Balancing power in and outside the ARF<\/p>\n
The recent progress made by the ASEAN Regional Forum might well
\nbe reversed by a combination of factors, institutional and
\ngeopolitical. Amitav Acharya examines the subject<\/p>\n
The second meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), held in
\nBrunei on Aug. 1, may well be remembered as a landmark event in
\nthe evolution of Asia-Pacific security cooperation. This is not
\nso much because of the list of security measures adopted by the
\nARF in Brunei. In fact, the ARF ministers selected only a handful
\nof items from the elaborate list of proposals contained in a
\nConcept Paper prepared by ASEAN following year-long consultations
\namong ARF members.<\/p>\n
The Brunei agenda called for exchanging information on annual
\ndefense postures on a voluntary basis, increasing dialogs on
\nsecurity issues on bilateral, sub-regional and regional bases,
\nmaintaining senior-level contacts and exchanges among military
\ninstitutions, and encouraging participation of the ARF members in
\nthe UN Conventional Arms Register.<\/p>\n
But the Brunei meeting might be remembered for two other and
\narguably more significant events, both of which preceded the ARF
\nmeeting. The first was Vietnam's formal entry into ASEAN.<\/p>\n
Although a mixed blessing, this considerably strengthens the
\ngrouping's clout and bargaining power, especially in dealing with
\nthe larger powers within the ARF, including China. The
\npotentially more important development was what some ASEAN
\nministers saw as a notable shift in China's position on the South
\nChina Sea dispute. In Brunei, Chinese Foreign Minister Qian
\nQichen hinted that Beijing was now willing to discuss the dispute
\nmultilaterally with ASEAN. He also seemed to accept the Law of
\nthe Sea as a basis for negotiations to resolve the dispute.<\/p>\n
Whether these statements, described by Philippine Foreign
\nSecretary Domingo Siazon as \"good signals\" from China, will
\nbecome official Chinese policy is far from certain. The signs are
\nthat the so-called shift in China's position on territorial
\nissues may be more apparent than real. While the Chinese Foreign
\nMinister was trying to appear conciliatory, his spokesman Shen
\nGuofeng reasserted an old position affirming China's
\n\"indisputable sovereignty over the islands and their adjacent
\nwaters\". In his view, the ARF was \"not an appropriate place\" for
\ndiscussions on the issue since, in his words, \"the most effective
\nway to handle this dispute is through bilateral negotiations\".<\/p>\n
The episode reflects the dilemmas of Chinese policy towards
\nmultilateral security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific. While
\nunwilling to sacrifice national interests and pride, China is
\nclearly feeling the pressure from ARF members to compromise more
\non this sensitive issue. By making an effort to sound
\nconciliatory, China clearly seeks to avoid being isolated within
\nthe ARF. For China, the political costs of defection from a
\nmultilateral security forum like the ARF have begun to outweigh
\nthe strategic benefits accruing from an uncompromising
\nterritorial posture.<\/p>\n
Apart from the South China Sea issue, the Brunei meeting did
\nprovide some insight into the ARF's long-term plans. The latter
\nenvisages three phases of security cooperation: confidence-
\nbuilding, preventive diplomacy and \"elaboration of approaches to
\nconflicts\". The original draft of the ASEAN concept paper listed
\nthe third stage as one of \"conflict resolution\", but the change
\nwas made as a concession to China which had warned against rapid
\ninstitutionalization of the ARF.<\/p>\n
The meeting also decided to set up three working groups, one
\ndealing with confidence-building measures (to be chaired by
\nIndonesia and Japan), another dealing with peacekeeping
\noperations (co-chaired by Malaysia and Canada) and a third one on
\nsearch-and-rescue cooperation (led by Singapore and the U.S.).
\nThese groups are expected to play an important role in developing
\nconcrete steps towards greater security cooperation beyond what
\nwas already adopted in Brunei.<\/p>\n
The Brunei meeting underscored the close linkage between
\nbilateralism and multilateralism in Asia-Pacific security
\ncooperation. A multilateral setting can both encourage and
\nprovide a useful venue for serious efforts at bilateral problem-
\nsolving. Although the meeting between Qian Qichen and Warren
\nChristopher produced no breakthrough in dealing with the fallout
\nof Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui's visit to the U.S., the very
\nfact that it was held underscores the usefulness of the ARF and
\nthe ASEAN ministerial consultations in providing a conducive
\ninstitutional setting. Similarly, the meeting between the Foreign
\nMinisters of China and the Philippines was an important step
\ntowards avoiding further tensions over the Spratly Islands.<\/p>\n
The Brunei meeting confirmed that ASEAN remains cautious about
\ndeepening the scope and pace of security cooperation in the Asia-
\nPacific region. The adoption of more intrusive measures of
\nconfidence-building remains a distant prospect. At the same time,
\nhowever, the Brunei meeting signaled a significant widening of
\nASEAN's (and the ARF's) security horizons. Malaysia's strong
\nvoicing of concern over the Bosnian situation and the intense
\ncriticism directed against French nuclear testing in the South
\nPacific by most ARF members are indicative of the development of
\nthe ARF as a debating venue for global security issues.<\/p>\n
But ultimately, a larger membership and wider security agenda
\nmight also pose serious challenges for ASEAN, the self-proclaimed
\n\"primary driving force\" behind the ARF. The advent of the ARF
\nrepresents a significant broadening of ASEAN hitherto inward-
\nlooking and sub-regional political and security agenda. An
\nexpanded ASEAN makes it more difficult for the group to achieve
\nconsensus on key issues, as the Foreign Minister of Singapore
\nnoted in Brunei.<\/p>\n
More ominously, Malaysia's Foreign Minister spoke of growing
\ndisunity within ASEAN over developments in the wider Asia-Pacific
\nregion. His reference to a lack of \"resolve\" on the part of ASEAN
\nto \"stay united in the face of certain pushes and pulls exerted
\nupon it by the dynamics of international politics and diplomacy\",
\nwas an implicit criticism of fellow ASEAN members who had failed
\nto back Malaysia's own regional and international initiatives,
\nparticularly the East Asian Economic Caucus proposal.<\/p>\n
Apart from questions of unity, ASEAN may have reason to fear
\nlosing control of the ARF to the grouping's larger and more
\npowerful actors. The ARF is an oddity in one important respect.
\nIt is the only regional security forum in which all the major
\npowers of the contemporary international system are represented
\n(if one accepts the representation of Britain, France and Germany
\nthrough the EU).<\/p>\n
It is also a rare case where leadership in institution-
\nbuilding has been provided by a collection of weaker states.
\nASEAN facilitated the creation of the ARF by providing it with a
\nsuitable institutional setting and anchoring it on its own long-
\nstanding code of inter-state behavior.<\/p>\n
While as a collective ASEAN carries significant diplomatic and
\npolitical clout within the ARF, its ability to prevail over the
\nmajor powers such as China and the U.S. on hard strategic issues
\nmight be limited. The fate of the ARF might well be decided by
\nthe shifting balance of structural strength among the major
\npowers in the region, rather than by ASEAN's painstaking and
\nsincere efforts at providing normative and entrepreneurial
\nleadership.<\/p>\n
This danger is especially apparent when one looks at ASEAN's
\napproach to the all important question of how to deal with
\nresurgent Chinese power. Under present circumstances, ASEAN's
\npreferred policy of \"engaging\" China is perhaps better than the
\nalternative of \"containing\" it. But this policy assumes that
\nChina is willing to be engaged on terms set out by ASEAN. If
\nChina is not, then an engagement policy could become an excuse
\nfor inaction and mask a lack of resolve in dealing with the
\nrealities such as China's displacement of the regional balance of
\npower. An ASEAN-led ARF can be good for debate and discussions,
\nbut might ultimately have a limited ability to influence the
\nbalance among the major powers, a key determinant of regional
\nstability.<\/p>\n
Dr. Amitav Acharya is an Associate Professor of Political Science
\nat York University, Canada.<\/p>",
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