Coalition government is the only way out<\/p>\n
This article is based on a presentation by political observer
\nCornelis Lay of Gadjah Mada University in a discussion on \"Post-
\nelection Indonesia: Who is going to be the fourth president?\"
\nheld in Yogyakarta last week on the occasion of the opening of
\nThe Jakarta Post representative office.<\/p>\n
YOGYAKARTA (JP): Beside constitutional problems, the
\nestablishment of the next Cabinet will also be made more
\ndifficult or worse by the fact that the so-called reformists'
\nagenda is never clear. They want to stop Habibie, Golkar and the
\nNew Order, but at the same time they do not want to accept
\nMegawati, as a leader, and the Indonesian Democratic Party of
\nStruggle (PDI Perjuangan). They refuse to accept anything. In a
\nway they seem to be in a battle against all sides albeit without
\nno clear direction.<\/p>\n
As long as the reformist camp has no clear focus of where to
\ngo, it's quite predictable that the final winner will be the
\nIndonesian Military. This has been the scenario of Indonesian
\npolitics for a long time.<\/p>\n
There has been a mix-up between our desire to build an
\nobjective, reasonable, and acceptable system and that of
\nsupporting a particular figure out of a mere personal and
\nemotional relationship. This has made all the arguments unclear.<\/p>\n
It's a good sign indeed that many people are beginning to use
\nthe 1945 Constitution's amendment and even use it as a yardstick
\nto distinguish between the status quo forces and the reformists.
\nYet, all the arguments they use to halt a particular force from
\nbeing the leader of the nation is indeed substantively
\nunconstitutional.<\/p>\n
You can see this during the last few days. There is a tendency
\namong certain people to use the so-called extra electoral process
\nas a basic political mechanism to form the government. They said
\nMegawati doesn't deserve the position as president because she is
\nstupid, reticent and such. Habibie doesn't suit the position
\nbecause of his close relationship to Soeharto. The only person
\nsuitable for the presidential position is, therefore, their man.
\nSuch a stance is certainly ignoring all the results of the
\nelections.<\/p>\n
It is time for us to show the nation that whoever wins the
\nelections -- should we believe it as a democratic mechanism and
\nthe political parties the instruments to reach democracy -- will
\nbe the president, regardless if the party can't reach a single
\nmajority.<\/p>\n
Extra electoral processes will only give us two possible
\nwinners: the Military or Golkar. No other parties are prepared to
\nface such a situation. The question is whether we would like to
\nbuild a system without an amendment to the 1945 Constitution.<\/p>\n
The argument that we're facing a deadlock on is a logic coming
\nfrom the 1945 Constitution. The Constitution says that the
\nPresident is elected by the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR)
\nbased on the highest number of votes. Therefore we're making an
\nassumption that such a regulation could make the presidential
\nelection process end up in a deadlock. Clearly, it's just wishful
\nthinking of many groups of people who are surprised by their loss
\nin the election. They dream of being supported by many people,
\nbut in fact there are only four to five of them.<\/p>\n
The question is, could we put this back on the democratic
\ntrack, meaning can we believe in both the party and the election
\nmechanism? If we could, and a particular political party --
\nregardless if it is Golkar, National Mandate Party (PAN),
\nNational Awakening Party (PKB), or Indonesian Democratic Party of
\nStruggle (PDI Perjuangan) -- wins the election at only 0.5
\npercent or even 0.01 percent above the average, it should be
\ngiven the authority to govern this republic. Otherwise, we're
\nonly practicing the 1945 Constitution. In other words, all the
\narguments for changing the Constitution will be nothing but
\nnonsense.<\/p>\n
Unfortunately, this kind of confusion about the reform agenda
\nhas also been infiltrated by confusion in ideology. This is
\nincredible. PDI Perjuangan or Megawati, for example, have been
\nregarded as part of a conspiracy of Catholic and Christian
\nminority groups. My serious question then is how could a person
\nlike Theo Safei who is rejected everywhere, have the power to
\ninfluence all the political bosses in PDI Perjuangan? The same
\nquestion can be posed to Sembiring Meliala, who is regarded as
\nthe second most influential person in PDI Perjuangan.<\/p>\n
Such an exaggerated imagination is very dangerous and would
\nbring the political process to two big political blocks. In
\nIndonesian history again, once the fissure of nationalist and
\nIslamic camps got stronger, the last winner was always the Armed
\nForces. There was no historical date refuting this fact. This is
\na political reality.<\/p>\n
Should the reformist forces in the community fail to set
\nthemselves free from the confusion, the question about the next
\npresident would be irrelevant. The one we should look at is the
\ncandidate who will be from the Armed Forces ranks. The General
\nElections Commission (KPU), also plays a role. KPU chairman
\nRudini gave political parties amazing authority to campaign. His
\nonly dream was that small parties would gain votes and join in a
\ncoalition, and say \"I will become the president\". It was just
\nthat simple. And everyone was surprised to know that small
\nparties gained no support.<\/p>\n
I think it's time for us to reunderline that it's not the
\nperson that matters as the properness of someone who becomes
\nirrelevant in an unclear system. Whoever the next president is,
\nif he\/she is elected through a non-electoral process, he\/she will
\nonly result in a serious political problem of legitimacy.<\/p>\n
Of no less importance is the political reality indicating that
\nPDI Perjuangan will collect more than 40 percent of the total
\nvotes. Yet, in reality, the seats it gets in the House of
\nRepresentatives will be below that. It may be less than 35
\npercent of the total seats. This alone raises a serious question
\nabout representation. How can a political party which may win
\nnearly 50 percent of the votes have less than 50 percent of the
\npolitical representatives? This could be a serious problem in the
\nfuture.<\/p>\n
The political parties should also not think that the problem
\nwill end there. When the time comes for them to decide who will
\nrepresent which territory, the questions about the percentage and
\nthe cumulative number will also become a serious matter among
\nparty representatives. We can probably see that a particular
\nparty gains a high percentage of votes in a particular regency.
\nYet, when it is compared to other regions cumulatively, the
\npercentage becomes very low. In this case, on what basis should
\nthe party representative for the region be selected?<\/p>\n
Take the case of PAN's votes, for example. If we use the
\nGunung Kidul village's percentage, it could be very high. Yet if
\nit is compared to Sleman's, it will be very low. The question is
\nwho will represent PAN in Jakarta? It looks simple but it could
\nresult in an internal complication in the party as every person
\nhas an interest to be in power. In PDI Perjuangan, the same
\nproblem occurs, as well as Golkar or any other parties.<\/p>\n
If the composition of the vote is stable like at present,
\nthere will be certainly two determining forces in the political
\nprocess: PAN and the Armed Forces. The problem is PAN itself is
\nfacing a dilemma between a desire to join with PDI Perjuangan and
\nthe possibility to join with Golkar.<\/p>\n
The first choice will cause the party's faction, supported by
\nA.M. Fatwa and friends, to leave PAN, while the second choice
\nwill cause a conflict with the force or network supported by
\nFaisal Basri and friends. This has made PAN powerless and left in
\nthe middle: it will become an opposition but will never form a
\ncoalition. It's a compromised choice, otherwise, PAN will be left
\nbehind by one of its factions. I think PAN is realistic in seeing
\nthis matter.<\/p>\n
In the meantime, we seem to forget the tangible enemy of ours
\nis the last symbol of the status quo force grouped in the
\nIndonesian bureaucracy. The tension between elected politicians
\nand the Indonesian bureaucracy during the 32 years of the New
\nOrder regime and the Golkar era will be difficult to conquer. I
\nsee that the concrete political conflict will occur at this
\nlevel.<\/p>\n
Just imagine how legislative candidates of political parties
\n-- who are only elementary school graduates, have prejudices and
\nextremely high political suspicions and were previous objects of
\nharm of particular parties -- all of a sudden control the formal
\npolitical structure on regional levels, have the authority to
\ngovern the region and state everybody as a thief practicing
\ncorruption, collusion and nepotism. At the same time, there are
\nalso highly talented bureaucrats who master high levels of
\ninformation -- as they have been in power for 32 consecutive
\nyears -- and who have to obey whatever instructions they receive
\nwhile there is no raise in their salary.<\/p>\n
Indonesia's most crucial political issue will be in the
\nbalancing of these two forces. We can not imagine the new
\nIndonesia without the existence of Golkar, Habibie, Megawati or
\nPDI Perjuangan. Likewise, Mega could not imagine the new
\nIndonesia without Islam, and so on.<\/p>\n
It is, I think, time for the Islamic political force and the
\nnationalist one to fully realize that this republic cannot be
\nbuilt only on one leg. That's why there is a need for both forces
\nto move to the middle and build a healthy coalition or
\ncooperation. It is the only possibility.<\/p>\n
How can such a thing be done? There certainly should be PDI
\nPerjuangan's accommodated politics as well as a desire to get
\ncloser to politics from the Muslim political forces.<\/p>\n
The problem is Muslim political forces have been putting a
\ndistance between them and PDI Perjuangan for the last two years.
\nThis was evident when Muhammadiyah leader Mochtar Buchori
\ndeclared himself a PDI Perjuangan member. He was indeed isolated
\nfrom the Muslim political forces, the Muhammadiyah Muslim
\norganization. This should become reflective material for the
\npolitical forces to see that such a concrete political force
\nmight not be distanced. We have to be able to build a rational
\ncooperation.<\/p>\n
If this doesn't work, read once again Indonesian history. In
\n1927 Muslim youths and nationalist ones failed to reach an
\nagreement. They succeeded in 1928. We thank God that there was
\nHatta who was able to be a bridge for both forces in 1945. We
\nfailed in 1959 and as a result the Armed Forces began to take an
\nimportant role in Indonesian politics.<\/p>\n
Should we fail again this time, we will certainly give the
\nArmed Forces a mandate to rule the nation and say that they are
\nthe most important force in this republic. Such awareness should
\nbe built among the reformists.<\/p>\n
How should we do that? Rector of Gadjah Mada University,
\nIchlasul Amal, has been trying to put this across. Among all
\nlimitations, the Gadjah Mada University has made a draft of it.
\nWe say there's no need to care so much about the person. Whoever
\nthe person is and whatever desire the person has in ruling the
\nnation, as long as he\/she is supported by a system which makes it
\npossible for any proper check and balance, distribution of the
\nauthority and limitation of power, it can be guaranteed that
\nhe\/she will not be the second Soeharto. (swa)<\/p>",
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