Cambodia still divided by factional rifts<\/p>\n
By Yuli Ismartono<\/p>\n
JAKARTA (JP): When Prince Norodom Ranariddh and Hun Sen,
\nCambodia's two prime ministers, visited Jakarta recently, they
\ntook pains to convince potential investors that their country is
\na safe place to do business.<\/p>\n
\"I am very pleased to report that the coalition government of
\nthe Kingdom of Cambodia is working extremely well,\" Ranariddh
\ntold members of the Indonesian Chamber of Commerce and Industry
\n(Kadin) at a luncheon meeting.<\/p>\n
But no sooner did interested Indonesian businessmen obtain
\ntheir Cambodian visas then the capital of Phnom Penh was again
\nrocked by political conflict.<\/p>\n
Renegade Prince Norodom Chakrapong, a half-brother of
\nRanariddh, made another attempt to overthrow the government, once
\nmore with the aid of his ally, former interior minister Gen. Sin
\nSong.<\/p>\n
The incident, although perceived to be of little significance,
\nserves to underscore the volatile situation and the fragile peace
\nexisting among the contending political groups ruling the
\ncountry.<\/p>\n
International legitimacy may have come to Cambodia after the
\nUnited Nations organized general elections a year ago, at a cost
\nof nearly US$2 billion. But the stability desperately needed by
\nthe people to rebuild their society, wasted by decades of war,
\nremains elusive. Despite brave attempts at national
\nreconciliation, Cambodia still seems to be a country divided by
\nfactional interests.<\/p>\n
Deep-seated suspicion, perhaps the legacy of its violent past,
\nseems to be an inherent nature of Cambodians. Here's a country
\nwhose monarch, King Norodom Sihanouk, however much he professes
\nto love his country, prefers to reside in Beijing and Pyongyang,
\nreturning home only for special events. His bodyguards are North
\nKorean, his doctors are Chinese and among his coterie of advisors
\nare a Chilean and a Thai general.<\/p>\n
Cambodia must be the only country in the world to be governed
\nsimultaneously by two prime ministers, each having equal powers,
\nbut not necessarily having the same objectives. Imagine the
\nconsequent complications of dealing with co-ministers, co-
\ndirector generals, and so forth down the line.<\/p>\n
One diplomat discovered that if he wanted his message to have
\nthe intended effect among government officials, he had to make
\nsure everything was delivered in duplicate.<\/p>\n
It is true that a coalition government may have been the only
\nway out of a deadlock at the end of last year's elections.
\nDespite a majority win in the polls, Ranariddh and his Funcinpec
\nparty was not able to dislodge the incumbent Cambodian People's
\nParty from the seat of government, which they had held for the
\npast 13 years, without risking an armed conflict.<\/p>\n
So the two biggest factions, once bitter enemies, agreed to
\ngovern side by side, their civil services and their militaries
\nunited, at least in name. \"It's a recipe for a slow-boiling
\ndisaster,\" said a political observer, monitoring events in
\nCambodia.<\/p>\n
In fact, the potential for problems is always present,
\nparticularly within the military. The new, united army, for
\nexample, is top heavy, with 67 percent of the personnel
\nconsisting of generals and colonels.<\/p>\n
Despite commitments to align and synchronize the forces, each
\nunit seems to keep to themselves, retaining their own chain of
\ncommand, making joint operations extremely difficult, if not
\nimpossible. Diplomats say, following the disastrous assault on
\nthe Khmer Rouge headquarters of Pailin some months ago, it was
\nrevealed that most of the troops who took the brunt of the
\nfighting were Funcinpec's and remnants of the KPNLF.<\/p>\n
The disbursement of international aid funds is another likely
\nbone of contention, each party vying to benefit their own people.
\nIn Phnom Penh, word got out that the police force to benefit from
\ntraining provided by the French were mostly those loyal to Prime
\nMinister Hun Sen, who led the government prior to the elections.
\nThe police force, as is the structure of the local
\nadministrations, remains mostly in the hands of former government
\nofficials.<\/p>\n
The sharp differences, if not actual divisions within the
\nranks of the coalition government, sadly apply to solving the
\nKhmer Rouge problem. The former Marxist group, notorious for the
\none million deaths they caused during four savage years of rule,
\nstill controls a significant portion of Cambodian territory, and
\nas such, poses the biggest threat to national stability.
\nAlthough they boycotted the elections last year, they persist in
\nclaiming their right to participate in the government \"in an
\nadvisory role.\"<\/p>\n
Hun Sen, a former Khmer Rouge who allied himself with the
\nVietnamese against the Beijing-backed Marxist group, would like
\nto see them outlawed once and for all, preventing any chance of
\ntheir returning to Cambodian society. But some Funcinpec
\nmembers, who believe the Khmer Rouge problem will never be solved
\nuntil they are included in the mainstream, want to leave the door
\nopen for further talks with them.<\/p>\n
According to analysts, the strength of the Khmer Rouge has
\nbeen considerably reduced to no more than about 6,000 guerrillas,
\nbut they are still a force to be reckoned with. Unlike military
\nunits belonging to the coalition government, the Khmer Rouge
\nremain a highly disciplined and mobile force, well-armed with the
\nlatest weapons from China.<\/p>\n
And unlike the government in power, the Khmer Rouge seem to
\nhave an endless supply of funds, originating from the rich gem-
\nmining and timber areas they control near the border with
\nThailand.<\/p>\n
Given such a precarious environment, Cambodia urgently needs
\nhelp to develop its shattered economy. Close to US$1 billion
\npledged by industrialized countries in Tokyo before the elections
\nhave helped somewhat, but the economy has been functioning too
\nweakly to build self-sustaining growth. What the government
\nreally wants is to attract foreign investment.<\/p>\n
Indeed, the country's agricultural, forest, mineral and
\nmarine resources could ultimately support a substantial number of
\nresource-processing industries. But in order to support that
\nlong-term objective, Cambodia needs to develop its war-torn
\ninfrastructure and train its work force, whose education has been
\ndisrupted by decades of continuous conflict.<\/p>\n
This cry for help was made by Ranariddh and Hun Sen during
\ntheir visit to Jakarta. \"They see a great deal of similarity in
\nIndonesia's battered political and economic situation in the
\n1960s and are looking for advice on how it was rebuilt,\" said the
\nanalyst. Ranariddh in particular, knows the Indonesian formula
\nworks for him, at least where political campaigning is concerned.
\nIt has been reported that prior to last year's elections,
\nFuncinpec people visited Jakarta to study Golkar's winning ways.<\/p>\n
The Cambodians have indicated they want to learn how to
\nrestructure the economy and to mobilize foreign aid effectively.
\nHigh on the list is help on how to create an efficient civil
\nservice, and re-train the new military. The Cambodians, who
\nrecently established the Khmer International Relations Institute
\n(KIRI), have also indicated interest in conducting exchanges with
\nthink tanks in Indonesia, as well as in other ASEAN countries.<\/p>\n
Ultimately, however, it is the Cambodians who must help
\nthemselves. The big question is whether they have the political
\nwill to put their differences and their own interests aside,
\ntowards a peaceful and prosperous Cambodia.<\/p>\n
The writer is a foreign correspondent for the Tempo news
\nmagazine.<\/p>",
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