Can ASEAN's China policy succeed?<\/p>\n
The admission of Vietnam marks an important moment in the 28-
\nyear long history of ASEAN. Seen from East Asia, our Asia
\ncorrespondent Harvey Stockwin notes that ASEAN has reversed the
\nlogic behind its creation in 1967, and has been a political more
\nthan an economic success story. ASEAN now faces a major test of
\nhow to manage its relationship with China.<\/p>\n
HONG KONG (JP): ASEAN's success in the politics of cohesive
\ndiplomacy has been pointedly illustrated by the issue of Vietnam.
\nVietnam is becoming an ASEAN member now, but not because the
\nUnited States had been pondering the decision years ago to
\nnormalize relations with Vietnam.<\/p>\n
To the contrary, ASEAN led the way. President Bill Clinton
\nbelatedly announced normalization with Vietnam recently, in part
\nbecause the U.S. saw the need to catch up with ASEAN.<\/p>\n
As the 28th annual Foreign Minister's Meeting (FMM) of the
\nAssociation of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) gets underway in
\nBrunei, the grouping has turned its original motivation on its
\nhead. Formed in the belief that economic cooperation would help
\npromote political togetherness, ASEAN's main achievement has been
\npolitical and diplomatic solidarity, while economic accord has
\nlagged behind.<\/p>\n
An ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) was belatedly agreed to in the
\n1980s instead of the 1970s. It is still something of an unproven
\ninstitution. The ASEAN Economic Ministers do not yet meet as
\nfrequently or as purposefully as they should.<\/p>\n
The Foreign Ministers meeting, on the other hand, has come to
\nresemble an umbrella that gets larger every time it is opened,
\nthus enabling more moves to take place, and more progress to be
\naccomplished, beneath its expanding shade.<\/p>\n
The annual FMM get-together has become a complex array of
\nmeetings. First come the preparatory meetings of officials,
\nfollowed by the FMM alone. This is followed by the PMC , as it
\nis widely known, -- the post-ministerial conference, now longer
\nin duration than the FMM itself. This consists of meetings with
\nASEAN observers (Papua New-Guinea, Laos, Myanmar and Cambodia)
\nand, both separately and collectively, with ASEAN's dialog
\npartners (Japan, Korea, the U.S., the European Union, Australia,
\nCanada and New Zealand).<\/p>\n
Last year, a further round of discussions after the PMC was
\nformally initiated. The 18-member ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF),
\nincluding all seven dialogue partners, the observers apart from
\nMyanmar and Cambodia, plus China and Russia but not yet India, is
\navowedly concerned with the issue of regional security. Whether
\nARF will provide the means for the development of collective
\nsecurity in Asia remains to be seen. For now, it comes closest
\nto doing so.<\/p>\n
Amidst all these multilateral meetings, significant bilateral
\nprogress in diplomatic relationships can also be registered,
\ngiven the multilateral pressure for conciliation rather than
\nconfrontation which pervades the overall get-together.<\/p>\n
One example of what may be accomplished in Brunei this year
\nunder the expansive ASEAN FMM-PMC-ARF umbrella is already
\nobvious.<\/p>\n
There can be no question that deteriorating Sino-American
\nrelations could easily affect regional stability. Already,
\nSecretary of State Warren Christopher and Chinese Foreign
\nMinister Qian Qichen have arranged at least one quiet get-
\ntogether in the umbrella's shade.<\/p>\n
Such a meeting will not end the deterioration, but it might
\nwell put some brakes on what Henry Kissinger has described as the
\n\"free fall\" in the Sino-American relationship. Should current
\nBeijing intransigence continue to manifest itself, both in
\nrelation to the U.S., and also to the South China Sea issue, then
\nQian will come under subtle pressure in Brunei to be more
\nflexible. The ASEAN faith, based on past performance, is that
\ntalking over problems can ease many tensions.<\/p>\n
This has given rise to the charge that ASEAN is nothing more
\nthan a \"talking shop\" wherein words are plentiful but substantive
\nachievements are much less commonplace. This may be true for any
\nsingle meeting but, taken over time, it is patently false.<\/p>\n
Formed in the wake of konfrontasi between Indonesia and
\nMalaysia\/Singapore, during ASEAN's 28-year existence it has
\ntamed, though not ended, the abundant raw material for Southeast
\nAsian regional discord. Territorial disputes between ASEAN
\nmembers have first been stilled and then negotiated, rather than
\nfought over. Other emotional issues have been kept within bounds.<\/p>\n
The overall ASEAN accomplishment is vividly illustrated by the
\nmain new departure due to take place in Brunei.<\/p>\n
When ASEAN was formed in 1967 the still-expanding Vietnam War
\nwas the key geopolitical reality in the region. ASEAN gained
\nmuch of its cohesion and strength in the late 1970s and early-to-
\nmid 1980s as it opposed Vietnam's attempt to conquer Cambodia.<\/p>\n
Now, in Brunei, the country ASEAN once opposed, Vietnam, is
\nbeing elevated from its former observer status to become the
\nseventh full member of the organization.<\/p>\n
Again, seen from East Asia, it appears that, in making this
\nmove, ASEAN is taking a calculated risk.<\/p>\n
Vietnam is often regarded as being more East Asian in
\ntemperament, more part of the Sinified cultural world rather than
\nthe polyglot world of Southeast Asia. ASEAN-wide reflexes may
\nnot always come easily to Vietnam's entrenched bureaucracy.
\nVietnam still shares a major interest with China and North
\nVietnam -- the survival of the communist political system.<\/p>\n
Above all, as the ASEAN Six become Seven, the three
\nIndochinese states cease to be a de facto buffer between ASEAN
\nand China. Put another way, ASEAN now shares a land border with
\nChina. When and if Laos and Myanmar become full ASEAN members,
\nthe Sino-ASEAN land border will lengthen.<\/p>\n
The risk seems worth taking for several reasons. Vietnam
\nyearns for greater economic dynamism which it hopes ASEAN
\nmembership will help impart. Joining AFTA will not be easy -- but
\nthe addition of 70 million Vietnamese to the AFTA market could,
\nif successfully accomplished, make AFTA far more formidable.<\/p>\n
For the foreseeable future, ASEAN will have to grapple with
\nthe ever-growing regional reality of an assertive China. In this
\ngeopolitical task, Vietnam will be a very useful guide, even if
\nit is communist.<\/p>\n
Further, with Vietnam's accession, all the Southeast Asian
\nclaimants to disputed islands in the South China Sea -- Vietnam,
\nBrunei, the Philippines and Malaysia -- are within ASEAN. Only
\nthe two Chinese claimants -- China and Taiwan -- remain outside.
\nVietnam will probably provide a healthy corrective to an enduring
\nASEAN mistake, the tendency to think that the mere issuance of
\nthe ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea in July 1992 binds
\nall claimants to conciliation.<\/p>\n
The most important document for China that year was its own
\nlaw on the South China Sea, passed in February 1992 by the
\nNational Peoples Congress, effectively annexing the whole sea as
\npart of China. That law implicitly involved the largest ASEAN
\nmember, Indonesia, since it could mean that Beijing claims the
\nNatuna Islands, too.<\/p>\n
ASEAN's technique, which Vietnam will now have to adopt, has
\nbeen to minimize territorial discord by freezing the status quo
\nin any dispute and conducting dialog. The recent Philippine
\nreaction to Chinese installations on Mischief Reef in the Spratly
\nIslands served to draw attention to the fact that China has been
\nquietly changing the status quo, and implementing its own law,
\nsince 1992 -- even though there was a tentative Indonesian
\nsponsored unofficial dialogue with ASEAN countries proceeding at
\nthe same time.<\/p>\n
Somewhat imperiously, in what looks like a blatant attempt to
\n\"divide and rule\" among those nations which the Middle Kingdom
\nhas traditionally regarded as \"tributary states\", China has
\ninsisted that all South China Sea disputes be settled with it on
\na bilateral basis.<\/p>\n
The challenge facing ASEAN both now in the Brunei meetings,
\nand also into that foreseeable future, is to insist, quietly but
\nfirmly yet persistently, that ASEAN solidarity is a multilateral
\ndiplomatic reality which Beijing must recognize and accept. It
\nwill never be easy, especially amidst the current profound
\nuncertainties of China's domestic politics. But ASEAN has no
\nchoice but to assert itself in this modest way, because only in
\ncohesion does Southeast Asia gain an ability to diplomatically
\ncounter China's greater overall power.<\/p>\n
The South China Sea will take much of the spotlight in Brunei
\nbut it remains only one of many other issues which will be raised
\nunder the expanding umbrella.<\/p>\n
ASEAN celebrates one failure and one success.<\/p>\n
The success came when Myanmar's military rulers, almost
\ncertainly anxious to increase their ASEAN connections, and
\ndecrease their wider isolation, released Aung San Suu Kyi from
\nsix years of house arrest.<\/p>\n
This enables ASEAN to claim that its policy of \"constructive
\nengagement\" with Myanmar was bearing fruit after all. But ASEAN
\ncannot sit back and relax. Rather, it must gently urge Myanmar's
\ngenerals to enter into further constructive engagement with Ms.
\nSuu Kyi.<\/p>\n
The ASEAN failure came when Philippine-Singaporean relations
\nseverely deteriorated over the Singapore hanging of a maid, Flor
\nContemplacion, who was convicted for murder, despite half-hearted
\nrequests from the government in Manila for a stay of execution.
\nIt was a complex incident which usefully reminded everyone that
\nASEAN solidarity remains an elitist concept -- which can be
\neasily damaged either by Singaporean elite disdain for Southeast
\nAsians, or Philippine elite disdain for their own people.<\/p>",
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