powers without agency. This commentary argues that true energy security for ASEAN requires not just technical resilience but enhanced geopolitical leverage to shape the conditions producing such disruptions.",
        "content": "<p>Commentary: ASEAN\u2019s energy crisis is not about energy<\/p>\n<p>The security architecture that was supposed to protect the flow of\nenergy to Southeast Asia has become the source of its interruption, says\nan academic.<\/p>\n<p>SEMARANG, Indonesia: The Hormuz blockade has exposed something deeper\nthan a supply disruption \u2013 the overarching limits of Southeast Asian\nagency in a crisis it cannot shape.<\/p>\n<p>Six weeks into the worst energy disruption in modern history, the\ncountries of ASEAN have done a great deal.<\/p>\n<p>Indonesia has frozen fuel prices, expanded subsidies, and ordered\nflexible work arrangements to cut consumption. The Philippines declared\na national energy emergency. Thailand reactivated coal plants and\nrationed diesel. Vietnam suspended crude exports and accelerated its\nethanol blending program.<\/p>\n<p>Across the region, governments have improvised with speed and\npragmatism.<\/p>\n<p>What none of them has done is shape the crisis itself. No ASEAN\nmember state has had meaningful influence over the decision to blockade\nthe Strait of Hormuz, the terms of ceasefire negotiations, or the\nconditions under which the strait might reopen.<\/p>\n<p>The region\u2019s most consequential energy corridor, through which over\nhalf of ASEAN\u2019s oil imports transit, has been shut down by a conflict in\nwhich Southeast Asia countries have had no seat at the table.<\/p>\n<p>This matters beyond the current emergency. For years, ASEAN\u2019s energy\npolicy discourse has been built around the language of resilience \u2013\ndiversification of supply, renewable energy targets, regional power grid\nintegration, strategic reserves. These are serious and necessary\ngoals.<\/p>\n<p>But the Hormuz crisis has made visible something that this language\ntends to obscure: Resilience, as currently practised, is a strategy for\nabsorbing shocks, not for reducing exposure to the conditions that\nproduce them.<\/p>\n<p>STRUCTURAL RISKS<\/p>\n<p>Consider the central irony of the current situation. The United\nStates has long been the implicit guarantor of freedom of navigation\nthrough the world\u2019s maritime chokepoints, a role that underpins ASEAN\u2019s\nentire model of trade-dependent growth.<\/p>\n<p>In 2026, it is the United States that initiated the military action\nagainst Iran, and the US, having now announced a naval blockade, that is\ncompounding the closure of the strait. The security architecture that\nwas supposed to protect the flow of energy to Asia has become the source\nof its interruption.<\/p>\n<p>For ASEAN, this is not an anomaly. It is the structural risk of\ndepending on a security order you do not control.<\/p>\n<p>Indonesia illustrates the pattern with particular clarity. The\ncountry has been a net oil importer since 2003. It consumes around 1.5\nmillion barrels per day but produces fewer than 700,000, with domestic\nreserves covering barely 20 days of consumption.<\/p>\n<p>A quarter of its crude imports transit through Hormuz. Each dollar\nincrease in the oil price expands its fiscal deficit by roughly US$400\nmillion; the rupiah\u2019s depreciation against the dollar compounds the\ndamage further.<\/p>\n<p>Jakarta\u2019s response, holding subsidised fuel at 60 cents per litre\nwhile Brent traded at above US$118, is politically effective and\nhistorically grounded, drawing on a social contract that dates back to\nthe Sukarno era.<\/p>\n<p>But it is also a strategy of fiscal absorption. The state budget acts\nas a shock absorber, not a shield. And the longer the crisis lasts, the\nthinner the cushion becomes.<\/p>\n<p>The forced return to coal is perhaps the starkest illustration.\nThailand, Vietnam, and the Philippines have reactivated or maximised\ncoal-fired generation to compensate for gas and oil shortages, precisely\nas all three governments were promoting energy transition roadmaps.<\/p>\n<p>The transition agenda is real, but it is being pursued on top of a\nfossil-fuel foundation that remains fully exposed to external\ndisruption. When the disruption arrives, the foundation is\nreasserted.<\/p>\n<p>ASEAN REMAINS VULNERABLE<\/p>\n<p>What is most striking, however, is the collective silence. ASEAN, as\nan institution, has issued no substantive statement on the Hormuz\ncrisis, proposed no coordinated diplomatic position, and exercised no\nleverage, individually or collectively, on the belligerents.<\/p>\n<p>China vetoed a UN Security Council resolution on the Hormuz Strait.\nIndia is recalibrating its entire energy diplomacy. South Korea has\nactivated an emergency economic task force. ASEAN is managing fuel\ncoupons and work-from-home mandates. The gap between the region\u2019s\neconomic exposure and its geopolitical weight has never been more\nvisible.<\/p>\n<p>This is not an argument for ASEAN to intervene militarily or to\nabandon its tradition of non-alignment. It is an argument for\nrecognising that energy security cannot be reduced to supply\nmanagement.<\/p>\n<p>The crisis has made clear that ASEAN\u2019s vulnerability is not primarily\ntechnical but political. It stems from a position in the global order\nwhere the region absorbs the consequences of great-power decisions\nwithout the capacity to influence them. Resilience without agency is\nadaptation on someone else\u2019s terms.<\/p>\n<p>The policy implications are not new, but the urgency is. Accelerating\nrenewables, building regional storage infrastructure, and diversifying\nsupply routes are necessary steps, and the current crisis may well\ncatalyse investment that years of summitry could not.<\/p>\n<p>But they will remain insufficient if they are not accompanied by a\nharder conversation, about whether ASEAN\u2019s institutional architecture is\ncapable of producing collective positions on the geopolitical conditions\nthat shape its energy security. The Hormuz crisis will eventually end,\nbut the structural exposure it has revealed will not.<\/p>\n<p>Aniello Iannone is a lecturer in Indonesian and Southeast Asian\nPolitics at the Department of Political Science and Government at\nDiponegoro University. This commentary first appeared on the Lowy\nInstitute\u2019s site, The Interpreter.<\/p>",
        "url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/commentary-aseans-energy-crisis-is-not-about-energy-1776207042",
        "image": ""
    },
    "sponsor": "Okusi Associates",
    "sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com"
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