China may have miscalculated over Mischief Reef (2)<\/p>\n
By Bilveer Singh<\/p>\n
This is the second of two articles examining China's recent
\nmove on Mischief Reef in the South China Sea.<\/p>\n
SINGAPORE (JP): There were a number of other developments
\nrelated to China's actions on Mischief Reef. First, despite its
\neconomic problems, the Philippines Congress approved a US$2
\nbillion arms build up program for the armed forces.<\/p>\n
It would appear that the Chinese action has given substance to
\nthe notion of a \"China threat\", with more countries in the region
\nlikely to procure armaments to protect themselves and deter
\nChina.<\/p>\n
Second, even though Singapore has been silent on the issue in
\nthe past, partly because it is not a claimant, during his state
\nvisit to China, on May 11, Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong candidly
\ntold Chinese Premier Li Peng that the dispute over the Spratlys
\ninvolved more than the question of sovereignty, or which country
\nshould benefit from its resources.<\/p>\n
It also involved the right of nations to navigate the waters
\nsurrounding the islands in the South China Sea, a point that was
\nof concern to trading nations such as Singapore.<\/p>\n
Third, the thorny issue dominated the Senior Officials Meeting
\nof the ASEAN Regional Forum in Brunei in late May, leading the
\nU.S. Secretary of State for East Asia and the Pacific, Winston
\nLord, to conclude that, despite China's objections, \"we
\nestablished the principle that the issue has to be treated
\nmultilaterally, as well as bilaterally\".<\/p>\n
This represented a major diplomatic defeat for China, which
\nhad hitherto refused to be officially engaged on the issue in a
\nmultilateral forum. Coming less than two months before the forum
\nmeeting, it was a clear signal to China that its actions in
\nMischief Reef have unsettled too many countries in the Asia-
\nPacific and that China stands to be increasingly isolated if she
\npersists in pursuing with her actions.<\/p>\n
Fourth, Vietnam, the country which bore the brunt of earlier
\nChinese military operations, quickly boosted its military
\npresence in the Spratlys, as well as calling for closer
\ncooperation with Russia and the U.S. in order to deter further
\n\"island-grabbing\" by China.<\/p>\n
What was significant about the Chinese actions at Mischief
\nReef was that it was the first of its kind against an ASEAN
\nmember state.<\/p>\n
That this was not accidental could be seen in two other
\nrelated actions. First, Beijing's claim to a section of the
\nNatuna seabed, about 250 kilometers north of Natuna Besar island
\nand second, on May 31, China's rejection of Malaysia's claim to
\nLayang-Layang, one of the islands in the Spratlys.<\/p>\n
What these actions showed was that China has now targeted
\nASEAN, as far as the South China Sea problem is concerned, and
\nthe situation will get worse following Vietnam's admission to
\nASEAN later in the month. Thus, a new fault-line has emerged, as
\nfar as the South China Sea dispute is concerned, between China
\nand ASEAN.<\/p>\n
However, unlike the past two military operations, the regional
\nand international reactions to China's occupation of Mischief
\nReef indicates that Beijing may indeed have miscalculated. This
\nwas largely a result of a number of factors.<\/p>\n
First, China underestimated ASEAN, assuming that it would only
\n\"bark\" and then accept the annexation. However, as the ASEAN
\ncountries were attempting to establish a \"code of conduct\" in the
\nregion, as seen in the attempt to universalize the Treaty of
\nAmity and Cooperation, as well as to make it operational in the
\ncontested zone through the ASEAN Declaration on the South China
\nSea, the ASEAN countries were forced to act before it gathered a
\nsteam-rolling momentum to the detriment of the region.<\/p>\n
Even though the Chinese may have the military might, through
\nASEAN's solidarity, the goal was to raise the political and
\ndiplomatic costs of further Chinese aggression in the region.
\nHere, the Chinese may have underestimated ASEAN's threshold and
\nresolve to face up to a much more powerful claimant, and with one
\nwhich all the countries had close ties.<\/p>\n
As a new post-Cold War era emerged in the region, it was
\nvitally necessary to establish clear-cut \"rules\" with regard to
\nterritorial boundaries and through its solidarity, ASEAN made it
\nknown to Beijing that its behavior was objectionable. Hence,
\nBeijing's underestimation of ASEAN, assuming that a weak and
\ndivided regional organization would come to terms the fruits of
\nChinese aggression.<\/p>\n
The Chinese may also have underestimated the growing concern
\nall-over the world with the South China Sea as a region of great
\nglobal significance and that any conflict there would have wider
\nworld-wide ramifications.<\/p>\n
With the Chinese acquiring power projection capabilities, and
\nwith growing concerns world-wide with the \"emerging Chinese
\nsuperpower\", there is great concern about the manner in which
\nChina would use its newly acquired power.<\/p>\n
As the issues are no longer bilateral in nature, China's South
\nChina Sea policies have taken on greater meaning. To many, the
\nconflict in the Spratlys has come to be seen as the litmus test
\nof China's future behavior.<\/p>\n
The key question is whether China will use its new found power
\nto behave in a responsible manner, or otherwise. Thus, most
\ncountries in the region would use China's South China Sea policy
\nas a barometer as to how China would treat its weaker neighbors.<\/p>\n
Dr. Bilveer Singh is a political scientist at the National
\nUniversity of Singapore. His views presented in this article are
\nstrictly his own.<\/p>",
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