Bali bombing: An investigator's analysis<\/p>\n
Robert S. Finnegan, The Jakarta Post, Jakarta<\/p>\n
On October 12, 2002 the Indonesian island of Bali experienced a
\nterrorist attack that rocked the world. It was unquestionably
\nwell-coordinated and executed, the largest in the country's
\nhistory.<\/p>\n
Investigators and forensics experts from both national and
\ninternational teams that had quickly been assembled flocked to
\nthe crime scene, ostensibly to begin what should have been a
\nlong, drawn out exercise in forensics and investigative sleuthing
\nto identify and capture the foot soldiers, coordinators and
\nmasterminds behind the attack that has left over 190 known dead,
\nscores missing without a trace and hundreds more wounded.<\/p>\n
It has turned out to be anything but that.<\/p>\n
The Indonesian government immediately vowed to unite in the
\nhunt for the bombers.<\/p>\n
The U.S. government along with the international community
\nseized the opportunity to point the finger at the shadowy al-
\nQaeda group along with Muslim cleric Abu Bakar Ba'asyir as the
\nculprits.<\/p>\n
In hindsight, it would appear that perhaps these individuals,
\ngiven their apparent intimate knowledge of the perpetrators
\nimmediately following the bombing should have been included on
\nthe investigating team. Perhaps if they had we would know more
\nthan we do today, which is very little despite the volume of
\ninformation (or disinformation) being vomited out by the
\nspokesmen for the investigative teams on a daily basis.<\/p>\n
A creeping sense of foreboding began soon after the forensics
\npeople and other investigators (inclusive of Insp. Gen. I Made
\nPastika and his army of hundreds of supposedly top-notch
\ninvestigators with virtually unlimited resources at their
\ndisposal) announced after only a week and a half that they were
\nwrapping up their on-site work and retreating to the labs to
\nanalyze their findings. Astounding work, as it must have set a
\nworld record for crime scene forensic analysis.<\/p>\n
Given the scope of the bombing and the sheer size of the
\nprimary and secondary blast areas - where trace from a plethora
\nof different explosive compounds were swabbed from - this was a
\nfeat that escaped even the vaunted investigators working the
\nWorld Trade Center crime scene in New York, who spent nearly a
\nyear literally sifting by hand for evidence at the site. It
\nwould appear that the teams on Bali possessed far superior skills
\nand techniques ... or was there something else responsible for
\ntheir haste in wrapping up so quickly and then sending the rest
\nof the evidence as quickly as possible to the bottom of the ocean
\noff Bali?<\/p>\n
At this point in their investigation National Police Chief
\nGen. Da'i Bachtiar states for the record that "traces of a
\nchemical powder used in the bomb" were found in the van allegedly
\nused to transport the large device. What powder? Even a cursory
\nexamination of the crater and primary site immediately following
\nthe bombings would make this statement laughable were it not for
\nthe circumstances.<\/p>\n
If indeed the Mitsubishi L300 van was used in the large blast,
\nthe five-foot deep by twenty-foot wide crater indicates that it
\nwould have been completely vaporized, including the engine block
\nwhich they apparently found intact - along with the victims who
\ninstantly vanished. Indeed, this begs the question: Where did the
\ninvestigators obtain this evidence in relation to the crater?<\/p>\n
Is it possible that if the van survived the large blast it was
\nbecause it was parked at the edge of the primary blast zone,
\npacked with small amounts of all the explosives - whose traces
\nwere found at the sites - in order to throw off independent
\ninvestigators?<\/p>\n
In addition, there is the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU),
\nallegedly signed jointly by the National Police and the
\ninternational investigation team, specifically restricting the
\nscope of the "investigation links" and prohibiting international
\ninquiries. Could this at least partially explain why Pastika has
\ncontinually stonewalled, intimidated and generally obstructed
\nindependent investigators during the course of their work?<\/p>\n
During the first weeks of the investigation, notables such as
\nState Intelligence Agency (BIN) Chief Hendropriyono, Susilo
\nYudhoyono, Assembly Speaker Amien Rais and Pastika focused or
\npretended to focus on foreigners - without specifying "which"
\nforeigners - who they said were behind the attack. Somehow this
\ntwisting, turning trail dried up and disappeared into thin air
\nwithout explanation, along with the former retired Air Force
\nOfficer who allegedly confessed to police his involvement in the
\nbombing and was then released. To this day his whereabouts
\nremain unknown and police investigators either cannot or will not
\nrelease any information on this man, an officer who was allegedly
\ntrained in America in explosives and is an incredible lead that
\nshould have been followed-up on aggressively and thoroughly. Why
\nwas it not?<\/p>\n
Are these the statements and actions of professional
\ninvestigators - or the actions of individuals engaged in a cover-
\nup?<\/p>\n
Let's look at the myriad of explosive traces found at the site
\nand subsequently cited individually off and on by investigators
\nand police as "the explosive" used in the bombings.<\/p>\n
First it was C-4, then RDX. These two are actually the same,
\nthe difference being nine percent mallable plastic used in C-4.
\nSo, which is more powerful? RDX - nine percent more powerful
\nthan C-4.<\/p>\n
Day after day, investigators trotted out a different explosive
\nand combinations of explosives purportedly responsible for the
\nblasts. In addition to C-4 and RDX there was now TNT, Ammonium
\nNitrate, HMX, Semtex, PETN, Chlorate and napalm. Everything but
\nthe kitchen sink. Was this gross ineptitude? Or another ploy to
\nthrow independent investigators off the trail?<\/p>\n
For example, had the originators of the napalm theory studied
\nup on the material before opening their mouths they would have
\nknown that napalm leaves a sticky, smelly residue on everything,
\nincluding victims. This was not in evidence at the blast site or
\nat the Sanglah burn ward and morgue, where the burn victims were
\ntaken. Therefore, in the absence of any physical evidence,
\nnapalm must be excluded and the originators of this farce be
\nawarded a grade of "F" in "explosives analysis." In other words,
\nif you are going to lie, be professional about it at least know
\nwhat you are lying about and have the mental capacity to remember
\nwhat you said when you said it. This single evidentiary template
\ncould easily be applied and extended to the entire "official
\ninvestigation" of the Bali bombings where deceit, obstruction and
\nobfuscation are and have been the name of the game.<\/p>\n
To put this in perspective, let us look at three of the
\nexplosives claimed by official investigators to have been used in
\nthe bombings, starting with the compound that has the lowest
\nvelocity of detonation in feet per second (FPS) which is
\nPotassium Chlorate at 3,500 FPS; compared to 12,000 FPS for
\nAmmonium Nitrate and diesel and finally 27,800 FPS for RDX. In
\nsimple terms, at any given distance from ground zero these
\ndifferent explosive compounds will exert pressure in pounds per
\nsquare inch. Damage to people and structures are a result of this
\npressure in varying degrees depending on the velocity of
\ndetonation. Even if RDX were used, the amount needed to cause the
\nlevel of destruction in evidence at the crime scene should have
\nbeen in excess of anything available through even the military,
\nwho denied possession of the explosive. There is also the
\ndelivery of the device to be taken into account.<\/p>\n
Each of the explosives cited by investigators (with the
\nexception of napalm) have unique and individual characteristics
\nthat vary for usage, stability and explosive yeild. They require
\nspecific detonators for each in order to obtain maximum effect.<\/p>\n
Also now at the bottom of the ocean off Bali is the
\nreinforcing bar (rebar) located more than fifty feet from ground
\nzero that had been completely stripped of concrete as a result of
\nthe blast. Documented military estimates of the force required to
\naccomplish this is roughly 1 million to 1.5 million pounds per
\nsquare inch.<\/p>\n
What kind of weapon or device could accomplish this? And for
\nthat matter leave a crater of that size? Why was it filled in?
\nThis arguably could have been one of the most important pieces of
\nevidence available to investigators not only for the trace
\nexplosive in evidence, but from which also could have been
\ndetermined (roughly) the size and composition of the device.<\/p>\n
With the police claiming (off and on) that Amrozi, Mukhlas and
\nSamudra (who allegedly at one point denied involvement in the
\nBali bombings) were the perpetrators of the blasts, then why do
\nthe official investigators not know EXACTLY the type of device
\nused in the main bombing and its precise composition? To put it
\nquite simply, how can we have a bomber or bombers in the absence
\nof a bomb?<\/p>\n
Why were Amrozi and Samudra so quick to confess and finger
\ntheir "accomplices"? Were these the actions of dedicated,
\nradical, Islamic fundamentalists? "Professionals"? Did they
\nexpect to further their cause by eviscerating their own
\norganization? Does it make sense that they were willing to kill
\nand maim hundreds of innocents - including many fellow
\nIndonesians - and yet implicate their comrades to save their own
\nskins?<\/p>\n
Given this dismal investigative performance, exactly what role
\ndid the international investigating team play in this debacle?<\/p>\n
If indeed there is one thing that has been glaringly apparent
\nthroughout this investigation, it is that perhaps nothing close
\nto the truth has been told as of today. It is also apparent that
\nsomething is very, very wrong not only with the procedural
\naspects of this case, but also with the suppression and outright
\ndestruction of evidence. The international investigators bear a
\nheavy responsibility for this, and should be held accountable.<\/p>\n
Jakarta Post Editor Robert S. Finnegan is an internationally
\npublished investigative reporter with over two decades
\ninvestigative experience. He currently holds an Alaska (U.S.)
\nPrivate Investigator license.<\/p>",
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