Can UN direct disarmament? (2)<\/p>\n
By Imron Cotan and Iwan Wiranataatmadja<\/p>\n
This is the second of two articles on the efforts of the UN to
\neliminate weapons of mass destruction.<\/p>\n
JAKARTA (JP): Some major powers, especially the United States,
\nthe United Kingdom and France, have taken a more narrowed and
\nrigid position by blocking the Conference on Disarmament to
\nnegotiate the treaty to ban totally nuclear weapons.<\/p>\n
In other words, they firmly believe that the nonnuclear
\nweapons states have no role at all as far as these weapons of
\nmass destruction are concerned, denying the fact that once being
\nused, these weapons would entirely destroy whole nations, with no
\nexception.<\/p>\n
They simply wish to \"localize\" this global agenda.
\nAccordingly, in every international forum, including the
\nConference on Disarmament, these countries continue to insist
\nthat the negotiations on nuclear weapons can only be properly
\ndone at bilateral levels between and among those major powers.<\/p>\n
This has, chief among all, totally run counter to the letter
\nand spirit of many international legally binding commitments from
\nwhich the mandate to multilaterally negotiate nuclear
\ndisarmament, derived, inter alia, as the Final Document of the
\nFirst Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly
\ndevoted to Disarmament (SSOD-I, 1978); the Partial Test Ban
\nTreaty; Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty; and, the
\nlatest, the decisions taken by the 1995 Review and Extension
\nConference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.<\/p>\n
Some arguments have been put forward that the Final Document
\nof SSOD-1 no longer fits current global political realities and,
\ntherefore, is obsolete. For many, that is not really the case. If
\nnot all, almost all developing countries consider that it remains
\nvalid until after the UN manages to conclude a new final document
\nreplacing the existing one.<\/p>\n
It is against this backdrop that some key players in the Non-
\nAligned Movement, especially Indonesia, see an importance to
\nurgently reach a consensus on the dates of the Session.<\/p>\n
Second, and on moral accounts, the international community is
\nfirmly convinced that once being used, these abhorrent weapons
\nwould jeopardize the very existence of all nations because their
\nimpact cannot be contained in segmented geographic parameters.
\nHence, the continuous presence of these weapons of mass
\ndestruction undoubtedly merits global concern. Fitting it into a
\nbigger perspective, the need to multilaterally treat those
\nnuclear weapons -- if not more urgent -- is of no less importance
\nthan dealing with the issue of eliminating these inhumane weapons
\nfrom the Middle East.<\/p>\n
Third, albeit bilateral talks have significantly reduced the
\nnumber of nuclear warheads, their full implementation still hangs
\nin the balance because Russia has, so far, failed to ratify START
\nII. Moreover, while further reductions remain uncertain, the
\nexistence of approximately 36,000 nuclear warheads in the
\narsenals of the most powerful nuclear weapons states continues to
\npose a great danger to humankind, particularly in a world where
\narms conflicts can still be easily spotted.<\/p>\n
Therefore, these bilateral endeavors need to be complemented
\nwith multilateral negotiations in order to render them more
\neffective.<\/p>\n
It is within this context that the Conference on Disarmament
\ncomes into the picture, for it is still more than well-equipped
\nto be used as a forum to negotiate nuclear disarmament.<\/p>\n
There are at least two underlying reasons to second this
\nargument. First, and of utmost importance, the present membership
\nof the 1995 Conference epitomizes geopolitical and military
\nrealities of the post-Cold War era, where all nuclear weapons
\nstates and key players in the international politics are
\nrepresented. Second, the 1995 Conference has proven its ability
\nto negotiate several yet-unprecedented disarmament agreements
\nregulating weapons of mass-destruction as previously described.
\nWhat renders the 1995 Conference limp now is the lack of
\npolitical will of the major powers to productively use it as a
\nforum, negotiating long-sought nuclear disarmament treaties.<\/p>\n
Worse still, they have consistently tried, and continue to
\ndilute, attention of member states from, and change the order of
\npriority of, the multilateral negotiations by persistently
\nadvocating that what the international community needs now is to
\ndeal with the conventional weapons.<\/p>\n
Therefore, it comes as no surprise that the 1995 Conference
\nhas, since 1996, been experiencing an acute impasse due to these
\nrecalcitrant attitudes of the major powers. The 1997 session was
\nthe most unproductive, during which the participating states were
\neven unable to agree upon the agenda items to be negotiated.<\/p>\n
Apart from the substantive difficulties, there is also a need
\nto confess that the Conference on Disarmament's Rules of
\nProcedure partly contributed to the current impasse and needs to
\nbe thoroughly revisited, enabling it to confront the new
\nchallenges and fundamental changes in this post-Cold War era.<\/p>\n
There are at least two rules which may be put under scrupulous
\nscrutiny. First, Rule 18, which requires the 1995 Conference to
\nconduct its work and adopt its decision by consensus and second,
\nRule 23, which only requires the 1995 Conference to establish ad
\nhoc subsidiary bodies to facilitate the negotiations on each and
\nevery item in the agreed agenda.<\/p>\n
As one might recall, Rule 18 throughout the history of the
\nRule has once been invoked, preventing the member states from
\nconcluding the negotiations on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
\n(CTBT). Albeit the Conference on Disarmament is a totally
\nindependent forum but it still operates within the gambit of the
\nUN General Assembly.<\/p>\n
However, Rule 18 has prevented the UN General Assembly from
\nrenegotiate the final draft of the CTBT as a genuine product of
\nthe Conference on Disarmament. Although the Australian government
\nmanaged to circumvent the procedural bickering, the draft cannot
\nbe claimed as a legitimate product of the 1995 Conference. This
\nwill certainly cast doubts on its future entry into force. After
\nall, with more than 60 member states, consensus building is
\nindeed a futile exercise.<\/p>\n
Rule 23 is also partly responsible for the slowness of the
\nConference on Disarmament to immediately embark upon substantive
\nnegotiations because it only requires the establishment of the ad
\nhoc subsidiary bodies at the beginning of every annual session.<\/p>\n
The first part of the Conference on Disarmament's yearly
\nsession is usually devoted to informal consultations on the
\nestablishment of these ad hoc committees. These unwarranted
\nrounds of consultations can also be prolonged until the Session
\nends. A way out needs to be invented, such as amending this rule
\nas to demanding the 1995 Conference to establish permanent
\nbodies, thereby allowing immediate negotiations on all agreed
\nagenda items.<\/p>\n
Coupled with the political will of all member states, these
\namendments would certainly give the Conference on Disarmament
\nwhat it needs to once again function as the sole multilateral
\ndisarmament negotiating forum. If that is the case, the ensuing
\nquestion would be which of the agenda items originating from the
\nFinal Document of SSOD-I are less controversial and more likely
\nto be negotiated in the near future.<\/p>\n
Needless to say, all nonnuclear weapons countries, including
\nIndonesia, have and continue to attach utmost importance to the
\nagenda item on nuclear disarmament for obvious reasons. However,
\ntaking into account the current situations with which the
\nConference on Disarmament is being confronted, these countries
\nneed to be open-minded to any ideas or proposals that may lead to
\nits speedy and eventual negotiations.<\/p>\n
In other words, the 1995 Conference needs to draw \"a balanced
\nprogram of work\", covering nuclear and nonnuclear agenda items
\nacceptable to all member states.<\/p>\n
There should be no substantive and practical hindrance
\nwhatsoever for the Conference on Disarmament to embark upon a
\nfull-fledged negotiation on the Negative Security Assurances; to
\nassure the security of the nonnuclear weapons states against the
\nuse or threat of use of nuclear weapons within the frame work of
\na subsidiary body.<\/p>\n
The demand by non-aligned and other neutral countries in the
\n1995 Conference (known as the Group of 21) for an immediate
\nnegotiation on this subject has a solid basis, especially for
\nIndonesia as a faithful member of the NPT Conference and as a
\nsignatory state to the CTBT.<\/p>\n
Better still, commitments have been made and well-documented
\nin the decisions taken in the 1995 NPT Review and Extension
\nConference which, inter alia, stipulate that all parties
\nconcerned should start negotiating these commitments that \"could
\ntake form of a legally binding regime\".<\/p>\n
However, it is really regrettable that some of those nuclear
\nweapons states not only considered the Conference on Disarmament
\nas no longer an appropriate forum but also stressed that any
\ndiscussion on this matter could only by possible if it is linked
\nand carried out in the frame work of the NPT Conference.<\/p>\n
All participating states in the Conference on Disarmament
\nfully understand the motive behind and the perceived result of
\nthe move. Some countries have hoped to corner India and Pakistan
\n-- the threshold nuclear weapons states -- so that these two
\ncountries would let go their nuclear options and join the NPT in
\nexchange of negative security assurances.<\/p>\n
It should be noted that these targeted nations have for
\ndecades steadfastly stood against these sorts of pressure, nor
\nthey have recently indicated their willingness to budge from
\nthese principled positions.<\/p>\n
To continue disengaging themselves from the negotiations to
\nconclude a legal regime on negative security assurances -- which
\nall nonnuclear weapons states are entitled to -- and trying to
\nmanipulate the prevailing situations should be aborted by the
\nnuclear weapons states. While absolutely unrealistic, it also
\nkeeps the majority of nonnuclear weapons states hostage, which
\nwould only do damage to the credence of the NPT Conference and
\nthe future endeavors of its states parties.<\/p>\n
Another less-controversial agenda item upon which the 1995
\nConference may work is the Transparency in Armament.<\/p>\n
In this more affluent world, transparency in military might
\nand equipment is a must in order to allay concerns of all states,
\nespecially the neighboring ones. It is also true the recent
\nscientific and technological edge has opened new vistas for the
\ninvention of a novel generation of conventional weapons -- with
\ntremendous destructive powers and which may possess strategic
\npostures.<\/p>\n
This certainly would also undermine the peace and security at
\nthe regional as well as at the global level. Not to mention the
\nexcessive accumulation of conventional weapons by certain states,
\nwhich has triggered arms conflicts all over the world, especially
\nin Africa. Should these frightening trends continue unabated, the
\ninternational community would helplessly witness the next
\nmillennium once again marred by senseless conflicts similar to
\nthose we are about to leave behind.<\/p>\n
In order to avoid these miserable situations, from the
\nperspective of the nonnuclear weapons states, the following
\nconclusions and suggestions can be drawn and put forward. First,
\nthe Conference on Disarmament is still well positioned to
\nnegotiate a series of disarmament treaties, especially those
\nregulating nuclear weapons for at least two underlining reasons.
\nOne, it represents the real and existing world political
\npowerhouses. Two, the existence of nuclear weapons continues to
\npose a global threat which merits global or multilateral actions,
\nwhich only the Conference on Disarmament can so far contemplate.
\nIndeed, global issues deserve global actions.<\/p>\n
Albeit, bilateral talks have so far significantly reduced the
\narsenals of nuclear weapons, the world will be much better off if
\nthey are coupled with successful multilateral negotiations. In
\nother words, these two measures are indeed mutually reinforcing.<\/p>\n
Second, the current impasse -- with which the Conference on
\nDisarmament is being confronted -- might well be circumvented if
\nall member states, especially those nuclear weapons states, live
\nup to their international obligations and commitments and show
\ntheir sense of flexibility, thereby allowing the 1995 Conference
\nto assume its mandated functions.<\/p>\n
Good lessons should be derived from the failures of the
\nConference on Disarmament to conclude the CTBT and to negotiate
\nthe Treaty on Antipersonnel Land mines. Concerted efforts are to
\nbe taken to avoid such unfortunate instances from rekindling in
\nthe future.<\/p>\n
Third, whether one likes it or not, the 1995 Conference's
\nRules of Procedure are partly to blame for the failures of the
\nConference on Disarmament to engage in meaningful exercises,
\nespecially Rule 18 and Rule 23. It might be timely to
\nrespectively amend them, thereby allowing the UN General Assembly
\nto assume its duties, if and when the 1995 Conference fails to
\ndischarge its mandate. And, at the same time, do away with a
\nroutine protracted debate on the establishment of ad hoc
\nsubsidiary bodies at each and every yearly session.<\/p>\n
Fourth, pending the results of the UN SSOD-IV, the 1995
\nConference's agenda derived from the Final Document of the SSOD-
\nI, should be maintained with nuclear disarmament peaks on the
\nagenda. Understanding the difficulties of some of the nuclear
\nweapons states, the Group of 21 should be ready to draft a
\nbalanced program of work of the 1995 Conference, covering
\nNegative Security Assurances and Transparency in Armament, which
\nare less problematic.<\/p>\n
To allow this to happen, member states should desist from
\nextorting other participating states to kowtow to their
\nunrealistic demands at the expense of the rest.<\/p>\n
Last but not least, all countries should honor their
\ninternational responsibilities and show their sense of
\nflexibility, thereby allowing the Conference on Disarmament to
\nonce again assume its function as the sole multilateral
\ndisarmament negotiating body. Failure to do so would have direct
\nbearings on the future of our planet.<\/p>\n
The writers are former United Nations Disarmament Fellows and
\nobservers of international peace and security affairs residing in
\nJakarta.<\/p>\n
Window: Needless to say, all nonnuclear weapons countries,
\nincluding Indonesia, have and continue to attach utmost importance
\nto the agenda item on nuclear disarmament for obvious reasons.<\/p>",
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