Chaos threatens June 7 polls<\/p>\n
By Hermawan Sulistyo<\/p>\n
JAKARTA (JP): The potential for further riots and other social
\ndisturbances, complicated by the current cloud of political
\nuncertainty, has made some observers doubt whether the general
\nelection, scheduled for June 7, can in fact be held.<\/p>\n
The elections are not only threatened by direct political
\ncauses, such as party affiliations, but also social turmoil and
\nthe aspirations of the people.<\/p>\n
So, what implications do the opinions of the often neglected
\nmasses have on the elite and palace politics? Or, how will
\nsociety's stability effect the general election and its immediate
\nconsequences?<\/p>\n
To answer these questions, the six following scenarios may
\nserve as examples. If society is adequately resilient to chaos,
\nand can maintain order and survive throughout 1999, the most
\noptimistic prediction is for the general election to go ahead
\nwith major hiccups. Failing this, however, a number of other
\nscenarios are possible.<\/p>\n
In the first scenario, the general election is smoothly
\norganized, with monitoring systems working well. The result will
\nbe a democratic structure of power. In this scenario, there will
\nbe a relatively balanced sharing of power among competing
\npolitical parties, with no majority in the House of
\nRepresentatives.<\/p>\n
The four parties expected to get the most votes -- the
\nIndonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI Perjuangan),
\nNational Awakening Party (PKB), National Mandate Party (PAN), and
\nGolkar -- share more or less the same portion of support, with no
\nsubstantial disparity shown in opinion polls. Golkar's future is
\nthe most difficult to predict. The party with immense funding and
\nthe broadest infrastructure has lately been experiencing
\nturbulent internal conflicts.<\/p>\n
With no single party gaining a majority -- a situation similar
\nto the 1955 general election, the fairest in Indonesian history
\n-- the parties must work to make concessions and alliances.<\/p>\n
The Armed Forces (ABRI) representatives in the House will take
\na determining role in shifting the balance of power. ABRI's 38
\nallocated seats, about 7 percent of the total 550, guarantees
\nthis force almost as much power as each of the big four. If ABRI
\nsides with the victor, as in the past, the problem of choosing
\nthe next leaders of the country will be simplified.<\/p>\n
The new president and vice president could be a logical
\nconsequence of an alliance among parties. In political alliances,
\npower sharing is necessary, and thus leaders of big parties such
\nas Megawati Soekarnoputri and Amien Rais, may have the chance to
\nlead the country as a team. Leaving aside improbable alliances
\nsuch as between, say, PAN and PKB -- although political interests
\nare always changing -- various pairings in the nations leadership
\nare possible. We could have Amien-Megawati, Megawati-Amien,
\nMegawati-Wiranto, or other such combinations.<\/p>\n
In the second scenario, the general election will not be held
\nsmoothly. It would be marked by violations of election laws,
\nplanning flaws, dissatisfaction among parties and voters, and a
\ngeneral lack of democracy. The result would be an ongoing
\nstruggle among political parties.<\/p>\n
For the presidential election, probably no candidate from any
\nparty, or even the army, could collect the minimum necessary
\nvotes to seize the presidential office. In such circumstances,
\nand considering the general reluctance to ever admit political
\ndefeat, the only compromise is that the candidate \"can't be
\nours\", but likewise, \"won't be yours\".<\/p>\n
In this case, someone without any political attachments or
\naffiliations, has more chance of being accepted by all competing
\nparties. Perhaps Nurcholish Madjid will have the chance to be
\nthis compromise. Such a candidate could also be someone with less
\n\"political flavor\", although he or she could be a party person,
\nsuch as Sri Sultan Hamengkubuwono (Golkar) or Ichlasul Amal
\n(PAN). But a candidate could also be a military man, such as
\nSusilo Bambang Yudhoyono.<\/p>\n
The third scenario is that the general election is held but
\nfails to perform as a means of democratic process. The situation
\ncould be chaotic, marked by unending conflicts between groups
\nwithin the elite and the populace.<\/p>\n
The best possible solution would be for the government to
\ndeclare a \"quasi state of emergency\" and make it clear that the
\nregime is indeed a transitional government. The only thing to do
\nthen would be to hold another election. However, there is no
\nguarantee that the next election would proceed any better than
\nthe last. This situation would definitely need a strong leader to
\nprevent the country from crumbling.<\/p>\n
The fourth scenario is that the general election does not take
\nplace as scheduled. The military then takes over the government
\nand runs the state in a junta-type rule. Many pro-democracy
\nactivists believe that the possibility of a military take-over is
\nhigh. One reason for this is the view that the widespread riots
\nand conflict are proof of the inability of a civilian regime to
\nmaintain order and stability, and thus gives the military the
\nchance, and the rationale, to step in and take over the
\ngovernment.<\/p>\n
For those presaging this scenario, the reported involvement of
\nsome military personnel in several riots is clear evidence of the
\nmilitary's intention to create tension and chaos in order to
\nhijack power. But ABRI has repeatedly denied this possibility. In
\naddition, there is little probability that civilian technocrats
\nwould support a governing junta. And without civilian
\ntechnocrats, there is no way the military can overcome the
\neconomic crisis. The international community is definitely not in
\nfavor of a junta either.<\/p>\n
In the fifth scenario, due to various reasons, particularly
\nintensifying social unrest, the general election is delayed.
\nAlthough the 1999 election is not realized, there is a positive
\npush toward holding a later election when the situation returns
\nto normal. Again, in this situation the military has greater room
\nto maneuver. By taking an active role, a now more consolidated
\nArmed Forces would lead the process toward a consensus on the
\ndelayed general election. But this scenario lacks rationale. A
\ndelayed election will increase political uncertainty, which in
\nturn will worsen the social and economic condition.<\/p>\n
The final scenario sees chaos and anarchy continuing and
\nworsening, with high crime rates and social disruptions. Some
\nobservers, including the respected Abdurrahman Wahid (known as
\nGus Dur) even believe that a revolution is not an impossibility
\nin the near future. However, revolution here seems a faint
\npossibility, for the current situation lacks some common
\nprerequisites: notable are the absence of an ideology and avant
\ngarde leaders and supporters. But this does not rule out a future
\nrevolution altogether.<\/p>\n
Whichever scenario is closest to reality, one thing is clear,
\nthat societal forces will have a pivotal role in directing the
\ncourse of political events. Yet unfortunately, this factor is
\noften neglected and ignored by most politicians and members of
\nthe elite in their power play; it is regarded as a constant in
\nthe power equation. Only when riots break out will many
\npoliticians question the seemingly inexplicable factors beyond
\ntheir palace politics.<\/p>\n
Dr. Hermawan Sulistyo is executive director of Research
\nInstitute for Democracy and Peace (RIDeP).<\/p>",
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