Civilian elite risks losing touch<\/p>\n
By Ikrar Nusa Bhakti<\/p>\n
JAKARTA (JP): The death of four Trisakti University students
\nlast May 12 motivated students to escalate their campaign for
\ntotal reform. In the same way as Arief Rachman Hakim, a
\nUniversity of Indonesia student who was shot to death by the
\nmilitary in 1966, the four became martyrs and heroes for
\npolitical reform.<\/p>\n
In the two days after the shooting, there were massive riots
\nin Jakarta and its surrounding satellite towns of Bekasi and
\nTangerang.<\/p>\n
These were the worst riots in Indonesia's modern political
\nhistory. Rumors making the rounds were plenty. One said the riots
\nwere the work of some military officers who wanted to imitate
\nwhat their predecessors did during the Malari Affair in 1974,
\nwhen they ordered hoodlums to loot and burn shopping centers in
\nSenen, Central Jakarta.<\/p>\n
Their intention was to deceive the public into believing that
\nthe riots were committed by students; thus, the public would
\ncondemn students and would not support their demonstration for
\ntotal reform. The politics of scapegoating the students was
\nunsuccessful.<\/p>\n
Another rumor said they were organized by the military as an
\nexcuse for their chief commander, Gen. Wiranto, to stop student
\ndemonstrations.<\/p>\n
Others speculated the riots were part of a power struggle
\namong the military elite.<\/p>\n
Another story had it they were organized to demolish symbols
\nof development of Soeharto's regime.<\/p>\n
The deaths of the students and the riots did not quash the
\nstudents' determination to topple Soeharto as a precondition for
\ntotal reform.<\/p>\n
For the second time in Indonesia's young history, a student
\nmovement succeeded in forcing the president out of office. This
\ntime it was the most powerful man in Indonesia who had ruled with
\nan iron fist for 32 years.<\/p>\n
Several factors forced Soeharto to make the decision:<\/p>\n
* The occupation of the House building by thousands of
\nstudents. They were willing to sacrifice their lives rather than
\nleave the building without Soeharto's resignation. The Armed
\nForces (ABRI) accommodative attitude toward students during their
\ndemonstrations boosted their spirit to topple Soeharto.<\/p>\n
* Soeharto failed to reshuffle his Cabinet in time, and 14 of
\nhis ministers resigned.<\/p>\n
* It seems probable Gen. Wiranto told Soeharto that ABRI could
\nnot support him any more.<\/p>\n
There may have also been several external factors which
\ncontributed to expedite Soeharto's downfall, such as the delay in
\ndisbursement of International Monetary Fund's bailout
\ncontribution for Indonesia and the indirect support for student
\nmovements in the country.<\/p>\n
In a way, these May student demonstrations in Indonesia can be
\nregarded as a middle class revolution. Compared to previous
\nstudent movements, this year's student movements were supported
\nby almost all sections of society, particularly the middle class.
\nTheir support came in the form of money, food, printing
\nmaterials, T-shirts, encouraging public opinion, organizing short
\ncourses to enhance students' critical ability, musical
\nentertainment and others.<\/p>\n
The middle class' help for the students can be divided into
\nfive categories:<\/p>\n
First, those who had genuine motives for political and
\neconomic reforms or the true believers. They spent a lot of money
\nto assist student demonstrations, without any political or
\neconomic interests except total reforms.<\/p>\n
Second, former student activists who had tried to topple
\nSoeharto's regime for more than 24 years and who were eager to
\nend the dictatorship in Indonesia.<\/p>\n
Third, those who were unhappy with the Soeharto's family
\nbusiness activities since the beginning of the economic crisis in
\nJuly 1997, either because they lost their jobs or they could not
\ncompete with crony capitalists who were close to Soeharto's
\nfamily.<\/p>\n
Fourth, the newcomers or \"free riders\" who jumped on the
\nbandwagon just before Soeharto's downfall.<\/p>\n
Fifth, former Soeharto's cronies and aides who wanted to \"wash
\ntheir hands\" to show to the people that they were clean and eager
\nto dissociate themselves from corruption, nepotism and collusion.
\nStudents call this group \"last-minutes heroes\" or \"eleventh hour
\nheroes\".<\/p>\n
Although Soeharto has lost his power, students and civilian
\npolitical elites still continue their demands for total reform.
\nMany have never accepted Habibie as Soeharto's successor, because
\nHabibie was very close to Soeharto and he is still considered
\npart of the problem, a leader whose managerial capability to
\nhandle the present political and economic crisis still needs to
\nbe tested.<\/p>\n
Some legal experts believe the transfer of power from Soeharto
\nto Habibie was illegal or unconstitutional. In other words, the
\nnation shows increasing signs of polarization over Habibie
\npresidency and his cabinet. Students are also divided between
\nthose who support Habibie and those who still oppose him.<\/p>\n
The aftermath of Soeharto's resignation can be regarded as a
\nperiod of struggle for powers among political elites, without
\nconsidering social and economic conditions.<\/p>\n
Today, many former Soeharto cronies are forming new political
\nparties as if, in this new era of political reform, people are
\nfree enough to do that without any consideration that their
\nactions will endanger the nation's unity and stability.<\/p>\n
It seems their understanding of the liberal democratic system
\nwas very limited. Unless statesmanship grows at the heart of
\nIndonesia's political elite, this country will inadvertently be
\ntorn to pieces.<\/p>\n
The present situation also sees a psychological war between
\nmilitary and civilian elites. While the civilian political elite
\nis still screaming about total reform without any agreement on
\nthe future reform agenda, the military are preparing drafts of
\npolitical development after Soeharto.<\/p>\n
The military elite is also trying to show to the people that
\nthey are humble and accommodative toward the civilian elite who
\ndemand total reform.<\/p>\n
Minister of Information Yunus Yosfiah's handling of the
\nproblem of the free press in Indonesia is an example of how ABRI
\napproaches journalists.<\/p>\n
In addition, ABRI Chief of Sociopolitical Affairs, Susilo
\nBambang Yudhoyono, showed the accommodative approach in dealing
\nwith the people and political elite.<\/p>\n
The elite can still discuss political reform in cafes and
\nhotels. The elite can also afford to think about \"what menus will
\nwe pick to eat from today?\", while the common people who live
\nfrom one day to another ponder \"what will we eat today?\".<\/p>\n
Unless the civilian elite take the people's stomachs into
\nconsideration, it is possible the grassroots groups will shift
\ntheir allegiance from the civilian to the military elite in the
\nnext six months or so.<\/p>\n
Although it is hard to believe at present, it is not
\nimpossible that the military will dominate the government because
\nthe civilian political elite cannot cope with the present
\neconomic and political crisis.<\/p>\n
The writer is a researcher at the Center for Political and
\nRegional Studies, Indonesian Institute of Sciences.<\/p>\n
Window: In a way, these May student demonstrations in Indonesia
\ncan be regarded as a middle class revolution. Compared to previous
\nstudent movements, this year's student movements were supported
\nby almost all sections of society, particularly the middle class.<\/p>",
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