{
    "success": true,
    "data": {
        "id": 1169320,
        "msgid": "british-intervention-indonesia-1447893297",
        "date": "2005-08-16 00:00:00",
        "title": "British intervention Indonesia",
        "author": null,
        "source": "JP",
        "tags": null,
        "topic": null,
        "summary": "British intervention Indonesia David Jardine, Carlisle, UK Sixty years ago on Aug. 17 Indonesia's Founding Fathers President Sukarno and Vice-President Mohamad Hatta issued the Proclamation of Independence or Proklomasi as it is known. An historic event. The national leaders, under great pressure from militant nationalist youth, had seized the hour. Unknown to the leaders and their enthusiastic followers, forces were soon to move against them.",
        "content": "<p>British intervention Indonesia<\/p>\n<p>David Jardine, Carlisle, UK<\/p>\n<p>Sixty years ago on Aug. 17 Indonesia's Founding Fathers<br>\nPresident Sukarno and Vice-President Mohamad Hatta issued the<br>\nProclamation of Independence or Proklomasi as it is known. An<br>\nhistoric event. The national leaders, under great pressure from<br>\nmilitant nationalist youth, had seized the hour.<\/p>\n<p>Unknown to the leaders and their enthusiastic followers,<br>\nforces were soon to move against them. Over the horizon were the<br>\nBritish, whose brief was to secure the terms of the Japanese<br>\nsurrender that had brought the Asia-Pacific War to an end. These<br>\nterms included the demobilization of the Japanese forces and the<br>\neventual repatriation of the soldiers, sailors and airmen to<br>\nJapan.<\/p>\n<p>Of more pressing concern to the British Supreme Commander for<br>\nSouth East Asia Lord Louis Mountbatten in the light of the many<br>\nstories of Japanese wartime atrocities that had already emerged<br>\nwas the fate of the tens of thousands of Allied POW and other<br>\ninternees, principally the Dutch women and children, held in<br>\nJapanese camps in Java, Sumatra and elsewhere.<\/p>\n<p>Allied SEAC HQ in Kandy, Ceylon issued \"instructions\" over the<br>\nradio to these unfortunates, who had suffered grievously in the<br>\ncamps for more than three years, to stay put until Allied troops<br>\narrived to free them. The Japanese were under strict orders to<br>\nsecure the camps and to maintain law and order. All of this,<br>\nneedless to say, was going on over the heads of the Indonesian<br>\nRepublican leaders.<\/p>\n<p>A collision course was set for which the Indonesians should<br>\ntake no responsibility; their justifiable aim was complete<br>\nindependence from the Netherlands after more than three centuries<br>\nof colonial rule and exploitation. The Dutch, whose homeland had<br>\nbeen smashed by the Nazi occupation and war and also by the<br>\nFamine Winter of 1944-1945, were intent on re-conquest of the<br>\ncolony once known as the Dutch East Indies.<\/p>\n<p>When Mountbatten dispatched British and Indian troops to<br>\nIndonesia in September 1945 no attempt had been made by him to<br>\nestablish contact with the Republican government. Indeed, on the<br>\ncontrary, these forces would land with no prior intelligence<br>\nwhatsoever, as Mountbatten himself would famously lament. The<br>\nBritish, whatever the rightfulness of their intentions towards<br>\nthe POW and internees, were simply blundering into the unknown.<br>\nThe Dutch, meanwhile, broadcast from Australia to denounce<br>\nSukarno and Hatta as \"quislings\".<\/p>\n<p>Younger Indonesian readers might now be mystified by this<br>\nreference. For their reference, Vidkun Quisling was the Norwegian<br>\nleader who threw in his lot with the Nazi occupation of his<br>\ncountry when the vast majority of his people either silently or<br>\nactively resisted it. To call Sukarno and Hatta \"quislings\" is<br>\nhistorically inaccurate. Neither man preached the virtues of the<br>\nJapanese occupation of the Indies, nor did they lead a puppet<br>\ngovernment; both simply had an eye on the future and whatever<br>\nroom for maneuver their nationalist cause might have.<\/p>\n<p>The British force that arrived in Batavia in September 1945<br>\nwas led by Gen. Sir Philip Christison and included men of the<br>\nSeaforth Highlanders, a Scottish regiment whose forebears had,<br>\ninterestingly, seen service in Java under Raffles in 1811-1816,<br>\nand Indian regiments such as the Gurkha Rifles and the Mahrattas.<br>\nFor the humanitarian purposes mentioned earlier teams called<br>\nRAPWI or Repatriation of Allied Prisoners of War and Internees<br>\nhad been formed and these fanned out, where they could in order<br>\nto locate their targets.<\/p>\n<p>Many of the Dutch, meanwhile, were in no mood to obey<br>\nMountbatten's instructions to stay put, even, that is, if they<br>\nhad had access to a radio, an offense liable to cruel punishment<br>\nby the Japanese. They were intent on returning to their pre-war<br>\nhomes in the cities and plantations, believing that they could<br>\nrestore the \"status quo ante\". Critically, the British were slow<br>\nto realize that this ambition was both futile and highly<br>\nprovocative to the Indonesians.<\/p>\n<p>The newly proclaimed Republic was now on a collision course<br>\nwith battle-hardened if war-weary British and Indian troops, some<br>\nof them fresh from the privations of the Burma campaign. If the<br>\nBritish would not recognize the republic and negotiate with it,<br>\nwhere to next?<\/p>\n<p>The author is a freelance writer.<\/p>",
        "url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/british-intervention-indonesia-1447893297",
        "image": ""
    },
    "sponsor": "Okusi Associates",
    "sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com"
}