{
    "success": true,
    "data": {
        "id": 1160138,
        "msgid": "bali-and-the-faceless-foe-1447893297",
        "date": "2005-10-04 00:00:00",
        "title": "Bali and the faceless foe",
        "author": null,
        "source": "",
        "tags": null,
        "topic": null,
        "summary": "Bali and the faceless foe Experts' early assessment of the Saturday evening bomb blasts in Bali points to the Jamaah Islamiyah (JI) as the party responsible. Two of its principal operatives, Azahari Husin and Noordin Top, are believed to be behind the attacks. Both are reputed to be bomb-makers and have been on the run for several years.",
        "content": "<p>Bali and the faceless foe<\/p>\n<p>Experts' early assessment of the Saturday evening bomb blasts<br>\nin Bali points to the Jamaah Islamiyah (JI) as the party<br>\nresponsible. Two of its principal operatives, Azahari Husin and<br>\nNoordin Top, are believed to be behind the attacks. Both are<br>\nreputed to be bomb-makers and have been on the run for several<br>\nyears. If Indonesian counter-terrorism experts and independent<br>\nspecialists such as the Singapore-based Dr Rohan Gunaratna are<br>\ncorrect about JI involvement, this says that it remains a<br>\nformidable force for destruction despite arrests of key figures<br>\nand organizational disruptions in several of the Southeast Asian<br>\ncountries it operates in. The question is, what would it take to<br>\ndisable the organization and its collaborator outfits like the<br>\nAbu Sayyaf? Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand have been more<br>\nsuccessful at holding the line, but it is acknowledged this is an<br>\ninterminable campaign.<\/p>\n<p>But Indonesia and the Philippines continue to be vulnerable,<br>\ndespite some notable captures and prosecutions. JI's trail of<br>\nsignature hits in Indonesia would suggest it has regenerative<br>\ncapability that would trouble its most determined adversaries.<br>\nStarting with the first Bali attack in 2002, it has managed to<br>\nmount deadly strikes each year (the Jakarta Marriott Hotel in<br>\n2003, the Australian embassy last year). And now Bali 2005, with<br>\n26 dead so far. Since April 1999, it has been associated with<br>\nsome 50 successful and attempted terror incidents across the<br>\nIndonesian archipelago.<\/p>\n<p>Work on the difficult ideological front to defeat a virulent<br>\nform of thinking will go on for decades. For the here and now, it<br>\nbears repeating that sifting of raw intelligence remains the one<br>\ncredible way to thwart such attacks. Security agencies should not<br>\nbe discouraged that the attacks in Bali's Kuta and Jimbaran areas<br>\ntook place despite intelligence reported by a number of countries<br>\nfor months that Indonesia, specifically Jakarta, was being<br>\ntargeted around this period.<\/p>\n<p>The problem was much of the information lacked details, so<br>\ncritical for meaningful intelligence work. The public will never<br>\nknow of successful infiltrations and the use of informers, and of<br>\nterrorist operations that were aborted because the heat was too<br>\nmuch. There is comfort to be drawn here. The hope is that the<br>\nquality of intelligence evaluation improves faster than a fervid<br>\nfatalism is growing.<br>\n-- The Straits Times, Singapore<\/p>",
        "url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/bali-and-the-faceless-foe-1447893297",
        "image": ""
    },
    "sponsor": "Okusi Associates",
    "sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com"
}