Bargaining for a final price at the MPR's Annual Session<\/p>\n
More proposals of an independent constitution commission have
\nsomewhat balanced the demands to return to the 1945 Constitution;
\nbut political parties are still "holding hostage" their favorite
\narticles in the Constitution. Another problem is the legality of
\nthe Annual Session of the People's Consultative Assembly
\n(MPR)itself, says political lecturer Riswandha Imawan of Gadjah
\nMada University in Yogyakarta. He talked to The Jakarta Post's
\nreporter Sri Wahyuni.<\/p>\n
Question: The demand to return to the 1945 Constitution has
\nled to concerns of a repeat of the 1959 Presidential Decree. How
\ndo you see this?<\/p>\n
Answer: There is no reason to issue such a decision. The
\ncountry would have to be declared to be in a state of emergency.<\/p>\n
This is only possible when anti-reform and pro-reform groups
\nof the same strength are involved in a conflict and end up in a
\ndeadlock that can cause constitutional crisis, leading to
\nnational disintegration. Theoretically, such a situation will not
\nemerge in the present context.<\/p>\n
First, there has emerged talk of the establishment of an
\nindependent constitutional commission, which I support because
\nit's a very rational choice to settle the amendment process.<\/p>\n
Second, lobbying among the political elite has on earlier
\noccasions led to an agreement to avoid deadlock.<\/p>\n
Q: So what are the main constraints in this MPR session?<\/p>\n
A: The most worrying factor is the fact that some parties are
\ntaking particular articles in the Constitution hostage (to
\nachieve their interests). The Regional Representatives' faction
\nhas taken Article 31 and Article 16 hostage in a bid to maintain
\ntheir existence at the Assembly.<\/p>\n
Islamic-oriented political parties have taken Article 29
\nhostage (to try to change it to enable the adoption of sharia for
\nMuslims) in a bid to make nationalist parties lower their
\nbargaining position regarding the second round of the direct
\npresidential elections. This is what could lead to a deadlock in
\nthe session.<\/p>\n
However, this is only part of the game theory that the parties
\nare playing -- trying to maximize their own interests by
\nminimizing other parties' interests. This is what we can expect
\nduring these 10 days (of the Annual Session until Aug. 10).
\nPoliticians are always buying time.<\/p>\n
(Current developments) may look like the makings of a deadlock
\nthat could lead to a constitutional crisis and a return to the
\n1945 Constitution. Yet, if we observe how politics is conducted
\nin Indonesia, you should not worry. An agreement among the top
\nfigures of the parties has already been made.<\/p>\n
Last year's MPR session was an example of how a crucial
\nsituation on the last day of the session could be resolved thanks
\nto a short informal meeting among top party leaders; an agreement
\nwas reached in the last minutes of the session. On this occasion,
\nan agreement has been made even before the session has begun.<\/p>\n
Q: Could you elaborate on the conditions prior to the issuance of
\nthe July 5, 1959 Presidential Decree?<\/p>\n
A: It was the Konstituante, an institution that had the task of
\ndrawing up the Constitution, which was dismissed by then
\npresident Sukarno.<\/p>\n
Some regions were trying to break away from the republic as a
\nresult of the government's incompetence in handling problems. The
\nmilitary was also very actively involved in politics, not to
\nmention the intense confrontation between political parties. Top
\nparty leaders were competing to get close to the president. They
\nrefused to compromise, especially regarding state ideology and
\nthe Jakarta Charter (which includes the statement that Muslims
\nshould practice their religion according to their teachings,
\ntaken to mean the adoption of sharia).<\/p>\n
We can still avoid such a crisis. Just look at the repeated
\nstatements of MPR Speaker Amien Rais regarding, for example
\nArticle 29. He said he would try to discuss various alternatives.
\nIf the parties refused to adopt one, there's no reason to not
\nreturn to the original formulation.<\/p>\n
So (the apparent threat to return to the 1945 Constitution) is
\nnot a final price that cannot be bargained. It's just an
\nexperiment (to get the best that the parties can bargain for).<\/p>\n
Q: The Indonesian Military (TNI) and National Police faction
\nearlier raised a number of options regarding the amendment
\nprocess: To return to the 1945 Constitution -- later corrected to
\nmean to return to original articles if new formulations were not
\nagreed upon; to set up an independent constitutional commission
\nand to treat the amended constitution as a transitional one
\nbefore such a commission is established...<\/p>\n
A: (To return to the 1945 Constitution) would indeed be
\nridiculous. It's obvious that the original script (of the
\nConstitution) was executive heavy. It did not explicitly regulate
\nhuman rights and did not clearly state the check-and-balance
\nmechanism that enables control by political institutions.<\/p>\n
Q: The suspicion remains that the TNI's main target is reinstating
\nthe 1945 Constitution. What is your comment on this matter?<\/p>\n
A: There are some figures in the TNI, particularly elderly ones,
\nwho feel their achievements have been betrayed -- (the 1959
\nreinstatement of) the 1945 Constitution.<\/p>\n
But there are also many TNI figures who are capable of seeing
\nthat a constitution is not a holy book. It can be adapted
\naccording to developments. But they also want to remind us not to
\ngo too far. They do not want the MPR to act beyond its authority.<\/p>\n
So I think (such figures) are trying to remind us to think
\nmore rationally, that according to the previous amendment, this
\n(amendment process) must be done through a Constitutional Court.<\/p>\n
Q: Would demands to return to the old Constitution by TNI be an
\neffort to restore its existence in politics?<\/p>\n
A: Yes, the argument would be that they're needed for national
\nstability. The best option would be to treat the Constitution as
\na transitional constitution while waiting for the establishment
\nof an independent constitutional commission.<\/p>\n
The toughest problem that the MPR is facing is that it has
\nabolished its own existence by amending Article 1 of the
\nConstitution regarding its function and position. Therefore, the
\nkey factor for this year's Annual Session is the establishment of
\na Constitutional Court.<\/p>\n
So the MPR should just focus on this because the amended
\narticle says approval to an amendment to the Constitution can
\nonly be authorized by the courts.<\/p>\n
Q: What's the worst possibility should the unamended Constitution be
\nreinstated?<\/p>\n
A: It would cause the restoration of authoritarianism, with the
\nmilitary as the most triumphant party.<\/p>",
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