Can the UN direct disarmament?<\/p>\n
By Imron Cotan and Iwan Wiranataatmadja<\/p>\n
This is the first of two articles on the efforts of the UN to
\neliminate weapons of mass destruction.<\/p>\n
JAKARTA (JP): Due to their devastating impacts on human beings
\nand the environment, nuclear, chemical and biological weapons
\nhave since their invention preoccupied the international
\ncommunity. All nations unanimously label these abhorrent weapons
\nas weapons of mass destruction and furthermore have agreed to
\nwork for their eventual elimination.<\/p>\n
The international outcry to ban these weapons once again
\ngained strong impetus after chemical weapons were used during the
\nGulf War, prompting the government of France to take the
\ncourageous initiative of organizing the Paris Conference on
\nChemical Weapons (1991).<\/p>\n
The result was indeed very encouraging. The United Nations-
\nsponsored Conference on Disarmament in Geneva gained a much
\nstronger momentum from it, hence finally concluding the then
\nseemingly endless round of negotiations on the convention.<\/p>\n
Ever since, the international community's preoccupation with
\nthese inhumane weapons, if not steadily escalated, has never
\nreceded, especially after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. The UN
\nSecurity Council has accordingly passed a series of resolutions
\ndemanding Iraq abandon its weapons of mass-destruction options.
\nThe squabbles over the proper implementation of these resolutions
\nhave continued unabated.<\/p>\n
Indeed, through the Conference on Disarmament, the United
\nNations did and continues to play a pivotal role in trying to
\nconclude a series of legal regimes banning totally these
\nabhorrent weapons from the world's arsenals. Putting aside the
\nloopholes and weaknesses contained therein, the Biological
\nWeapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention were
\nsuccessfully concluded in 1972 and 1993 respectively.<\/p>\n
Unfortunately indeed, the international community's efforts to
\nconclude a series of legal regimes regulating nuclear weapons
\nhave encountered formidable hurdles. The Conference on
\nDisarmament -- as the sole recognized multilateral negotiating
\nforum -- has so far failed to address these weapons. It is
\ntherefore legitimate to question whether this august body is
\nstill best suited to deal with the global disarmament agenda,
\ntaking into account the new realities and formidable challenges
\nbrought by the tumultuous and yet unpredictable post-Cold War
\nera.<\/p>\n
The multilateral disarmament negotiations are not novel and
\nthe United Nations has played and continues to play a significant
\nrole in this regard. When the UN Disarmament Commission became a
\ndeliberative forum of the UN General Assembly, the international
\ncommunity managed to form several multilateral negotiating forums
\nwithin the ambit of the UN system to deal with the global
\ndisarmament agenda.<\/p>\n
These include the 10-Nation Committee on Disarmament, the 18-
\nNation Committee on Disarmament and the Conference of the
\nCommittee on Disarmament which -- at the later stage -- was
\ntransformed into the Conference on Disarmament.<\/p>\n
Surprisingly indeed, during the Cold War era these forums
\nsignificantly contributed to the curtailment of these weapons of
\nmass destruction by successfully concluding some major
\ndisarmament agreements covering the Treaty Banning Nuclear
\nWeapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water
\n(PTBT, 1963), the Non-Proliferation Treaty (1970) and the
\nBiological Weapons Convention (1972).<\/p>\n
When the new era was ushered in, the Conference on Disarmament
\nwent through its most productive and successful epoch when it
\nmanaged to conclude -- albeit painstakingly -- the most
\ncomprehensive convention totally outlawing chemical weapons
\n(1993).<\/p>\n
However, just when the new pattern of relationships between
\nand among the major powers was about to take final shape the work
\nof the conference was unfortunately marred by two distressing
\nfactors.<\/p>\n
The first was the failure of the states party to the Non-
\nProliferation Treaty to achieve a final consensus document during
\nthe 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Non-Proliferation
\nTreaty. The second was the inability of the conference to fully
\ndischarge its mandate to conclude the negotiations on the
\nComprehensive Test Ban Treaty due to the unreconcilable views of
\nthe non-nuclear weapons states and the nuclear weapons states on
\nhow to achieve general and complete nuclear disarmament under
\nstrict and effective international control.<\/p>\n
These two indeed discouraging developments have ever since
\nsignificantly overshadowed the negotiations on these weapons.<\/p>\n
The writers are former United Nations Disarmament Fellows and
\nobservers of international peace and security affairs, residing
\nin Jakarta.<\/p>",
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