Command and control<\/p>\n
The president is the supreme commander of the Indonesian armed
\nforces. The 1945 Constitution -- both in its amended and original
\nforms -- clearly stipulates such. Even top military brass would
\nnot argue with the president's official distinction as commander
\nin chief. But the current degree of actual control the president
\nhas over this most strategic of state institutions is ambiguous.<\/p>\n
Past Indonesian leaders, from Sukarno to Megawati
\nSoekarnoputri, under the prevailing political system of the time,
\nfrom parliamentary democracy, authoritarianism to direct
\npresidential elections, have had to come to terms with the
\nmilitary in their own way.<\/p>\n
Either by prostration or compromise, no president has survived
\nwithout the \"blessing\" of the military. It was not public
\nopinion, but rather the military that has determined the
\npolitical turning points of the nation.<\/p>\n
Even during the initial phases of the current era of
\ndemocratic resurgence, the military was a defining actor in the
\nfate of post-Soeharto administrations. Either by conscious
\nomission or as a sustaining ally, its role was crucial in
\nterminating and perpetuating at least two administrations.<\/p>\n
As the nation attempts to nudge its institutions toward
\negalitarian and accountable norms, it has to be said that the
\nIndonesian Military (TNI) has consistently maintained its
\nexclusiveness. As other state institutions succumb, in varying
\ndegrees, to demands for reform, the TNI has continued to
\njealously guard against external initiatives to transform its
\ninstitutionalized habits.<\/p>\n
After seven years of reformasi, changes within the TNI have
\nonly begun to scratch the surface. It is true that the TNI has
\nnot prevented the progress of democratic reform. But neither has
\nit been at the forefront in implementing reform.<\/p>\n
Hence, suspicion remains of the TNI's true intentions. This
\nsuspicion also indicates that despite the democratic elections,
\nthere is doubt that the defined commander in chief (the
\npresident) has absolute command and control over the TNI.<\/p>\n
The election of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono brought about an
\nintriguing paradox: the nation is now looking to a retired
\nmilitary general to \"impose\" important reforms on the TNI.<\/p>\n
One question that has yet to be answered in Susilo's 100-plus
\ndays in power is how he perceives and intends to pursue the
\nrelationship with the institution that taught him everything he
\nknows. Will he seek to make the military a bedfellow, like his
\npredecessor? Or will he seek to \"tame the beast\", as Abdurrahman
\nWahid unsuccessfully attempted?<\/p>\n
One advantage Susilo has over his two predecessors is that
\nbeing directly elected, he has more legitimacy and a stronger
\nmandate than any leader since the first president, Sukarno.<\/p>\n
The impending appointment of the new TNI chief is an important
\ngauge of how Susilo will pursue the relationship with the
\ninstitution. While TNI Headquarters will submit a list of
\npreferred candidates to replace the departing Gen. Endriartono
\nSutarto, the President, as the commander in chief, has the right
\nto appoint whoever he feels comfortable with and sees fit to
\nserve as TNI chief.<\/p>\n
The President should seriously consider returning to the
\ntradition of rotating the position of TNI chief between the Army,
\nNavy and Air Force. With the last two TNI chiefs being from the
\nNavy and the Army, the appointment of a Navy man as TNI chief
\nwould be a logical option. Such a bold decision would help
\naddress imbalances within the military resulting from the Army's
\ndomination of influence, and potentially tip the political
\nbalance in the TNI in the President's favor.<\/p>\n
The House of Representatives also has a key role to play in
\nconsenting to the President's choice of TNI chief. It is an
\nopportunity for the House to show it is a truly independent body.<\/p>\n
We have no specific preference as to who should become the
\nnext TNI chief. The four leading candidates, however, have not
\nshown much enthusiasm for our desired goal of civilian supremacy
\nand public accountability over the TNI.<\/p>\n
Gen. Ryamizard Riyacudu, Lt. Gen. Djoko Santoso, Air Marshall
\nDjoko Suyanto and Adm. Slamet Soebijanto remain to varying
\ndegrees trapped in the conservative mind-set that persists in
\nsetting the TNI apart from other public institutions because of
\nits perceived role as the guardian of the state.<\/p>\n
We can only suggest that the best candidate is not one whose
\nchest glitters with medals, but rather a soldier whose loyalty
\nresides with the elected president and the nation, and not the
\ninstitution of the TNI.<\/p>\n
The future of our democracy rests in the depth and sincerity
\nof the social, political and economic reforms we are now
\nundertaking. The potency of these reforms depends on the degree
\nto which the TNI is willing to cede to civilian supremacy.<\/p>",
"url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/command-and-control-1447893297",
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"sponsor": "Okusi Associates",
"sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com"
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