The greatest threat to Taiwan in a war scenario with China is not\nsolely the success of the People\u2019s Liberation Army (PLA) landing on its\nshores. The more decisive risk may emerge when the systems inside the\nisland stop working: the power grid goes down, the internet is\ndisrupted, communication cables are severed, fuel distribution stalls,\nand military units lose contact with the command centre.<\/p>\n
Taiwan itself has begun testing this possibility more concretely. In\nthe Han Kuang war games in August 2026, the government for the first\ntime deliberately slowed mobile internet access in several areas to\nsimulate conditions when civilian communications are disrupted by war.\nThe exercise also tested the ability of civilian institutions to\ncontinue functioning amid a simultaneous crisis.<\/p>\n
The simulation highlighted a concern that is increasingly prominent\nin Taiwan\u2019s defence strategy. A country does not have to lose all of its\nterritory first to experience paralysis. If electricity, communications,\nlogistics and command structures can be severed simultaneously, the\nability to resist can deteriorate even when most of the military and\nweaponry remain intact.<\/p>\n
An analysis of Taiwan\u2019s defence written from the perspective of the\nUnited States special operations community assesses that advanced\nweaponry and precision strikes are indeed important for slowing an\nenemy. However, these capabilities cannot replace the need for a\nsocietal structure capable of enduring when the island experiences total\nphysical and communications isolation.<\/p>\n
The issue is becoming more critical because Taiwan\u2019s defence and\neconomic ties with the United States continue to strengthen. The top US\ndiplomat in Taipei, Raymond Greene, said on Monday (31\/8\/2026) that\nWashington\u2019s relationship with Taiwan has \u2018never been stronger\u2019,\nespecially as cooperation between the two sides deepens in the high-tech\nand advanced manufacturing sectors.<\/p>\n
However, close ties with Washington do not erase Taiwan\u2019s\ngeographical problem if war actually breaks out.<\/p>\n
Taiwan has long relied on the porcupine strategy. The concept aims to\nmake the island a target too expensive to attack through the purchase of\nasymmetric, mobile and relatively difficult-to-destroy weapons.<\/p>\n
Harpoon missiles, HIMARS, upgrades to Patriot systems, drones and\nvarious advanced combat platforms are part of this approach. Washington\nis also encouraging Taipei to develop capabilities that can destroy an\nattacking fleet before it reaches the coastline.<\/p>\n
However, critics of the strategy remind that Taiwan is not merely an\nartillery platform in the middle of the sea. Taiwan is a society with a\npower grid, hospitals, telecommunications, ports, transport, food\nwarehouses, fuel distribution and a bureaucracy that must all continue\nto function after the first missile is fired.<\/p>\n
Taiwan\u2019s problem is fundamentally different from Ukraine\u2019s. Ukraine\nhas land borders with NATO member states, including Poland, Slovakia and\nRomania. Weapons, ammunition, radios, medical supplies and various\nequipment can still be sent overland without having to penetrate\nairspace or waters controlled by Russia.<\/p>\n
Taiwan has no land borders at all. The island is separated from\nmainland China by about 100 miles of open water. If Beijing is able to\nimpose an effective blockade through warships, air power, anti-ship\nmissiles and air defence systems, Taiwan\u2019s entire operational space\ncould potentially be closed off.<\/p>", "url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/china-hasnt-landed-taiwan-could-be-paralysed-first-1788162743", "image": "" }, "sponsor": "Okusi Associates", "sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com" }