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    "data": {
        "id": 1336546,
        "msgid": "can-a-perry-process-defuse-north-korea-1447893297",
        "date": "2003-02-27 00:00:00",
        "title": "Can a 'Perry process' defuse North Korea?",
        "author": null,
        "source": "JP",
        "tags": null,
        "topic": null,
        "summary": "Can a 'Perry process' defuse North Korea? Yoichi Funabashi, The Asahi Shimbun, Tokyo The time is not yet ripe for creative initiatives such as Carter diplomacy and the Perry process. I recently interviewed Stanford University professor William Perry, who served as former United States President Bill Clinton's secretary of defense.",
        "content": "<p>Can a &apos;Perry process&apos; defuse North Korea?<\/p>\n<p>Yoichi Funabashi, The Asahi Shimbun, Tokyo<\/p>\n<p>The time is not yet ripe for creative initiatives such as<br>\nCarter diplomacy and the Perry process.<\/p>\n<p>I recently interviewed Stanford University professor William<br>\nPerry, who served as former United States President Bill<br>\nClinton&apos;s secretary of defense.<\/p>\n<p>Soon after leaving as defense secretary in 1997, he was put in<br>\ncharge of dealing with the North Korean missile crisis as the<br>\nClinton administration&apos;s North Korean policy coordinator. He led<br>\ndifficult negotiations and advanced the &quot;Perry process&quot; to<br>\nstabilize U.S.-North Korea relations. On the wall of his office<br>\nhangs framed &quot;words of appreciation&quot; from bipartisan members of<br>\nCongress.<\/p>\n<p>Four years later, we are facing another nuclear crisis over<br>\nNorth Korea&apos;s secret nuclear development program using enriched<br>\nuranium. What is the aim of the North&apos;s nuclear program?<\/p>\n<p>&quot;We can&apos;t be sure of what their intentions are,&quot; Perry said,<br>\n&quot;but I think ... they are seriously pursuing a nuclear weapon<br>\nprogram. That is, they are seriously heading toward becoming a<br>\ndeclared nuclear state, which could include nuclear testing and<br>\nwould include the serial production of nuclear weapons.&quot; Over and<br>\nabove this, he added, North Korea may seek to emulate Pakistan.<\/p>\n<p>As far as North Korea&apos;s clandestine nuclear program is<br>\nconcerned, it appears Perry was also left in the dark. He said he<br>\nwasn&apos;t aware of such information while he was policy coordinator.<br>\nThe U.S. side, Perry says, always suspected North Korea was doing<br>\nsomething behind their back, and once went as far as carrying out<br>\nan inspection in the mountains (of Kumchangri), though to no<br>\navail.<\/p>\n<p>It is difficult to conceal the plutonium project because of<br>\nthe huge facilities required. But such is not the case with<br>\nenriched uranium, which doesn&apos;t require such facilities. Perry<br>\nalso noted, &quot;... it is possible that in the first few years it<br>\nsimply was an experimentary laboratory program, and that the<br>\ndecision to go into production on it has happened only recently.&quot;<\/p>\n<p>If nothing is done to contain the situation, it could develop<br>\ninto a military conflict.<\/p>\n<p>Perry stressed that the U.S. must immediately begin serious<br>\ndialogue with North Korea to settle the nuclear problem. Although<br>\na solution may be a long time in coming, he said, North Korea<br>\nshould freeze its nuclear program and the U.S. should refrain<br>\nfrom taking military action.<\/p>\n<p>The administration of George W. Bush maintains the problem<br>\nshould be discussed in a multilateral forum, not simply bilateral<br>\ntalks between the U.S. and North Korea, since the issue concerns<br>\ninternational society as a whole.<\/p>\n<p>Perry, however, said the U.S. should not hold to such a<br>\nstance. The Bush administration is demanding that North Korea<br>\ngive up its nuclear development program &quot;immediately,<br>\ntransparently and completely.&quot; But Perry believes that may be<br>\ndifficult and advocates a more realistic approach, such as asking<br>\nfor a North Korean promise to &quot;freeze&quot; nuclear development.<\/p>\n<p>Perry also objected to the argument within the Bush<br>\nadministration to abolish the Korean Peninsula Energy Development<br>\nOrganization (KEDO).<\/p>\n<p>Spawned after the 1994 U.S.-North Korea Framework Agreement,<br>\nKEDO is a multilateral project to help boost North Korea&apos;s energy<br>\nsupply that took off under the joint initiative of Japan, the<br>\nU.S. and South Korea. In exchange for removing a nuclear threat,<br>\nthe project promises to provide North Korea with light-water<br>\nnuclear reactors.<\/p>\n<p>In short, the aim of KEDO is to neutralize a nuclear threat<br>\nwith nuclear energy. Under the agreement, the U.S. was obliged to<br>\nprovide North Korea with heavy oil during the construction of the<br>\nreactors, but it recently cut off shipments.<\/p>\n<p>Perry said that was a mistake. The termination of heavy oil<br>\nsupply, he said, aggravated the nuclear crisis and gave North<br>\nKorea an excuse to resume nuclear development.<\/p>\n<p>It is better to keep KEDO intact as a forum to encourage U.S.-<br>\nNorth Korea dialogue, Perry argues. In the future, however, it<br>\nwould be more reasonable to convert KEDO into a supply source of<br>\nnon-nuclear, rather than nuclear, energy, he said.<\/p>\n<p>Former U.S. President Jimmy Carter&apos;s visit to Pyongyang<br>\neventually led to the settlement of the 1994 North Korean nuclear<br>\ncrisis. Can a similar approach be taken again to bring the<br>\nsituation under control?<\/p>\n<p>Carter played a useful role, Perry said. But his success owed<br>\nto the firm stand of the U.S. government, which showed its<br>\nreadiness to take military action as a last resort, Perry<br>\ncontends. The U.S. dispatched aircraft carriers to surrounding<br>\nwaters and deployed Patriot missiles to South Korea. The Japanese<br>\nprime minister allowed the use of U.S. military bases in Japan<br>\nshould force have proved necessary.<\/p>\n<p>Carter diplomacy, Perry said, was effective because Japan, the<br>\nU.S. and South Korea cooperated. At that time, the U.S. refrained<br>\nfrom harshly threatening North Korea. Diplomacy sometimes<br>\nrequires &quot;a little coercion, a little threat of military force.&quot;<br>\nAt the same time, Perry stressed, it also requires creativity.<\/p>\n<p>The U.S. government is too obsessed with preparing for an<br>\nIraqi attack to seriously deal with North Korea&apos;s nuclear threat.<br>\nIts diplomacy lacks both coercion and creativity. I ended the<br>\ninterview feeling vexed that the time is not yet ripe for<br>\ncreative initiatives such as Carter diplomacy and the Perry<br>\nprocess.<\/p>\n<p>Soon after my meeting with Perry, I was told by a Chinese<br>\nCommunist Party diplomatic source that he recently obtained<br>\n&quot;reliable information from a North Korean source.&quot;<\/p>\n<p>According to the source, &quot;If the Bush administration plans to<br>\nsend either Carter or Perry as a special envoy to North Korea,<br>\nPyongyang is willing to meet him.&quot;<\/p>",
        "url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/can-a-perry-process-defuse-north-korea-1447893297",
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    "sponsor": "Okusi Associates",
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