China cautious about Taiwan for now<\/p>\n
By Ellis Joffe<\/p>\n
ANN ARBOR, Michigan, United States: China will attack the
\nisland it regards as a rebel province only if Taiwan's leaders
\ndeclare independence formally and separate irrevocably from the
\nmainland.<\/p>\n
A number of compulsions drive China's leaders: nationalism,
\nthe link between Taiwan and their political legitimacy, relations
\nbetween conservatives and reformers in the Chinese leadership and
\nthe military's stand.<\/p>\n
If Taiwan made a formal break, China's leaders would not be
\nable to tolerate the affront to national honor and the challenge
\nto sovereignty. A military response would probably come quickly.<\/p>\n
China's leaders would also not tolerate Taiwan's indefinite
\nrejection of Beijing's demands for negotiations on the basis of
\nthe \"one-China\" principle.<\/p>\n
But in this case, the Chinese could postpone action until they
\nare ready.<\/p>\n
If they decided to attack, the damage to China's economic
\ndevelopment, international standing and regional relations would
\nbe incalculable. Given such consequences, they would settle for
\nnothing less than total achievement of their objectives.<\/p>\n
In contrast to previous crises over Taiwan, these would
\npresumably be unlimited: to bring about the unconditional
\nsurrender of Taiwan's leaders to China's demands, or to conquer
\nthe island and eliminate its leaders. Military courses of action
\nwould be tailored to such ends.<\/p>\n
Only three options seem feasible: blockading Taiwan's sea-
\nlanes, missile attacks and amphibious invasion.<\/p>\n
China has to assume that the United States will intervene.<\/p>\n
First, because of Washington's dispatch of two carrier groups
\nto the vicinity of Taiwan in 1996, which ended China's menacing
\nmissile tests around the island and defused the crisis.<\/p>\n
Second, because of the NATO bombardment of Yugoslavia in the
\nKosovo crisis, which Beijing still sees as being driven by
\nAmerica's quest to become the world superpower.<\/p>\n
If China took military action against Taiwan, it would not do
\nso believing that it could deter U.S. intervention. Drawing a
\nlesson from the NATO attack on Yugoslavia, it would calculate
\nthat it could withstand limited bombardment by the U.S., which
\nwould be restrained by its allies and public opinion.<\/p>\n
All of China's options contain a high degree of uncertainty. A
\nblockade could involve submarine attacks and stopping ships
\nphysically or deterring them by mining sea-lanes, or threatening
\nto fire missiles.<\/p>\n
The effects of such actions would certainly undermine Taiwan's
\neconomy, or even destroy it if enforced effectively for a long
\nperiod. What is uncertain is the ability of the Chinese navy and
\nair force to sustain a blockade.<\/p>\n
Missile strikes would devastate Taiwan's strategic centers and
\ncause heavy suffering. One uncertainty would be the U.S.
\nresponse. Another would be the resolve of Taiwan's population.<\/p>\n
An amphibious invasion is unrealistic now because of China's
\nmilitary deficiencies, Taiwan's strong defense posture and U.S.
\npower.<\/p>\n
The Chinese armed forces are training for such an invasion.
\nMilitary commanders are acquiring modern weapons systems designed
\nto increase sea-lift capabilities and upgrade air and naval
\nsupport. But it will take a decade or so before the Chinese are
\nreasonably ready to undertake such a vast operation.<\/p>\n
The most likely option seems to be missile strikes. It is,
\nhowever, extremely risky. China cannot afford to fail. Once it
\nbegins such strikes, it will have to continue until Taiwan
\nsurrendered.<\/p>\n
If the combination of Taiwan's determination and U.S.
\nintervention precludes an early surrender, Beijing will have to
\nextend bombardment until it wreaks havoc on the population and
\ndestroyed the island.<\/p>\n
Even if it can pull this off, the price will be enormous.<\/p>\n
Pending major advances in its capabilities, the Chinese
\nmilitary is not likely to recommend large-scale operations. It
\nwill threaten to use force and might carry out low-intensity
\nactions to back up the threats.<\/p>\n
But it will stop short of starting a war that would be open-
\nended and for which the Chinese armed forces are not ready.<\/p>\n
That is the logical conclusion. If, however, China feels
\nintolerably provoked by the political moves of Taiwan's
\nleadership, logic could not be counted on to prevail.<\/p>\n
The writer, a professor of Chinese studies at the Hebrew
\nUniversity of Jerusalem and currently on leave at the University
\nof Michigan, contributed this comment to the International Herald
\nTribune.<\/p>\n
-- The Straits Times\/Asia News Network<\/p>", "url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/china-cautious-about-taiwan-for-now-1447893297", "image": "" }, "sponsor": "Okusi Associates", "sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com" }