Autonomy and the reform agenda<\/p>\n
By Hermawan Sulistyo<\/p>\n
JAKARTA (JP): The initial \"reform agenda\" proposed by
\nconcerned scholars and college students in the early stages of
\nthe Indonesian transition in 1998 was not only intended to
\ninclude the eradication of corruption, collusion and nepotism.<\/p>\n
The agenda was also to reform statecraft and state management,
\nparticularly as regards center-periphery relations and other
\nfundamental issues, such as those related to security. But, of
\ncourse, the whole range of changes envisaged was much wider.<\/p>\n
On the restructuring of relations between the national
\ngovernment and provincial-local administrations, the role of the
\nMinistry of Home Affairs is particularly important.<\/p>\n
Some political analysts have raised doubts about the
\nanticipated performance of the new minister in continuing the
\nadoption and implementation of the regional and local autonomy
\nscheme, basing their analyses on the track record of Minister
\nHari Sabarno.<\/p>\n
The three-star-general spent many years of his career in the
\nlegislature, a background which has made him infamous as a
\npoliticized military officer. He was one among a few political
\narchitects involved in the three successions of power over the
\npast four years; and he managed to survive the political
\nstruggle.<\/p>\n
But a minister's personal background may not be as significant
\nin predicting the future of the autonomy scheme and its
\nimplementation as the match between President Megawati
\nSoekarnoputri and the ministry's paradigm of stability, security
\nand national integration.<\/p>\n
Megawati's administration prioritizes stability -- a euphemism
\nfor a more repressive approach. Protests and demonstrations are
\nseen more as a disturbance than as a sign of political
\nparticipation. The paradigm may not only be seen at the national
\nlevel, but also in the approach that the administration takes on
\nregional-local issues. The extreme cases of separatist movements,
\nparticularly the Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, or
\nGAM) are to be cured by harsher, firmer and stronger measures.<\/p>\n
Under such a paradigm, an interior minister of military
\nbackground (although Hari Sabarno will be required to quit the
\nmilitary) will fit into the overall policies. He has repeatedly
\nstated that he would let the people watch closely and judge for
\nthemselves whether his policies are democratic. The problems of
\nrestructuring the regional-local administrations, however, go far
\nbeyond the mere issue of whether he will act democratically.<\/p>\n
Separatist movements, communal conflicts, local demands over
\nthe management and allocation of natural resources, and other
\n\"non-national issues\" are only the phenomena and results of the
\nmore serious and longer problems of the unjust and unfair
\nstructure of the state administration. The issues seen from the
\nnational perspective as \"provincial and local\" would not come to
\nthe fore if their scale and intensity were not threatening to the
\nnational government.<\/p>\n
The reform agenda concerning these issues is known as the
\nlocal autonomy scheme. The agenda was adopted in Law number 22 on
\nregional autonomy and Law number 25 on the fiscal balance. The
\nagenda was first implemented into the administration system in
\nJanuary 2001. Now, after less than a year of implementation, some
\nprovisions in the laws have already shown some flaws and
\nweaknesses. A striking example is the provision on the
\n\"territorial division\" of the sea, as regulated by the law.<\/p>\n
The major discourse in the issue is dominated by scholars who
\nagree that the management of the sea cannot be divided under
\nlocal administrative managements. The control and management over
\nthe sea should be placed in the hands of the national government.
\nHad the national government not changed, a return of the rights
\nover sea management from the local administrations to the central
\ngovernment might not have become a serious issue in governance.<\/p>\n
But under the more centralized paradigm of Megawati's
\nadministration, the return will significantly contribute to the
\nparadigm. It will strengthen the new paradigm of establishing a
\nstronger national government. While some political leaders have
\nexpressed their endorsement of the new policies, political
\nanalysts and pro-democracy activists have expressed their concern
\nand worry over the possibility of backlashes in respect of these
\npolicies.<\/p>\n
Ryaas Rasyid, the architect of the local autonomy scheme, has
\nopenly expressed such a concern. He said that a failure in the
\nimplementation of the decentralization scheme may lead to the
\ncountry's real disintegration. Many political analysts would
\nshare his view. This view should be taken as a precautionary
\nwarning and not disruptive opposition by Minister Hari Sabarno.<\/p>\n
The national administration should therefore move carefully to
\nbalance the stability paradigm and the decentralization of
\ngovernance programs that hitherto have been pursued by local
\nadministrations.<\/p>\n
Unfortunately, Megawati's administration has only less than 37
\nmonths left to deal with the complex situation until the next
\nchange of government in 2004.<\/p>\n
Dr Hermawan Sulistyo is national coordinator of Conflict
\nStudies Network (CSN)-Indonesia and chair of Conflict and Peace
\nResearch Network (CONCERN).<\/p>",
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