Balancing the defense budget<\/p>\n
Imanuddin Razak, Staff Writer, The Jakarta Post, Jakarta<\/p>\n
The government, through the Ministry of Defense, launched on
\nMarch 31 a white paper on defense strategy.<\/p>\n
To some, the publication of the paper was welcome, an
\nindication of transparency on the part of the defense ministry
\nand the Indonesian Military (TNI).<\/p>\n
Still, the paper has received strong criticism, as it calls
\nfor the importance of restoring the military's territorial
\nfunction.<\/p>\n
The function, which includes Army bases and posts at all
\nadministrative levels down to that of the village, has been
\nblamed for TNI's dominating political role and abuses during the
\nleadership of then president Soeharto.<\/p>\n
However, while most of the paper's content sets out the
\nmilitary's defense strategies and policies, the last section,
\nChapter Six, calls for an increase in the annual defense budget,
\nfrom below 1 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) to around 2
\npercent of GDP within the next two or three years.<\/p>\n
In the long term -- 10 years to 15 years from now -- the
\nministry is seeking a defense budget of 3.86 percent of GDP.<\/p>\n
The government slightly increased the TNI budget to Rp 13.9
\ntrillion (US$1.5 billion) this year. Last year, it received Rp 11
\ntrillion.<\/p>\n
The paper indeed contains a contradictory statement, as it
\nsays that within the next 10 years to 15 years Indonesia will not
\nface serious threats from other countries in the form of invasion
\nor military attack; but that it will face a variety of domestic
\nthreats, including radical movements, communal conflicts,
\nterrorism and separatist movements.<\/p>\n
A contradicting reality was when TNI chief Gen. Endriartono
\nSutarto said last Wednesday that it was now in the process of
\npurchasing 48 Russian jet fighters, including Sukhoi-27s and
\nSukhoi-30s, over the next four years.<\/p>\n
The question is whether the country needs that number of
\nmodern jet fighters, given that the defense ministry said that
\nthere would be no serious threats from other countries in the
\nnext 15 years. Modern jet fighters are needed to cope with
\noutside threats, not domestic radical and separatist movements,
\nterrorism or communal conflicts.<\/p>\n
Also, the purchase of Sukhoi fighters is considerably
\ncontroversial: A Sukhoi fighter, fully equipped with arms and
\ncombat technology, is worth around $100 million. Regardless of
\nhow it will be paid for, if Indonesia purchases 48 Sukhois, it
\nwill have to pay $4.8 billion, or triple this year's defense
\nbudget.<\/p>\n
It is indeed true that TNI needs to upgrade its Navy and Air
\nForce fleets and its Army's equipment.<\/p>\n
But TNI should not hastily ask for more money, especially when
\nthe country has yet to recover from the economic crisis.<\/p>\n
TNI should spare a thought for its fellow citizens, such as
\nthose working in the informal sector, like vendors, who have
\nworked hard to survive economic hardship. Scores of laid-off
\nworkers have also tried to run their own business.<\/p>\n
Business-wise, management pundits always advise that in the
\nevent of an organization's financial problems, it must
\nimmediately look for new sources of income to finance its
\noperational activities.<\/p>\n
Military analysts have estimated that the government's
\nbudgetary allocation to TNI accounts for only 30 percent to 35
\npercent of its actual expenditure. The remaining 65 percent to 70
\npercent is raised by \"off-budget\" businesses, including
\nfoundations and other \"less legal\" operations, they said.<\/p>\n
It has widely been suggested that TNI's business foundations
\nand units should be put under a holding company, to be managed
\nand audited by the government, which could then return some 75
\npercent of its profits back to TNI for soldiers' welfare.<\/p>\n
It should also be made clear whether the money that results
\nfrom its business units and foundations really goes into TNI's
\ncoffers for use on the welfare of its troops -- or if it has
\nmerely lined the pockets of its individual leaders.<\/p>\n
And if all these other sources of income still cannot cover
\nits expenditure, any adviser would surely refer to the basic
\nprinciple of business prudence -- that spending should not be
\ngreater than revenue.<\/p>\n
The paper reveals in Chapter Six that the defense budget has
\nlargely been used to cover routine spending -- troop salaries,
\npurchase of goods, maintenance and official trips of its officers
\n-- rather than developing the state's defense system.<\/p>\n
For example, 2002 saw budget spending amounting to Rp 2.8
\ntrillion and routine spending of Rp 9.8 trillion.<\/p>\n
To cut spending, the TNI could consider reducing the purchase
\nof unnecessary goods and minimizing officers' trips, particularly
\noverseas ones.<\/p>\n
Perhaps, the TNI should adopt the words of late U.S. president
\nJohn Fitzgerald Kennedy: \"Don't ask what your country can do for
\nyou, but what you can do for your country.\"<\/p>",
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