China aims to improve ties with ASEAN<\/p>\n
By Rizal Sukma<\/p>\n
JAKARTA (JP): Chinese Prime Minister Li Peng's recent visit to
\nMalaysia and Singapore marked a further attempt by Beijing to
\nforge closer ties with ASEAN countries.<\/p>\n
The visit provided a good opportunity for China to explain its
\nrole and policies in Southeast Asia, in particular, and the Asia-
\nPacific, in general.<\/p>\n
In Singapore, for example, Li once again maintained that the
\nso-called \"China threat\" theory was baseless. China has also put
\nforward another proposal for joint cooperation in the Spratley
\nIslands. These developments, if sustained, will be welcomed by
\nthe Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries.<\/p>\n
Despite such assurances, however, two main challenges remain
\nin future efforts to improve ASEAN-China relations.<\/p>\n
1. How to deal with elements of \"inconsistency\" and
\n\"uncertainty\" in China's foreign behavior, especially with regard
\nto territorial conflicts in the South China Sea<\/p>\n
2. How to address the question of Taiwan, either within ASEAN
\nor in the wider framework of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).<\/p>\n
The first challenge poses a delicate problem for the way ASEAN
\ndeals with China's behavior in the South China Sea and how the
\nassociation attempts to create a more predictable regional order
\nin the post-Cold War Southeast Asia.<\/p>\n
The second challenge has wider implications as it would affect
\nthe future course of ASEAN-China relations and determine the
\nfuture role of the association in the ARF. It poses a real
\nproblem for ASEAN's role as \"the primary driving force\" in the
\nARF process.<\/p>\n
The South China Sea disputes would be the first \"issue area\"
\ndirectly affected by the inconsistency and uncertainty in China's
\nforeign behavior.<\/p>\n
Due to the importance of national sovereignty and territorial
\nintegrity for the Chinese leaders, it is likely that the search
\nfor a peaceful solution to the South China Sea disputes would
\ncontinue at present pace and, therefore, present another
\nprotracted problem for ASEAN to handle.<\/p>\n
Based on its experience in seeking solutions to the Cambodian
\nconflict, in which China was involved albeit in a less direct
\nmanner, ASEAN is all too familiar with how such a conflict
\nexposed its own weaknesses.<\/p>\n
The Cambodian conflict has demonstrated how difficult it was
\nfor ASEAN to deal with a regional security problem on a common
\npolicy basis. It also demonstrated the difficulty that ASEAN must
\nface when it tackles the question of how best to respond to
\nChina's role in the region.<\/p>\n
More importantly, the Cambodian conflict revealed the limit of
\nASEAN's capacity to play a moral role.<\/p>\n
The South China Sea conflict, especially due to the
\nsensitivity of the issue and the presence of military elements,
\nwill be a more delicate problem than the Cambodian conflict.<\/p>\n
There is no guarantee that a quick solution, through the use
\nof force, would be viewed as a non-option for parties in the
\ndispute.<\/p>\n
In this regard, China is seen as the main party which has the
\ntendency to move into that direction and use force to assert its
\nclaims in the area.<\/p>\n
The incident between China and the Philippines in early 1995,
\nover the status of the Mischief Reef, sent a clear sign that
\nBeijing had changed its approach. This suggested that Beijing was
\nno longer hesitant to make military moves against other
\nclaimants.<\/p>\n
Another area of concern for ASEAN is how far the strategy of
\nbilateral negotiations, currently employed by China, will divide
\nASEAN's unity and cohesiveness.<\/p>\n
China has repeatedly attempted to negotiate with other
\nclaimants on a bilateral basis. The most recent bilateral talks
\nwere held between China and Vietnam in April 1995. Such
\ndevelopments, however, could present a new problem for ASEAN.<\/p>\n
It is not unlikely that Vietnam, which recently became a
\nmember of ASEAN, might be seen in some circles as already having
\na dividing effect on the association. While at the same time
\nVietnam may be seen as trying to manipulate its membership for
\nits own narrow interests vis-a-vis China.<\/p>\n
In this regard, it seems that China understands very well the
\nproblem confronting other claimants in the South China Sea
\ndisputes. However, ASEAN claimants are more prepared than China
\nto accept a multilateral approach to the disputes.<\/p>\n
Beijing seems to recognize that there might also be some
\nwariness among its rivals that such an approach would force them
\nto grant public recognition over the rights of others in the
\narea.<\/p>\n
Indeed, ASEAN is well aware of such a possibility and it has
\ntaken measures to deal with the problem accordingly, especially
\nat a multilateral level.<\/p>\n
For example, ASEAN has always tried to persuade China to
\nrespect the association-proclaimed codes of conduct -- such as
\nZone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) and the Treaty of
\nAmity and Cooperation (TAC) -- as the norms, values, and
\nprinciples around which the interests of all parties should
\nconverge.<\/p>\n
At the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) in August 1995, ASEAN
\nforeign ministers issued a Declaration on the South China Sea
\nconflict calling all parties to \"refrain from taking actions that
\ncould destabilize the region ...\"<\/p>\n
More specifically, through Indonesia's informal initiative,
\nASEAN has also begun to bring China into a dialog forum which
\nspecifically explores the positive ways to manage the disputes.<\/p>\n
Through such efforts, ASEAN clearly hoped to induce a certain
\ndegree of predictability into the behavior of each party.
\nHowever, China's attitude and responses toward such ASEAN
\ninitiatives seem to have made ASEAN's role more difficult in its
\nattempts to make the regional political relations more
\npredictable.<\/p>\n
First, ASEAN has always been frustrated by inconsistency in
\nChina's behavior. Second, China remains reluctant to use
\nmultilateral forums in seeking solutions to the South China Sea
\ndisputes and ignored calls by ASEAN to denounce the use of force
\nin solving the disputes.<\/p>\n
With regard to the Taiwan question, the main problem for ASEAN
\nstems from growing signs of an independence push among the
\nTaiwanese leaders and people.<\/p>\n
Since the end of the Chiang era in Taiwan, President Lee Teng-
\nhui -- a native Taiwanese who came to power in 1988 after the
\ndeath of president Chiang Ching-kuo -- has shown a tendency to
\nharbor a new vision for his country.<\/p>\n
Tired of being a non-legitimate actor in the international
\ncommunity, Taiwan opted for a more aggressive foreign policy
\ncommensurate with its tremendous economic achievements and
\nstrength.<\/p>\n
Taiwan now pursues a new policy of t'an hsing wai-chiao
\n(flexible diplomacy) to create a larger diplomatic space for
\nitself and play a more important international role. Through this
\nnew policy, Taiwan sought international recognition as a
\npolitical entity separate from mainland China.<\/p>\n
The initial results of Taiwan's new policy in Southeast Asia
\nhave been alarming for Beijing. Since the 1980s and early 1990s,
\ncontacts between ASEAN and Taiwan officials, either at
\nministerial or above ministerial levels, have been growing
\nsignificantly.<\/p>\n
The diplomatic contacts have also been more substantial than
\nin any previous period. During the 1986\/1991 period, for example,
\nTaiwan's direct investment in five ASEAN countries (not Brunei or
\nVietnam) amounted to US$11.7 billion.<\/p>\n
In this regard, Beijing resented the fact that Taiwan had been
\nable to use its economic advantage for extracting political and
\ndiplomatic mileage in this region.<\/p>\n
ASEAN would face a difficult problem if Taiwan really declared
\nitself an independent state separate from mainland China and
\ndemanded recognition from them. This would be ASEAN's worst
\nnightmare.<\/p>\n
There has not been any major discussion among ASEAN members on
\nhow it should respond to such a possibility. The association's
\nattitude has been to leave any decision about the Taiwan issue to
\nthe parties involved. Moreover, ASEAN continues to see the
\nproblem in terms of the \"One China Policy\" and the fact that
\n\"Taiwan is part of China\".<\/p>\n
Given such possibilities, ASEAN's position in the ARF would be
\na difficult one. On the one hand, ASEAN clearly expects the ARF
\nto be a vehicle through which China's positive participation
\ncould be assured.<\/p>\n
For ASEAN, China's participation is a paramount priority for
\nany attempt at building a stable regional order. On the other
\nhand, the rise of the Taiwan question with its inevitable
\nimplications for ASEAN shows that Taiwan is a significant
\nsecurity problem which affects the stability of the Asia-Pacific
\nregion.<\/p>\n
For example, during Beijing's military intimidation of Taiwan
\nin early 1996, it was reported that Taiwan urged Indonesia,
\nSingapore, and the Philippines to provide military cooperation if
\nthere was an outbreak of war (Yomiuri Shimbun as quoted in
\nRepublika, March 12, 1996).<\/p>\n
This demonstrates further that the question of Taiwan is not
\nan issue that ASEAN can easily avoid. Indeed, the Taiwan question
\nserves as the most visible issue linking the security of
\nSoutheast Asia with that of Northeast Asia.<\/p>\n
How, then, can ASEAN-China relations be improved in the
\nfuture?<\/p>\n
Even though both \"China problems\" discussed above will become
\npressing issues in China-ASEAN relations, it does not mean that
\nboth sides have no positive ground upon which a better and more
\nconstructive relationship can be forged.<\/p>\n
Since the end of the Cold War, China's general attitude in
\nhelping to create a stable relations in Asia-Pacific has been
\nconstructive.<\/p>\n
China, for example, has been an active and positive
\nparticipant in the multilateral dialog process aimed at fostering
\npolitical and diplomatic cooperation in the region.<\/p>\n
More specifically, China has been an active player in the ARF.
\nIt has also been responsive to the idea of greater military
\ntransparency, even though this remains limited.<\/p>\n
The publication of China's \"white defense paper\" in 1995, for
\nexample, is clearly a promising sign. Even though the content of
\nthe paper was criticized for its lack of transparency, it clearly
\ndemonstrates that China is beginning to feel more comfortable
\nwith the habit of dialog which will become the basis of a
\nmultilateral security arrangement in the region.<\/p>\n
There have also been other examples which suggest China's
\ngrowing conformity with the regional trend. All in all, ASEAN-
\nChina relations will definitely undergo significant improvement
\nif the current trend of Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs)
\nbetween the two parties continue to evolve.<\/p>\n
The problem now is that ASEAN would like to see an
\nacceleration of change in that direction.<\/p>\n
The writer is a researcher at the Center for Strategic and
\nInternational Studies, Jakarta.<\/p>",
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