Can Asia-Pacific security vacuum really be filled?<\/p>\n
Denny Roy looks at whether the prospective vacuum created in the
\nAsia-Pacific in the wake of a U.S. military withdrawal will
\nactually be filled by another power.<\/p>\n
The assumption that a withdrawal of U.S. influence from the
\nAsia-Pacific would create a power or security \"vacuum\" has become
\ncommonplace among analysts of the region. This assumption,
\nhowever, has been largely unexamined. The \"vacuum\" metaphor
\nimplies that if the dominant power, or hegemony, abdicates its
\nrole as shaper and enforcer of the rules of international
\ninteraction, the forces of nature will immediately and inevitably
\nsuck another country into this role as a replacement.<\/p>\n
But the \"vacuum\" effect is only one possible response to the
\ndiminution of great power influence. While the emergence of a
\npower vacuum in the region is a strong possibility, this outcome
\nis not inevitable. History bears out this conclusion.<\/p>\n
After the First World War, Great Britain was clearly finished
\nas the world's dominant power. No other major European power was
\nin any position to take up global leadership. Two rising powers
\nreacted in opposite ways to this hegemonic breakdown. In the
\nPacific, Japan, which had previously cooperated with the dominant
\npower (and would return to this pattern again after World War
\nII), opted to build its own regional hegemony, the Greater East
\nAsia Co-prosperity Sphere. But the U.S., by then the world's
\nstrongest power (although militarily under-armed), declined the
\nglobal leadership role of which it was capable.<\/p>\n
There was no \"vacuum\". The vulnerable Japanese decided to take
\ncontrol of an uncertain and threatening external environment, but
\nthe Americans, militarily secure and economically almost self-
\nsufficient, saw no compelling reason to strive for hegemony.<\/p>\n
The reason the \"power vacuum\" is not a sure thing is that
\nrising, middle-rank countries have both incentives and
\ndisincentives for opportunistic expansion. One incentive is
\ncontrol of the international or regional system, which the
\ndominant power can adjust to serve its own interests. Another
\nincentive is defensive: blocking a neighboring state (and
\npotential enemy) from gaining additional capabilities and
\nprivileges that would result in an increase of its relative
\npower.<\/p>\n
These incentives, however, are potentially balanced by
\ncountervailing considerations. A state that suddenly becomes more
\nassertive will frighten its neighbors, which will likely respond
\nby forming an alliance to contain the threatening state. Another
\ndisincentive to unilateral expansion is economic interdependence:
\npeaceful cooperation may be a more effective way to amass
\nnational wealth than coercion and conquest. In theory, then, a
\nrough balance obtains between the factors that would give rise to
\na vacuum and the factors that would prevent a vacuum.<\/p>\n
Moving from the abstract to the concrete, do the particular
\ncharacteristics of the Asia-Pacific region make it susceptible to
\nthe vacuum effect? There are two bright spots. First, the smaller
\nstates of the region have become stronger since the Japanese
\ninvasion of the Pacific War. These states are now better able to
\nprotect themselves and to contribute resources to a defensive
\nalliance. Second, ASEAN has proved it can foster cooperation and
\ndialogue for Southeast Asian states.<\/p>\n
But conditions that would guarantee peace and stability in a
\npost-hegemonic environment do not yet exist. Northeast Asia has
\nno real counterpart to ASEAN, and the establishment of effective
\nmultilateral organizations faces the serious obstacles of
\nhistorical animosity (Chinese versus Japanese, Japanese versus
\nKoreans, North Koreans versus South Koreans, and so on) and
\nseemingly insoluble political grievances (divided Korea, divided
\nChina, disputed territories, and so forth).<\/p>\n
Economic interdependence in the region is uneven; the major
\nties are bilateral connections between Japan and everyone else,
\nand states trade more with outside countries than among
\nthemselves.<\/p>\n
Only the Russians and the Chinese have nuclear weapons,
\nfurther skewing the imbalance between the strong and the weak
\nstates, and creating the potential for nuclear blackmail should
\nthe U.S. nuclear umbrella be removed.<\/p>\n
Political systems throughout the region remain highly
\ndissimilar, running the gamut from democracy to hard-core
\nauthoritarianism. While Japan is clearly content with the status
\nquo and would not undertake a major military buildup unless
\nprovoked, the same cannot be confidently said of China.<\/p>\n
Thus, while the vacuum effect is not inevitable here, it will
\nremain the most likely outcome unless purposeful action is taken
\nto avoid it. Regional states would be wise to use this decade or
\nso of breathing space to strengthen the disincentives to
\nopportunistic, unilateral expansion by deepening the culture of
\nmultilateralism, ingraining the habits of consultation and
\ncompromise, and avoiding steps that would increase neighbors'
\nsense of insecurity. The ideal the region should work towards is
\na no-vacuum outcome in which no government suddenly increases its
\nmilitary capabilities or political demands in the wake of a U.S.
\nwithdrawal.<\/p>\n
Instead, governments in the region might agree to maintain the
\npresent system of economic and political regimes, or meet
\ntogether to formulate new regimes, and all would continue to
\npursue their interests through established diplomatic channels
\nand peaceful economic competition.<\/p>\n
Dr. Denny Roy is a Research Fellow at the Strategic and Defense
\nStudies Center at the Australian National University.<\/p>",
"url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/can-asia-pacific-security-vacuum-really-be-filled-1447893297",
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"sponsor": "Okusi Associates",
"sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com"
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