{
    "success": true,
    "data": {
        "id": 1092635,
        "msgid": "avoiding-the-mistakes-of-ambon-1447893297",
        "date": "2001-03-01 00:00:00",
        "title": "Avoiding the mistakes of Ambon",
        "author": null,
        "source": "JP",
        "tags": null,
        "topic": null,
        "summary": "Avoiding the mistakes of Ambon By George J. Aditjondro NEWCASTLE, Australia (JP): Indonesia has again been plunged into a new spate of ethnic violence. Since the first Dayak attack on Madurese settlers in the town of Sampit, Central Kalimantan, on Feb. 18, at least 400 people have been killed -- mostly Madurese. Jakarta's response has, however, been deplorable.",
        "content": "<p>Avoiding the mistakes of Ambon<\/p>\n<p>By George J. Aditjondro<\/p>\n<p>NEWCASTLE, Australia (JP): Indonesia has again been plunged<br>\ninto a new spate of ethnic violence. Since the first Dayak attack<br>\non Madurese settlers in the town of Sampit, Central Kalimantan,<br>\non Feb. 18, at least 400 people have been killed -- mostly<br>\nMadurese.<\/p>\n<p>Jakarta's response has, however, been deplorable. After first<br>\nallowing the police and military to be passive onlookers, with<br>\nonly the Navy helping tens of thousands of Madurese migrants flee<br>\nto East Java, Vice President Megawati Soekarnoputri has deployed<br>\n1,200 officers and soldiers from the 650 Battalion of the<br>\nStrategic Reserve Command (KOSTRAD) to the troubled province.<\/p>\n<p>Heavily outnumbered, they have not been able to stop the<br>\ncarnage, while Dayak vigilantes have occupied the province's<br>\ncapital, Palangkaraya, in their campaign to cleanse the province<br>\nof all Madurese migrants.<\/p>\n<p>Jakarta's uneasiness in dealing with this recent ethnic<br>\nuprising indicates several points.<\/p>\n<p>First, it shows how unprepared the National Police is in<br>\ntaking over the role of maintaining civilian peace and order from<br>\nthe military, after 30 years of living in its shadow.<\/p>\n<p>Apart from Jakarta, where the Police's Special Brigade<br>\n(Brimob) has enough water cannons and tear gas to deal with a<br>\nmassive uprising, in the outer islands -- especially in Aceh and<br>\nWest Papua -- Brimob troops have responded with the same brutal<br>\ntactics as their military counterparts: shoot all troublemakers<br>\non sight.<\/p>\n<p>That is, if they are not outnumbered by the troublemakers.<\/p>\n<p>Second, the military commanders in Jakarta have not learned<br>\nthe bitter lessons from Ambon in Maluku.<\/p>\n<p>Sending in Kostrad troops did not help to extinguish the<br>\nethnic flames in Maluku, but had instead fanned the flames, due<br>\nto the military doctrine of treating all social unrest as treason<br>\nand all troublemakers as enemies of the state -- to be<br>\nexterminated.<\/p>\n<p>Kostrad troops from Makassar, South Sulawesi, had proven to be<br>\nnot impartial in the interethnic and interreligious riots in<br>\nAmbon, and openly sided with the Muslim locals and migrants.<\/p>\n<p>Third, the central government has not realized the extent of<br>\nbitterness which the Dayak people, the indigenous people of<br>\nKalimantan, feel toward those successive governments in<br>\nmarginalizing them on all fronts.<\/p>\n<p>Certainly, the massive opening up of Kalimantan to foreign and<br>\nnational mining, forestry and plantation companies, as well as to<br>\nplanned and spontaneous migrants from Java and other islands, the<br>\npoor, traders and laborers, have not benefited the indigenous<br>\npeople, who have been systematically evicted and alienated from<br>\ntheir customary lands.<\/p>\n<p>Then, all existing political parties have not seriously<br>\naddressed Dayak concerns or included Dayak intellectuals in their<br>\nnational boards.<\/p>\n<p>In fact, the political party law that determines that all<br>\npolitical parties have to have branches in 13 provinces closes<br>\nthe door for the emergence of a Kalimantan-wide party, since<br>\nthere are only four provinces in this Indonesian part of the<br>\nisland of Kalimantan, or Borneo.<\/p>\n<p>This is especially ironic, considering the fact that the<br>\nCentral Kalimantan province was created by the late president<br>\nSukarno in 1957 in response to aspirations expressed by the Pro<br>\nPanca Sila Cutlass and Shield Movement (Gerakan Mandau Talawang<br>\nPro Panca Sila [GMTPS]).<\/p>\n<p>This Ngaju-Dayak insurrection demanded a separate province for<br>\nthe Ngaju-Dayak people, separate from the existing province of<br>\nSouth Kalimantan.<\/p>\n<p>It broke out on Nov. 10, 1956, with an attack on the police<br>\nstation in Pahandut, the village that later became Palangkaraya,<br>\nCentral Kalimantan's newly created capital.<\/p>\n<p>This movement was partly triggered in reaction to the rising<br>\nmovement to create an Islamic state, Darul Islam, which was<br>\nwidely supported by Ibnu Hajar in South Kalimantan.<\/p>\n<p>Apart from upholding the state philosophy of Panca Sila, GMTPS<br>\nalso supported a federative structure for Indonesia, rather than<br>\nthe unitarian structure that has been upheld with the military's<br>\niron fist for nearly five decades.<\/p>\n<p>So, if Jakarta wants to find a fundamental solution to the<br>\nDayak rebellion in Central Kalimantan, and prevent it from<br>\nspreading to the other Kalimantan provinces, and turn it into an<br>\nisland-wide movement for Dayak self-determination, Megawati and<br>\nher military supporters had better fly over and start talking to<br>\nthe Dayak leaders, rather than simply using the Wild West style<br>\nof \"sending in the cavalry\".<\/p>\n<p>Dr. George J. Aditjondro teaches at the Department of<br>\nSociology and Anthropology at the University of Newcastle,<br>\nAustralia.<\/p>",
        "url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/avoiding-the-mistakes-of-ambon-1447893297",
        "image": ""
    },
    "sponsor": "Okusi Associates",
    "sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com"
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