Changing electoral behavior<\/p>\n
Anton Doni<\/p>\n
In 1955 and thereafter, political scientists believed that
\nIndonesians' political choices were bound solely by ideological
\nties. One's choice was limited to alternatives within his\/her
\nideology: either nationalist, modern Muslim or traditional
\nMuslim. For Indonesians, a shift to another ideology is quite
\ndifficult. If you were a modern Muslim, you tended to choose the
\nMasyumi party. If you had a secular or nationalist orientation,
\nyou chose the Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI), and if you were
\nmore of a traditional Muslim you chose the Nadhlatul Ulama (NU).<\/p>\n
Starting in the late 1960s, the New Order regime abandoned
\nthose old choices, and manufactured new parties for the people to
\nchoose from, requiring them to desert their previous affiliation.
\nThe old symbols of culture-associated parties were suppressed.
\nSome were exchanged for new ones but without the influential
\nfigures.<\/p>\n
While some believed that suppression under the New Order had
\neradicated all the old loyalties, many others believed they were
\nsustained. Especially in the 1999 election, many believed that
\nideological voters were still significant. This belief, to some
\nextent, will therefore hinder real democratic choices in the 2004
\nelection. But what precisely was the magnitude of the loyalty
\nfactor in the 1999 election?<\/p>\n
At a glance, the ideological attachments seemed significant if
\nwe look at the pattern of electoral behavior in some selected
\nprovinces: Central Java, East Java, Bali and Bangka Belitung in
\nSumatra. In Central Java, Bali and Bangka Belitung, the
\nIndonesian Nationalist Party (PNI) won in the 1955 election and
\nthe Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P), a sort of
\nrevived form of the PNI, won in 1999. In East Java, NU won in the
\n1955 election and the National Awakening Party (PKB), the revived
\nform of the NU, took the most votes in East Java in the 1999
\nelection. Without considering that these two winning parties in
\n1999 were similarly aligned with the reformasi movement in their
\ncampaigns, the distribution of political choices would confirm
\nthe perception that ideological commitments are still key
\ndeterminants in voting behavior.<\/p>\n
But, are ideological connections the only motivation for
\nIndonesian voters?<\/p>\n
First, this does appear to be the case in relation to the
\n\"choosing PDI-P\" behavior, but there must be some other issues
\naside from the ideological loyalties. The fact that PDI-P was not
\nthe only choice for those with a nostalgia for PNI, simply
\nconfirms this possibility. In a significant number of provinces
\nthat went to Masyumi in the 1955 election, PDI-P was the choice
\nin 1999. Choosing PDI-P in those regions thus seems to prove that
\nideological attachments are not the only determinant. Something
\nmust have been different. Their number, 11 provinces, is quite
\nsignificant. The provinces; North Sumatra, South Sumatra,
\nLampung, Bengkulu, Riau, Jakarta, West Java, as well as East and
\nCentral Kalimantan all voted for PDI-P in 1999, but Masyumi took
\nthe most votes in 1955 from each.<\/p>\n
Second, with such a history of ideological ties, there is no
\nsingle pattern of voting behavior. Another aspect, in which
\npragmatic considerations were the dominant issues that guided the
\nvoting behavior was also shown by the Indonesian electorate.
\nTaking into account the economic and political context of the
\n1999 election, those ideas must be in relation to the economic
\nand political crisis, bringing to the front the need for economic
\nimprovement, clean government and more freedom.<\/p>\n
Third, rising pragmatic ideas were also confirmed in the fact
\nthat Golkar, the party blamed by the reform movement but a
\npowerful and pragmatic political entity, was still the most
\ninfluential party in 15 provinces: All five provinces in
\nSulawesi, East and West Nusa Tenggara, Papua and West Irian Jaya
\nprovinces, North Maluku, West and South Kalimantan, West Sumatra,
\nRiau and Jambi. Thanks to the limited access to reform voices
\nfrom the student movement in Java, such pragmatic ideas as
\nfreedom and clean government were indeed not the main issue for
\nvoters in those regions. However, the development achievements
\nunder the New Order was what Golkar could exploit as its selling
\npoint to garner votes. Development was, of course at a price, but
\nit is a fact that past ideological attachments have a limit to
\ntheir influence in these regions.<\/p>\n
So how about the 2004 election? Different directions have been
\nindicated in various surveys, with some opinions pointing to a
\npragmatic choice and others saying voters will vote along
\nideological lines. However, if it goes the way of ideology, it
\nwould simply be because the current government has been unable to
\naddress their existing pragmatic needs. Thus, it is a
\nfundamentally a pragmatic way of searching for alternatives in
\nthis environment of poor alternatives.<\/p>\n
If, as it seems from the 1999 results, a more pragmatic
\nelectorate voted as a product of a massive political stimuli by
\nthe reform movement and systematic political manipulation by the
\nNew Order, then the challenge in this current absence of
\nnationwide stimuli will be for a more advanced transformation of
\nthe fertile soil of democracy and development to be reinforced in
\nthis coming 2004 election through various efforts of political
\neducation.<\/p>",
"url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/changing-electoral-behavior-1447893297",
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