{
    "success": true,
    "data": {
        "id": 1242722,
        "msgid": "behind-occasional-strains-between-neighbors-1447893297",
        "date": "2002-03-06 00:00:00",
        "title": "Behind occasional strains between neighbors",
        "author": null,
        "source": "JP",
        "tags": null,
        "topic": null,
        "summary": "Behind occasional strains between neighbors J. Soedjati Djiwandono, Political Analyst, Jakarta Geographic proximity does not ensure easy relations between neighboring countries. On the contrary, it may precisely be a hindrance to good and friendly relations. Take a look at relations between India and Pakistan, Japan and China, Japan and South Korea, China and Russia, or between Japan and Russia.",
        "content": "<p>Behind occasional strains between neighbors<\/p>\n<p>J. Soedjati Djiwandono, Political Analyst, Jakarta<\/p>\n<p>Geographic proximity does not ensure easy relations between<br>\nneighboring countries. On the contrary, it may precisely be a<br>\nhindrance to good and friendly relations. Take a look at<br>\nrelations between India and Pakistan, Japan and China, Japan and<br>\nSouth Korea, China and Russia, or between Japan and Russia.<\/p>\n<p>Likewise, commonalities and similarities in historical<br>\nbackgrounds and cultural traditions that often relate to<br>\ngeographic proximity do not necessarily contribute to smooth<br>\nrelations. In fact, similarities and differences are often of<br>\nlittle relevance to friendly relations between neighbors, unless<br>\nthey are of complementary nature in terms of their national<br>\ninterests.<\/p>\n<p>The present analysis will focus on the case of Indonesia's<br>\nbilateral relations with Australia, Malaysia, and Singapore.<br>\nThere is nothing new about that, except to the extent that it has<br>\nrecently assumed a more serious dimension.<\/p>\n<p>There has been a constant problem between Malaysia and<br>\nIndonesia on the flow of immigrants from Indonesia to Malaysia,<br>\nlegal as well as illegal, in search of a better life. Since the<br>\neconomic crisis in 1997, however, the problem has become worse.<br>\nIncreasing numbers of Indonesian immigrants of either status have<br>\nbeen returned, not to say deported, to Indonesia than ever<br>\nbefore.<\/p>\n<p>Indeed, if in the past, particularly since Sukarno's policy<br>\nagainst Malaysia in the early 1960's, Malaysia has a lingering<br>\nperception of Indonesia as potential source of threat to its<br>\nsecurity. Now if not in military or expansionist terms, since the<br>\nworsening crisis in 1997, Indonesia remains a potential threat to<br>\nthe security of its neighbors. One can imagine the possible flow<br>\nof \"boat people\" from Indonesia. The increase of immigrants,<br>\nlegal and illegal, is its manifestation.<\/p>\n<p>As regards Indonesia's relations with Australia, the strong<br>\nopposition expressed by Speaker of the House of Representatives<br>\n(DPR) Akbar Tandjung and Speaker of the People's Consultative<br>\nAssembly (MPR) Amien Rais to the recent visit of the Australian<br>\nPrime Minister John Howard reflected, again, how complex<br>\nrelations between the two countries had been. And the boisterous<br>\nreaction in Indonesia to the remark by Senior Minister Lee Kuan<br>\nYew that Indonesia is a nest of terrorists has reflected the<br>\nsporadic strains in the relations between the two neighbors.<\/p>\n<p>The question of the truth or falsity of Lee's remark has<br>\nbecome irrelevant. Emotion has dominated the controversy over the<br>\nissue.<\/p>\n<p>Indeed, geographic proximity has tended to give rise to undue<br>\nexpectations. Consciously or otherwise, Indonesians tend to<br>\nexpect Australia to understand Indonesia better than the United<br>\nStates and, therefore, to be more tolerant and less critical<br>\ntowards Indonesia.<\/p>\n<p>Thus Australia's attitude or policy that is negative in the<br>\neyes of Indonesia would tend to be resented more than a similar<br>\nattitude or policy adopted by the United States. In fact, despite<br>\nthe differences, there are more similarities between Australia<br>\nand the U.S, something Indonesians seem to ignore or could not<br>\ncare less about.<\/p>\n<p>Geographic proximity also tends to create certain<br>\nmisperceptions. Because of its sheer size in terms of its<br>\nterritory and population, Indonesia is often perceived by certain<br>\nquarters in Australia as a potential source of threat to their<br>\nsecurity, even if in the vague expression of a \"threat from the<br>\nNorth\", which may well refer to China.<\/p>\n<p>Officially, Indonesia often expresses its resentment, although<br>\nat the same time such a perception may have somewhat \"ego<br>\nmassaging\" effect on Indonesians.<\/p>\n<p>As regards Singapore, there is often a perception in Indonesia<br>\nthat Singapore is \"little China\". Its large Chinese population,<br>\nas part of the entire overseas Chinese population of Southeast<br>\nAsia, are often described as a potential \"fifth column\" for China<br>\nin the future. That such a perception is wrong on historical<br>\nground -- i.e. contrary to the original idea in the Spanish civil<br>\nwar in the mid 1930s -- is either overlooked or never known.<\/p>\n<p>It is often said that Singapore seems to be beset with a<br>\nbesieged mentality, like Israel. Indonesians do not seem to<br>\nappreciate this. Thus they do not seem to understand why<br>\nSingapore as well as Malaysia seem cautious towards Indonesia,<br>\nperceiving it as a potential source of threat to their security,<br>\neven that of the region.<\/p>\n<p>Towards the end of Soeharto's rule, for example, Senior<br>\nMinister Lee Kuan Yew often made the point that the stability of<br>\nthe region had been linked to the personal leadership of<br>\npresident Soeharto. He seemed to have been worried lest<br>\nSoeharto's successor might be one who would be one not as<br>\ncommitted as Soeharto had been to ASEAN.<\/p>\n<p>That cautious attitude, however, is not without foundation. It<br>\nis certainly based on past experience, particularly as related to<br>\nthe confrontation policy of Sukarno, and the invasion and, if not<br>\ndirectly impacting to ASEAN, the annexation of East Timor by<br>\nIndonesia under Soeharto. Even so, when the issue of East Timor<br>\nwas first discussed in the United Nations, the resentment of<br>\nIndonesia, Singapore abstained from a resolution that seemed to<br>\nfavour Indonesia's stand.<\/p>\n<p>There is also a lingering prejudice in Indonesia that<br>\nSingapore's prosperity has been at the expense of Indonesia.<br>\nThis, as well as the cry of \"intervention,\" is often brought to<br>\nthe surface again whenever Indonesians feel offended by Singapore<br>\nsuch as Lee Kuan Yew's remark.<\/p>\n<p>As regards Malaysia, in the past, probably to give a sense of<br>\nhaving a \"big brother\" in the face of China before Malaysia<br>\nopened diplomatic relations with that Asian giant, Malaysia was<br>\nkeen on the idea of \"Malay solidarity\" or \"brotherhood\" (Rumpun<br>\nMelayu), as a basis for Malaysian-Indonesian relations. However,<br>\nsuch an idea did not last long. Probably with the opening of<br>\ndiplomatic relations between Malaysia and China in the early<br>\n1970s and the strengthening of ASEAN, the idea of Rumpun Melayu<br>\nwas after all no longer necessary nor relevant.<\/p>\n<p>More importantly, in Indonesia the idea was losing support.<br>\nIndonesians of non-Malay stock and those who racially may well be<br>\nMalays but not Muslims began to feel less and less comfortable<br>\nwith it. In Malaysia, a Malay is by constitution a Muslim. That<br>\nis not the case in Indonesia.<\/p>",
        "url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/behind-occasional-strains-between-neighbors-1447893297",
        "image": ""
    },
    "sponsor": "Okusi Associates",
    "sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com"
}