Challenges to RI foreign policy<\/p>\n
By Ali Alatas<\/p>\n
This is the second of two articles based on a presentation by
\nthe former minister of foreign affairs at the Aksara Foundation,
\nwhich focuses on the development of an interactive civil society.
\nThe function was held on March 23.<\/p>\n
JAKARTA: The Non-Aligned Movement and other developing
\ncountries, including Indonesia, do acknowledge the basic right
\nand responsibility of the United Nations to help relieve human
\nsuffering.<\/p>\n
However, there is great sensitivity and concern regarding the
\nnotion of circumscribing the principle of state sovereignty as
\nimplied in humanitarian intervention.<\/p>\n
For as succinctly stated by Algeria's president before last
\nyear's UN General Assembly session: \"Sovereignty is our last
\ndefense against the rules of an unequal world\".<\/p>\n
Furthermore, most developing countries are acutely conscious
\nof the fact that they have practically no say in the decision-
\nmaking processes of the UN Security Council nor in the
\nsurveillance of their implementation.<\/p>\n
Some have also argued that to accord legitimacy to a new,
\nglobal doctrine of humanitarian intervention could have grave
\ndestabilizing consequences for a state. Incidents and crises
\ncould be \"created\" or precipitated by elements within societies
\nto seek international attention or provoke foreign interference.<\/p>\n
External forces could initiate or exploit such internal
\nsituations for their own, political ends. Moreover, those
\ncommitting humanitarian intervention will inevitably be from the
\nadvanced countries of the North and those intervened upon will be
\ncountries of the South, thus creating yet another dimension of
\nNorth-South contention and possible allegations of
\nneocolonialism.<\/p>\n
Hence, Indonesia and other Non-Aligned Movement countries are
\nof the view that the fundamental questions posed by this evolving
\ninternational norm in favor of intervention need first to be
\nthoroughly discussed by the international community.<\/p>\n
We would then arrive at consensus on the principles and
\ncriteria, the mandate and guidelines for such intervention, as
\nwell as on the specific circumstances and conditions under which
\nhumanitarian intervention could take place.<\/p>\n
In this effort, Indonesia and Indonesian diplomacy will
\nundoubtedly be expected to play an active role.<\/p>\n
These are two fundamental trends in contemporary international
\nrelations which I believe will test the validity and efficacy of
\nIndonesian diplomacy in the immediate years ahead.<\/p>\n
Of course, there are and will be other challenges to the
\nconduct of our foreign policy in the global arena, e.g. how to
\ncontribute effectively in ensuring the equitable reform and
\ndemocratization of the UN and especially of its Security Council;
\nplus how to maintain our active advocacy and role in disarmament
\nand in international and regional security issues, etc.<\/p>\n
Unfortunately, the available time does not allow us to go
\ndeeper into these aspects. However, I think you will agree with
\nme that success or failure in meeting the above global challenges
\nwill largely depend on how we manage and overcome the more
\nspecific, national challenges confronting Indonesia today.<\/p>\n
Firstly, there is the enormous challenge of economic recovery
\nand restructuring after the devastating crisis of 1997.<\/p>\n
Contrary to other disaster-struck countries like Thailand and
\nSouth Korea, the magnitude and complexity of our efforts at
\nrestructuring and rebuilding the banking and corporate sectors
\nand resuscitating exports and foreign investment flows are
\nfurther exacerbated.<\/p>\n
Indonesia simultaneously will have to continue efforts of
\ndemocratization, good governance, decentralization and regional
\nautonomy, while also trying to redefine the civilian-military
\nrelationship.<\/p>\n
The specific challenge posed to Indonesian foreign policy is
\ntherefore to be able to exert an external diplomacy geared toward
\noptimizing cooperation and support, material as well as
\npolitical, from friendly countries and international
\norganizations, for the success of our financial\/economic recovery
\nprograms and our national development goals -- of course while
\nalways steadfastly abiding by our basic principles of foreign
\npolicy.<\/p>\n
In other words, and as foreign minister Alwi Shihab has
\nstated, economic diplomacy will be the priority task.<\/p>\n
We have done so before, in the 1960s and early 1970s, when we
\nwere recovering from the 1965 disaster. And like before, it is
\nclear that to attain this priority, objective peace and
\nstability, not only domestically but also in the regional and
\ninternational context, are absolutely essential.<\/p>\n
Thus, Indonesia's foreign policy has the parallel task to also
\nsecure a regional and international environment of relative peace
\nand stability, an environment of cooperation and mutual goodwill,
\nwithout which national development and economic recovery will be
\nvery difficult to achieve.<\/p>\n
It is then quite natural that we focus our attention in the
\nfirst place to the countries in our immediate surroundings: East
\nand Southeast Asia.<\/p>\n
And that explains why Indonesia has accorded and must continue
\nto accord high priority to its relations in the context of the
\nAssociation of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the ASEAN
\nRegional Forum, the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, etc.<\/p>\n
But in the global context, Indonesia's foreign policy will
\nalso be called upon to continue striving toward the building of a
\nnew world order of true independence, lasting peace, social
\njustice and equitable prosperity.<\/p>\n
This will have to be done by nurturing friendship and
\ncooperation with all nations, irrespective of differences in
\npolitical and social systems, and based on the principles of
\nsovereign equality, territorial integrity, mutual benefit,
\nnoninterference and peaceful coexistence.<\/p>\n
Secondly, there is the challenge to safeguard the nation's
\nunity and territorial integrity. Feelings of resentment and
\nalienation and even tendencies toward separatism among people in
\nsuch restive provinces as Aceh and Irian Jaya undeniably
\nconstitute a serious threat to national cohesion and integrity.<\/p>\n
And this threat can only be overcome by the manner and degree
\nof success in which the government can fashion a political
\nsolution to these problems. Nonetheless, the specific challenge
\nto Indonesian diplomacy will be, through heightened vigilance and
\nenhanced surveillance capacity, to prevent external intervention
\nin whatever form to further aggravate the situation.<\/p>\n
Indonesia's diplomacy is also being directed toward preempting
\nany possible support from foreign quarters to separatist
\nmovements in the country.<\/p>\n
Thirdly, there is the challenge of restoring and maintaining
\npolitical stability and social order, without which neither
\neconomic recovery nor democratization is possible.<\/p>\n
As long as ethnic and religious strife persists, public safety
\nand order remain tenuous and anarchy threatens to overwhelm
\ndemocracy and the rule of law, there can be no confidence in
\nIndonesia among foreign investors and trading partners.<\/p>\n
It should therefore be realized that even the most
\nsophisticated diplomacy will not be able to gloss over the facts
\nor to paint an image contradicting the realities on the ground.<\/p>\n
So it is of vital importance, for Indonesia itself but equally
\nfor the region as a whole, that the government and people are
\nable to respond effectively and successfully to these challenges.<\/p>\n
Fourthly, there is the continuing challenge of how to deal
\nwith the East Timor question. Although East Timor, as an issue of
\ncontention or conflict is no more there, our ongoing discussions
\nand negotiations with the United Nations and UNTAET, as East
\nTimor's transitional administration, on such issues as the
\ndisposition of remaining assets, Indonesia's withdrawal from the
\nTimor Gap treaty (where Australia, of course, is the other
\ninterested party) will demand the continuing attention of our
\nMinistry of Foreign Affairs and other agencies.<\/p>\n
It is inter alia for these purposes that recently President
\nAbdurrahman Wahid officially opened the Indonesian interests
\noffice in Dili.<\/p>\n
Also, the manner in which Indonesia will be handling the
\nadjudication of the alleged human rights violations in East
\nTimor, and the eventual verdicts reached by whatever national
\ntribunal that may be set up, will determine whether the UN
\nSecurity Council will continue to be seized with the question or
\nwhether it can finally be put to rest.<\/p>\n
Finally, the nurturing of mutually advantageous ties between
\nIndonesia and a prospective independent Timor Lorosae, and the
\ntriangle relationship encompassing Australia as well, will no
\ndoubt constitute a continuing challenge to Indonesian foreign
\npolicy for many years to come.<\/p>",
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