Chechnya and Russian polls<\/p>\n
When the war in Chechnya had just started in December 1994, I
\nwrote a letter to The Jakarta Post entitled Legacy of an Empire,
\ncalling on the Russian government to grant Chechnya and other
\nautonomous republics the right to a confederation status,
\nincluding the right to secede. I pointed out that by freeing
\nthese predominantly non-Russian ethnic republics, particularly
\nsuch important territories of Tatarstan and Bashkortostan in the
\nVolga-Ural region, the Russians would be relieved of
\napproximately 17 million largely alien and often hostile
\nsubjects. I further argued that these autonomous republics should
\nhave the right to withdraw like the union republics of the former
\nSoviet Union, such as Kazakhstan and Belarus, because the
\ndistinction between the two types of republics was not
\nfundamental and was in fact was quite arbitrary.<\/p>\n
How naive I was. Now, 19 months later, the war in Chechnya in
\nthe northern Caucasus is still dragging on and the autonomy that
\nhas been granted to the various republics is yet to include the
\nright to a free self-determination or sovereignty. Yet, while
\nRussia is opposed to the cessation of Chechnya and Tatarstan, it
\ntacitly or even overtly supported the separatist movements of the
\nBosnian Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the ethnic Russians in
\nMoldova and the Abkhassians in Georgia. Obviously, Russia's
\ninterference in these instances has been dictated by selfish
\ninterests rather than by any democratic or moral principle.<\/p>\n
It seems that as far as the Chechens and the other non-ethnic
\nRussians are concerned, it will make little difference whether
\nthe runoff -- to be held on July 3, 1996 -- is won by President
\nYeltsin or his nationalist-communist rival Gennady Zyuganov. It
\nis difficult to predict which of the two contenders will win. On
\none hand, the fact that Russia is so different from the West in
\nterms of history, culture and even religion could drive most
\nRussians to vote for Zyuganov's group in the Duma (parliament's
\nlower house) election in December 1995. Indeed, he is often
\nconsidered to be equally responsible for Russia's political and
\neconomic humiliation at the hand of Western hegemonic ambitions.
\nOn the other hand, the intensive maneuverings and conspiracies
\nundertaken by the president in the past two weeks or so may
\nattract a large enough number of votes, which could result in
\neither candidate winning by a narrow margin. The basic
\nuncertainty, however, is probably caused by the notoriously
\ncapricious and unpredictable nature of the Russian electorate
\nthemselves.<\/p>\n
One thing seems certain, though. Irrespective of who wins the
\nnext election, Russia's foreign policy is likely to be
\nincreasingly more assertive than it has been in recent years,
\nevoking in the process perceived visions of Russia's glorious
\npast. Under these circumstances, such issues as the independence
\nof Chechnya and the other autonomous republics may have to be
\nrelegated to the limbo of history for the time being, unless, of
\ncourse, international pressure could be brought to bear to induce
\nthe Russians to relent.<\/p>\n
MASLI ARMAN<\/p>\n
Jakarta<\/p>", "url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/chechnya-and-russian-polls-1447893297", "image": "" }, "sponsor": "Okusi Associates", "sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com" }