Cold War has aftermath in Asia-Pacific<\/p>\n
The latest incidents on the Korean peninsula show how much the
\nsecurity situation in the Asia-Pacific region is determined by
\nconflicts left over from the Cold War, writes Walden Bello in
\nthis Inter Press Service commentary.<\/p>\n
MANILA: Like the Taiwan Strait crisis, the latest incidents on
\nthe Korean peninsula remind us of the extent to which the
\nsecurity situation in the Asia-Pacific region continues to be
\ndetermined by conflicts left over from the Cold War.<\/p>\n
North Korea's apparent motive in announcing that it will no
\nlonger respect the rules governing the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ)
\nestablished by the Armistice of 1953, is to pressure the United
\nStates to sign a peace treaty that would end what is technically
\na state of war between the two nations that has lasted 46 years.<\/p>\n
To all who would like to leave the Cold War behind, this
\nshould not seem unreasonable. By comparison, the United States
\nand Japan signed a peace treaty in 1951, six years after the
\ncessation of hostilities in Pacific War.<\/p>\n
The problem in Korea, however, is that neither Washington nor
\nSeoul really want a normalization of relations with North Korea.<\/p>\n
A dehumanized North Korea allows the South Korean
\nestablishment to counter pressure from its population for
\nreunification of the country. It also provides the U.S.,
\nincreasingly seen by a majority of South Koreans as the main
\nobstacle to reunification, with an excellent excuse to maintain
\nits 35,000 troops on the peninsula.<\/p>\n
Indeed, the North Korea \"threat\" is a central justification
\nnot only for U.S. Army presence in South Korea, but for the
\nmaintaining of almost 43,000 troops in Japan and for the forward
\ndeployment of the massive floating base that is the Seventh
\nFleet.<\/p>\n
U.S. policy toward North Korea since the end of the Cold War
\nwould justifiably alarm that country:<\/p>\n
Immediately after the U.S. victory over Iraq in the Gulf War
\nin 1991, General Colin Powell, then head of the U.S. Joint Chiefs
\nof Staff, told the press that \"I'm running out of devils... I'm
\ndown to Fidel Castro and Kim Il-Sung.\"<\/p>\n
Then the Commander in Chief of U.S. Forces in the Pacific,
\ntestifying before Congress, identified North Korea as \"the
\ngreatest immediate danger to regional security\".<\/p>\n
In 1992, the New York Times reported that the Pentagon's first
\npost-Cold war defense guidance has identified the Korea peninsula
\nas the site of two out of seven scenarios of post-Cold War
\nconflict in which U.S. forces may be involved.<\/p>\n
At the height of U.S. accusations that North Korea intended to
\nuse the five-megawatt reactor at Yongbyon to reprocess nuclear
\nfuel in order to develop nuclear weapons, South Korea and U.S.
\nmilitary circles actively discussed the option of air strikes or
\ncommando attacks to \"take out\" the reactor.<\/p>\n
Just as North Korea entered negotiation with Washington to
\naddress the nuclear reactor question in Geneva, President Bill
\nClinton said at the G-7 Summit in Tokyo in July 1993, that the
\nUnited States \"would retaliate quickly and overwhelmingly if
\n(North Korea) were to ever use, to develop and use, nuclear
\nweapons. It would be the end of their country as they know it\".<\/p>\n
Normalization of relations between the United States and North
\nKorea appeared to be a possibility after the conclusion of the
\nGeneva agreement in October 1994. This committed Pyongyang to
\nseal the suspected reprocessing facility at Yongbyon and to give
\nup development of graphite-based nuclear reactors in return for
\nbeing provided with light-water reactors (which are much less
\neasy to use for weapons production) and oil by the United States
\nand a consortium of countries.<\/p>\n
But even as Pyongyang was negotiating with Washington in 1994,
\nthe United States was taking action that could only heighten
\nNorth Korea's insecurity.<\/p>\n
A Patriot anti-missile defense battalion was designated for
\ndeployment near Seoul, with another U.S.-based battalion tapped
\nto reinforce it in the event of an emergency. Aircraft
\nmaintenance crews were bolstered in both South Korea and Japan.
\nAnd Pentagon officials openly considered reversing President
\nGeorge Bush's policy of withdrawing tactical nuclear weapons from
\nU.S units deployed abroad and reintroducing them in Korea and
\naboard U.S. ships in the Sea of Japan.<\/p>\n
Instead of rewarding North Korea for agreeing to give up its
\nnuclear energy program, Washington revealed that a military
\nbuildup of its forces on the Korean peninsula was an essential
\npart of its new strategic posture in the Asia-Pacific. Shortly
\nafter the signing of the Geneva Accord, the Pentagon Strategy
\nPaper (the so-called Nye initiative) released in February 1995
\nannounced, \"We are... prepositioning military equipment in South
\nKorea to increase our capability to respond to crisis.\"<\/p>\n
North Korean hopes that the Geneva Accord would lead to
\nnormalization were further dashed this year when General Gary
\nLuck, the commander of U.S. forces in South Korea, told the U.S.
\nCongress that the collapse of the Pyongyang regime was \"a matter
\nof when, not if\".<\/p>\n
From this assessment by such a strategically placed official
\nNorth Korea could only conclude that Washington's current policy
\ntoward it is not to normalize relations but to hasten Pyongyang's
\ncollapse or at least to do nothing to prevent it.<\/p>\n
In its rush to portray North Korea's latest moves in the DMZ
\nas another crazy move by a mad-dog regime, the Western press does
\nnot even consider the possibility that one of the messages that
\nPyongyang might want to communicate is that, contrary to Gen.
\nLuck's assertion, North Korea is far from collapsing.<\/p>\n
The world's response to this latest crisis in the Korean
\npeninsula is not what Washington might have hoped for. In South
\nKorea most citizens are likely to criticize both Washington and
\nSeoul for provoking North Korea's moves by not being serious
\nabout normalization and reunification.<\/p>\n
And inside the United States, sentiment against continuing
\nmilitary commitments abroad continues to grow.<\/p>\n
Most Asians simply want a comprehensive peace agreement that
\nwould formally end the Korean war, provide for significant
\ndemilitarization of the Korean peninsula, get U.S. troops out of
\nSouth Korea, and pave the way for the reunification of the Korean
\nnation.<\/p>\n
It is time for the United States to give Koreans the
\nopportunity to work out their problems by themselves, and stop
\ndragging the rest of us back into confrontations that belong to
\nthe past.<\/p>\n
Walden Bello is co-director of Focus on the Global South, a
\nprogram of the Chulalongkorn University Research Institute
\n(CUSRI) and the author of several works on regional security.<\/p>\n
-- IPS<\/p>", "url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/cold-war-has-aftermath-in-asia-pacific-1447893297", "image": "" }, "sponsor": "Okusi Associates", "sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com" }