Chaos comes of leaders' failure<\/p>\n
By Christopher Lingle<\/p>\n
DENPASAR, Bali (JP): Images of bloody street confrontations in
\nIndonesia provide an unavoidable impression that the country may
\nbe slipping into chaos. With the removal of the strong hand of
\nPresident Soeharto at the helm, there are several interpretations
\nof why the country moved so quickly from order to disorder.<\/p>\n
It could be claimed that it is simply a matter of the strains
\nof the economic crises that has led to these outbreaks. Yet
\nhealthy democracies seldom see the breakdown in law and order
\nthat is being threatened.<\/p>\n
A reversal of cause and effect might provide a better under
\nstanding of Indonesia's unhappy experiences. This alternative
\nview suggests that the institutions of Asian democracy and
\npolicies justified by Asian values have retarded the transition
\nto more modern systems of governance. Decades of autocratic or
\nauthoritarian rule under the guise of democracy have kept Asians
\nfrom participating in self-determination. Distrust of the legal
\nand judicial systems as well as finding their voices at the
\nballot box to be ineffective have made manning street barricades
\nseem a logical step. Unfortunately, safety valves like organiza
\ntions of civil society that monitor or limit government power
\ntended to be systematically aborted or allowed to survive only if
\nthey serve the ends of the regimes.<\/p>\n
Either through action or deed, it is clear that many leaders
\nin the region believe that their citizens are not suited to the
\nrough and tumble uncertainty of democracy. These same Asian lead
\ners have promoted Asian values or insisted on the viability of a
\nregional variant of Asian democracy. Reflecting a mixture of
\npaternalism and cynicism, this racially derisive view portrayed
\nAsians as incapable or unworthy of being involved in decisions
\nthat affected their destinies. Happily these views have
\nthemselves became a casualty of the economic crises affecting the
\nregion since most supporters have become silent in the wake of
\nthe ongoing turmoil.<\/p>\n
Asian values and Asian democracy were predicated upon several
\ndubious premises. Both relied upon an assertion that Asians
\npossessed an unshakeable preference for order that justified
\nlimiting their freedoms. In turn, the individual was subordinated
\nto the community and individual rights were seen as foreign
\nintrusions. It is no accident that this interpretation
\nconveniently supported the sort of autocratic, single-party
\nstates and long-serving rulers that have dominated East Asian
\npolitics.<\/p>\n
Several myths were promoted about life and business in
\nIndonesia and much of the rest of East Asia were supported by
\nthese political conditions. First, many believed that (at least a
\nlittle bit of) authoritarianism was beneficial in promoting
\neconomic growth. A corollary was the most important determinant
\nof success in business or life was having the right political
\nconnections. These deceptions had resonance when times were good
\nand economies were booming. In the long run, the stark reality is
\nthat authoritarian government are unstable and political
\nconnections provide no protections when speculative bubbles burst
\nor when export markets evaporate.<\/p>\n
Then there was a belief that political rights were less
\nimportant to Asians than were economic conditions. This notion
\nwas based upon a false dichotomy of economic and political free
\ndom. These rights are mutually supportive. Restraints on one will
\nimpact upon the other. In all events, the retreat from politics
\narose from the understanding that the costs of being involved in
\nopposition parties were high and painful while the benefits were
\nlow. Now as economic uncertainty grows, it becomes rational to
\nexpress disfavor with the political status quo since the losses
\nare reduced.<\/p>\n
Current instability in Asia is due to the lack of extensive
\ndemocracy. This will be a problem that will plague more regimes
\nin the future. There are several missing components in so-called
\nAsian democracy. In the first instance, suppression of opposition
\nparties has deprived most Asians of the sort of experience in
\nmultiparty democracy. Without this, it is almost impossible to
\ndevelop a sense of political maturity and self-confidence.<\/p>\n
Similarly, there are few active elements of what is known as
\ncivil society. These are often spontaneous and voluntary group
\nings that emerge to moderate the arbitrary exercise of power.
\nAsian democracy was about politicizing most elements of life that
\nled to high costs of standing up to the abuses of powerful
\nindividuals or governments.<\/p>\n
Another problem is that given the long tenure of specific
\nleaders or the dominance of a single party, it is not surprising
\nthat the judicial systems are not fully independent. Instead of
\nthe rule of law in many Asian countries the law was bent to serve
\nthe purposes of a dominant leader or party.<\/p>\n
Yet the struggle in Asia also reflects an inevitable and
\nuniversal process where the primacy of the collective over the
\nindividual is increasingly seen as obstructive to progress. The
\nhistory of the evolution of social and political institutions of
\nmankind suggests a trend towards arrangements that assign a
\ngreater role to the individual as the basis of community values
\nand a force for positive change.<\/p>\n
In other words, moving from feudalism towards self-ownership
\nis a universal phenomenon. From a macro point of view, this is
\nseen in the widespread acceptance of democracy. Supporting the
\nmicro basis is the development and implementation of individual
\nrights, including property rights to insure the compatibility
\nwith pricing market structures. In the future, successful
\ncommunities will be those that facilitate rather than obstruct
\nthis movement towards a greater role for the individual.<\/p>\n
The transition process that has begun in Indonesia and
\nelsewhere reflects a fundamental shift arising from the conflict
\nbetween universal forces of modernization and embedded conserva
\ntism. However, it does not support the widely discussed images of
\nhidden hands and shadowy conspiracies that are seen as being
\nbehind the violence. It is simpler than that. In sum, unrest and
\npolitical instability in Asia is not so much driven by economic
\ncollapse as it is by leadership failure.<\/p>\n
The writer is a Hong Kong-based independent corporate
\nconsultant and adjunct scholar of the Center for Independent
\nStudies in Sydney who authored The Rise and Decline of the Asian
\nCentury (Seattle: The University of Washington Press, 1998). His
\nE-mail address is: CRL@po.cwru.edu.<\/p>",
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