China may have miscalculated over Mischief Reef (1)<\/p>\n
By Bilveer Singh<\/p>\n
This is the first of two articles examining China's recent
\nmove on Mischief Reef in the South China Sea.<\/p>\n
SINGAPORE (JP): By the time the National People's Congress
\npassed the Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone in
\nFebruary 1992, China had already twice used force to occupy
\nislands in the South China Sea, namely, in January 1974 and in
\nMarch 1988.<\/p>\n
On both occasions, China was involved in a \"fire-fight\" with
\nthe Vietnamese and got away without much negative consequences.
\nBy this, China manifested its intentions to become a major player
\nin the South China Sea region which she claimed was exclusively
\nhers on the basis of history.<\/p>\n
Even though Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and the
\nPhilippines also claimed parts or whole of the South China Sea
\nregion, China was not prepared to discuss the issue of
\nsovereignty with them even though it indicated its preparedness
\nto undertake joint economic activities.<\/p>\n
Then in February 1995, China occupied Mischief Reef, some 135
\nnautical miles to the west of the Philippines and 240 kilometers
\nwest of the Philippines island of Palawan. The Chinese built four
\nstructures on the reef, indicating that they had been at work for
\nsometime. The Chinese occupation of the Mischief Reef was novel
\nto the extent that for the first time a territory claimed by an
\nASEAN member, in this case the Philippines, was attacked.<\/p>\n
China's aggression in Mischief Reef was not unexpected. Her
\ndetermination could be seen in the incorporation of the Spratly
\nIslands as part of the Hainan Province in July 1987 and in
\nFebruary 1992, the passage of the maritime law, giving her a
\nlegal basis to claim the whole of the South China Sea.<\/p>\n
China also boosted her sovereignty claims to the region
\nthrough a host of activities, including maritime expeditions, the
\noperation of meteorological stations as well as the granting of
\noil exploration concessions to foreign companies in areas with
\noverlapping claims.<\/p>\n
With a booming economy, China has undertaken a large scale
\nmilitary modernization program, emphasizing on the development of
\npower projection capabilities. China has also indicated interest
\nin acquiring an aircraft carrier by 2000. China has also been
\nundertaking large scale military exercises in the South China Sea
\nregion as well as demonstrated her ability to operate outside the
\nSouth China Sea.<\/p>\n
As China was gripped with an internal power struggle, it was
\nindeed puzzling that China should now raise the stakes in the
\nSouth China Sea contest. The question is why? First, the
\nPhilippines was understandably targeted as it was militarily the
\nweakest of all the claimants. The Chinese calculated that their
\nmilitary action would go unchallenged and they were right. It was
\nall the more inviting as the Philippines-United States strategic
\nnexus had been weakened following the American military
\nwithdrawal from the Philippines in December 1992.<\/p>\n
More significant were other political and strategic
\ncalculations. Beijing targeted Mischief Reef as it was the outer
\nperimeter of the Spratly chain, the occupation of which will
\nallow China to claim all the waters and islands within it. It
\nwill provide her with an \"anchor\" to draw its base line as well
\nas claim the new Extended Economic Zone under the United Nations
\nConference on the Law of Sea which China is yet to ratify.<\/p>\n
Mischief Reef is strategically important as most of the north-
\nsouth maritime communications pass through the channel bordered
\nby Mischief Reef on the west and the Palawan island on the east.
\nChina's control of Mischief Reef will provide her with the
\ncapability to influence, and possibly control, the sea-lanes of
\ncommunications through which much military and commercial traffic
\npasses.<\/p>\n
The timing of Mischief Reef's occupation also appeared
\nimpeccable. The Clinton administration was preoccupied with
\ndomestic concerns; Japan was largely ambivalent; many Southeast
\nAsian countries were preoccupied with the economic engagement of
\nChina; and ASEAN's solidarity was weakened by the Philippines-
\nSingapore dispute over the hanging of a maid.<\/p>\n
The decision to occupy Mischief Reef was made at the highest
\nlevel, with President Jiang Zemin endorsing the military
\noperation to win the support of the military to bolster his
\npolitical position in post-Deng China.<\/p>\n
In view of the impeccable timing, as in the 1974 and 1988
\noperations, the Chinese expected the Southeast Asian countries as
\nwell as the international community to acquiesce their actions.
\nUnfortunately for Beijing, their actions were a major
\nmiscalculation, as seen by a number of reactions, which are
\nunlikely to benefit China in the coming years.<\/p>\n
In early March 1995, the European Union made its first ever
\ndeclaration on the South China Sea, expressing concern at China's
\nactions. It called on China and the Philippines to show
\nrestraint.<\/p>\n
It also invited both parties to adhere to the principles
\ncontained in the July 1992 ASEAN Declaration on the South China
\nSea, which had also been endorsed by China. The European
\nstatement warned that the South China Sea was a maritime area of
\ngreat importance to international traffic, signaling that any
\nworsening of the conflict there would have great international
\nrepercussions.<\/p>\n
On 18 March, the ASEAN Foreign Ministers expressed their
\n\"serious concern\" over China's occupation of Mischief Reef and
\ncalled \"for an early resolution of the problem\". The Foreign
\nMinisters called on all parties \"to remain faithful to the Manila
\nDeclaration on the South China Sea\". This \"solidarity\" was an
\nimportant signal to China that ASEAN was sticking together on
\nthis issue despite the Singapore-Philippine fracas over the maid
\nissue.<\/p>\n
The next reaction came from the United States. Traditionally
\nthe United States had always pledged neutrality with regard to
\nthe problem in the South China Sea, as was the case during the
\nearly phase of the Mischief Reef problem.<\/p>\n
Yet, on May 10, under the leadership of Dr. Josephy Nye, a
\nsenior State Department official, the United States made its
\nstrongest statement on the South China Sea, putting China on
\nnotice that her \"creeping annexations\" will no longer be
\ntolerated.<\/p>\n
This also coincided with a growing belligerency in the White
\nHouse and Congress against China. The statement warned that \"the
\nUnited States is concerned that a pattern of unilateral actions
\nand reactions in the South China Sea has increased tensions in
\nthat region\".<\/p>\n
It also reaffirmed that \"the United States strongly opposes
\nthe use of threat or force to resolve competing claims and urges
\nall claimants to exercise restraint and to avoid destabilizing
\nactions\".<\/p>\n
The statement also clearly sign-posted American interest in
\nthe region by stating that \"maintaining freedom of navigation is
\na fundamental interest of the United States. Unhindered
\nnavigation by all ships and aircraft in the South China Sea is
\nessential for the peace and prosperity of the entire Asia-Pacific
\nregion, including the United States\".<\/p>",
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