Chicken as a crisis indicator<\/p>\n
By Hermawan Sulistyo<\/p>\n
JAKARTA (JP): The country is still vulnerable to rioting and
\nsocial unrest due to the worsening political economy.<\/p>\n
Besides political aspects, the deterioration of the economy
\nsince the middle of 1997 has provided conditions conducive to the
\noccurrence of explosive riots or anarchy.<\/p>\n
Other indicators more familiar for political economists,
\nranging from a larger pattern of consumption to decreasing
\npurchasing power, can also be added.<\/p>\n
The political economy of the people, therefore, can be used to
\nmeasure the vulnerability of society to unrest, anarchy and other
\nviolent social dislocations. This rule can be called "the
\npolitical economy of chicken".<\/p>\n
In the 1970s, for example, chicken was still regarded as a
\nluxury food because it was consumed only by middle and upper
\nclass families. In the 1980s, the arrival of the massive modern
\npoultry industry resulted in much cheaper prices of the meat,
\nmaking it affordable for lower class families. But in 1998, when
\nthe economic crisis intensified, many poultry companies went
\nbankrupt. Before closing down their operations, these companies,
\nin early 1998, sold their chicken at very low prices. For people
\ncelebrating Idul Fitri or Lebaran festivities after the Muslim
\nRamadhan fasting month, cheap chicken was a blessing.<\/p>\n
In several places such as East Java, chicken sold at one-third
\nof its previous price levels. This fact alone temporarily
\ncontributed to calming the political climate in early 1998, and
\nadded to the already subdued political situation since the people
\nwere restraining themselves during the fasting month. But, as it
\nbecame clear later, this was a pseudo-calmed political climate.<\/p>\n
After Lebaran, which fell in 1998 on the last day of January,
\nthe scarce supply of chicken drove its prices to double and then
\ntriple. With money having been drawn upon for Lebaran, prices of
\nchicken were now unreachable. With no understanding of what was
\nbehind the price hike, not to mention the price hikes for all
\nother consumer goods and services as shown by uncontrollable
\ninflation rates, frustration and dissatisfaction mounted.<\/p>\n
Fanned by the increasing political tension, the potential for
\na riot was then only a matter of time and logical consequence of
\nthis explosive situation. What happened later was riots and
\nviolent conflicts. Without any understanding of this "political
\neconomy of chicken", it is impossible to assess mass upheavals
\nthroughout the year of 1998. This is not to deny political causes
\nthat in fact played a pivotal contributing role to social
\ndislocations.<\/p>\n
In early 1999, the situation was similar to the previous year.
\nWith most poultry companies already bankrupt, egg production was
\nvery low, forcing the government to import egg. The increasing
\ndemand for chicken meat and egg during Lebaran on Jan. 19 could
\nnot be met by the domestic supply.<\/p>\n
By a normal equation of the "political economy of chicken and
\negg", the society's resilience was vulnerable immediately after
\nthe Lebaran. With almost no public savings left, one week after
\nLebaran was the last bastion of economic resilience. This was
\nparticularly true for certain segments of occupational workers,
\nsmall-scale traders and those in the service industry.
\nNonagricultural cities and regions were then the most vulnerable
\nareas for social dislocations, with riots as their most dangerous
\ntype.<\/p>\n
Also by a normal standard of the "political economy of chicken
\nand egg", agriculture-based communities were less vulnerable than
\nthose of nonagricultural areas. There was hitherto only a few
\nrecorded cases of rural or farming unrest. But it was an overly
\npseudo-calm situation. Starting from Dec. 1, 1998, the government
\nstopped its subsidies for domestic sales of fertilizer and costs
\nfor rice planting consequently doubled.<\/p>\n
December 1998 was the planting season, so that an increase in
\nfertilizer price could normally cause peasant unrest. Many, if
\nnot most, rice farmers, however, still held stockpiles of
\nfertilizer from the previous planting season. Dissatisfaction and
\nresentment were growing but still under control. Only small-scale
\nriots broke out here and there -- with the two best known cases
\ntaking place in small towns in Central Java.<\/p>\n
April 1999 is the next planting season of rice, after the
\nharvest season in March. With no increase in the government-set
\nfloor price of rice, it will be hard for rice farmers to earn
\nprofits from their harvest. Social unrest in rural areas and
\nrice-producing areas can thus be expected to take place after
\nApril.<\/p>\n
The potential for riots in rural areas, however, is not the
\nsame as in nonagricultural areas. Different structures of land
\nownership, production efficiency and consumption patterns all
\ncontribute to the different levels of societal resilience. Some
\nareas are more vulnerable to social unrest than others. The
\nresult is a more sporadic pattern of small-scale rioting, unrest,
\nanarchy and even a "merely" increasing crime rate. In a
\nlongitudinal framework, the rural unrest could continue for
\nsometime until the next harvest season, which will fall in July.<\/p>\n
This analysis of people's political economy might be too
\noptimistic. Social resilience is in fact not as strong as
\nexpected. A few weeks before Lebaran, riots occurred in several
\ncities and areas -- like Lhokseumawe in Aceh, as well as
\nTangerang and Karawang in West Java, to mention just a few. One
\nmay argue that the riots were incited by provocateurs and thus
\nthe causes and triggering factors were political rather than
\nanything else.<\/p>\n
But without social, political and economic conditions
\nconducive to the eruption of social dislocation, it would be
\nimpossible to spark a riot. The triggers were, therefore, less
\nimportant. They might be political in nature but could also be
\nonly a brawl between kids, like what happened in Kalibata, South
\nJakarta, recently. Even in remote areas, far from Jakarta, such
\nas Ambon in Maluku and North Sulawesi, riots broke out
\nunexpectedly.<\/p>\n
Thus, based on the "political economy of chicken and eggs"
\napproach, we are facing a grim condition in the near future.
\nUnder this condition, if the coming general election ever fails,
\nit will be caused more by popular unrest rather than elite
\nconflicts and fragmentation.<\/p>\n
The writer is executive director of the Jakarta-based Research
\nInstitute for Democracy and Peace (RIDeP).<\/p>",
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