Avoid copying Lebanon's mistakes<\/p>\n
By Omar Halim<\/p>\n
JAKARTA (JP): The end of the Israeli occupation of Lebanese
\nterritory will trigger a series of developments and bring new
\nopportunities for Lebanon.<\/p>\n
The withdrawal of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) will bring
\nan end their effective support for the South Lebanon Army (SLA),
\na surrogate military force created, trained, sustained and
\nfinanced by Israel, which initially mostly comprised of Lebanese
\nMaronite Christians.<\/p>\n
These days, one reads that SLA posts and equipment are being
\nabandoned and some of its personnel and their families are
\nfleeing southern Lebanon and seeking asylum from Israel.<\/p>\n
The \"vacuum\" created by the sudden and rapid withdrawal of
\nforces loyal to Israel is apparently being filled by Hizbollah
\nforces, which are rapidly advancing towards the international
\nborder or, more properly termed, the Armistice Demarcation Line
\n(ADL).<\/p>\n
It is assumed that they are not overrunning the United Nations
\nInterim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) positions, which is located in
\nan area about 20 kilometers south of the Litany River (the
\nWestern Sector).<\/p>\n
The area south of the Western Sector, about 5 kilometers by
\n7.5 kilometers wide, down to the Armed Demarcation Line with
\nIsrael, was once controlled by SLA\/IDF forces.<\/p>\n
This means that Hizbollah forces would take over control of
\nthis area, together with the Eastern Sector of UNIFIL (up to the
\nLebanese border with Syria), which UNIFIL has never solidly
\ncontrolled since this sector has never been implicitly recognized
\nby the UN as being formally occupied by Israel.<\/p>\n
If this picture were to come true, then it would be very odd
\nindeed, since UN forces would become \"encircled\" by the Lebanese
\nArmy to the north and Hizbollah forces to the east and south. In
\nthis case, it would not be clear what would be the future
\nfunction of the UN forces.<\/p>\n
After the first Israeli invasion on March 14, 1978, which was
\nundertaken as a response to a Palestinian Liberation Organization
\n(PLO) commando attack near Tel Aviv from its bases in Lebanon,
\nthe UN Security Council, on March 19 1978, established UNIFIL to
\n(a) confirm the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon; (b)
\nrestore international peace and security; and (c) assist the
\ngovernment of Lebanon in restoring its effective authority over
\nthe area.<\/p>\n
One of the first problems faced by the UNIFIL mission was that
\nits \"area of operation\" was not negotiated beforehand with the
\nconflicting parties, and defined clearly by the Security Council.<\/p>\n
The mission was to define its own area of operation, based on
\nthe reasoning that after it was able to confirm the withdrawal of
\nIsraeli forces (the first part of the Mandate), it would define,
\nand maintain its own area of operation, based on consultations
\nwith the parties concerned.<\/p>\n
But there was no commitment made by the Israelis, either to
\nthe Security Council or to the United States, that they were
\ngoing to withdraw from Lebanon.<\/p>\n
There was therefore no Israeli withdrawal to be observed and
\nconfirmed, something which has persisted until now. At that time,
\nPresident Jimmy Carter was anxious not to let the Lebanon issue
\ninterfere with his mediation involving Egypt and Israel, which
\nafterwards led to the Camp David Agreement.<\/p>\n
The Council did not properly work the mandate out with the
\nparties concerned, that is the Israelis, the divided Lebanese and
\nthe Palestinians who were in control of most parts of southern
\nLebanon at the time.<\/p>\n
The result was the actual area as defined above, leaving a
\ngaping hole between the Western and Eastern sectors and the
\ncontinued Israeli occupation in southeast Lebanon, including
\nalong the border of Lebanon with Syria.<\/p>\n
The \"area of operation\" should have been a swath of territory
\nwhich could effectively have been used to prevent Israeli and SLA
\nsoldiers on the one hand, and armed elements from the north on
\nthe other, from entering the area, thus forming a buffer between
\nthe contending forces.<\/p>\n
Notwithstanding this handicap, UNIFIL has nevertheless been
\nable, by and large, to prevent large-scale confrontations between
\nthe two sides, except during the second Israeli invasion that
\ntook place on June 6, 1982.<\/p>\n
The situation however has been getting more tenuous as the
\nHizbollah forces have been using more and more long-range
\nrockets, which can reach Israel, particularly the \"finger of
\ngalilee\" rocket, from locations north of the UN forces.<\/p>\n
Why has Lebanon suffered all this? Since 1943, Lebanon has
\nbeen governed based on a formula for delicately balancing the
\nsectarian interests of its different ethnic and religious groups,
\nwhich was agreed upon in the National Pact of 1943.<\/p>\n
This pact was based on the 1932 census, which showed that the
\ndemographic composition of the country's population was 52
\npercent Christian and 42 percent Muslims, meaning a proportion of
\n6 to 5 for all government posts.<\/p>\n
The pact further stipulated that the president should be a
\nMaronite Christian; the prime minister a Sunni Muslim; the
\nspeaker of the Chamber of Deputies a Shi'ite Muslim and his
\ndeputy a Greek Orthodox; and the army commander a Maronite
\nChristian.<\/p>\n
By the 1970s, however, the demographic composition had shifted
\nin favor of the Muslims and, within the Muslim population, the
\nSunnis had been outstripped by the Shi'ites.<\/p>\n
In addition, the mass influx of Palestinians after the \"Black
\nSeptember\" incident in Jordan in 1970, tipped the balance
\nfurther.<\/p>\n
By 1975, the inflexibility of the Christians to accommodate
\nchange, and the increased militancy of the Muslims supported by
\nthe Palestinians, led to civil war.<\/p>\n
In October 1976, the Riyadh peace plan was agreed upon and,
\namong other things, it established the predominantly Syrian Arab
\nDeterrent Force (ADF).<\/p>\n
When Syrian ADF troops were being deployed toward the south,
\nthe Israeli government threatened to take \"stern measures\" if
\nthey were to advance further south beyond an imaginary \"red line\"
\nextending from the mouth of the Zahrani River straight to the
\neast.<\/p>\n
As the Syrians stopped deploying beyond that line, the absence
\nof the official Lebanese authority between that line and the ADL
\nwas replaced by the PLO, which was at that time the dominant
\nforce in southern Lebanon.<\/p>\n
The PLO supported a loose association of Muslim and leftist
\nLebanese parties -- Sunni, Druze, Shi'a, and a Greek Orthodox
\nChristian party called the Lebanese National Movement.<\/p>\n
Opposing these groups were the Lebanese predominantly Maronite
\nChristian militia forces supported by Israel.<\/p>\n
The division among Lebanese, exacerbated by the involvement of
\noutsiders, made Lebanon cease being an effective and unified
\nstate.<\/p>\n
In 1991, at Taif, Saudi Arabia, the Lebanese leaders reached
\nan agreement to establish a national government, but one still
\nbased on the 1943 National Pact formula.<\/p>\n
By this time, the PLO had relocated its headquarters to
\nTunisia (although there were still a significant amount of
\nPalestinian fighters remaining in southern Lebanon); the Amal
\nLebanese Shi'ite militia force in the south had weakened; and the
\nrival Hizbollah Lebanese Shi'ite forces were soon to return to
\nthe south from the Bekaa Valley which was controlled by the
\nSyrian forces.<\/p>\n
Therefore, the Hizbollah effectively became the Lebanese force
\nthat fought the continued Israeli occupation in the south,
\nsomething which is happening to this day.<\/p>\n
The national government of Lebanon had, however, almost 10
\nyears to consolidate its authority north of UNIFIL's area of
\noperation.<\/p>\n
The Lebanese army was reorganized based on intersectarian
\nprinciples by Gen. Emile Lahoud, who is now the Lebanese
\npresident.<\/p>\n
It is hoped that the Lebanese have gone a long way toward
\nestablishing a national and effective government by now. The
\npresent complete withdrawal of the Israelis from southern Lebanon
\nshould provide the present Lebanese government with the first
\nopportunity to assert its authority over the now vacated occupied
\nterritory.<\/p>\n
The UN could perhaps still play a role in fulfilling the third
\npart of its mandate, that is to assist the government of Lebanon
\nin restoring its effective authority in southern Lebanon.<\/p>\n
But this is not going to be so simple, since, unlike the
\nJordanians, the Lebanese have allowed themselves to become part
\nof the Middle East political chess match. As Indonesians, and for
\nthe sake of our future, let us not make the same mistakes!<\/p>\n
The writer, a former senior staff member at the UN, is based
\nin Jakarta.<\/p>",
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