Australia-RI seabed boundaries now settled<\/p>\n
By Richard Woolcott<\/p>\n
"There is a tide in the affairs of men which,
\n taken at the flood, leads on to fortune;
\n Omitted, all the voyage of their life
\n Is bound in shallows and in miseries.
\n On such a full sea are we now afloat;
\n And we must take the current when it serves,
\n Or lose our ventures".<\/p>\n
CANBERRA: Australia and Indonesia have taken the tide of which
\nBrutus spoke in Shakespeare's Julius Caesar. All maritime
\nboundaries between the two countries, which cross the Arafura and
\nTimor Seas and the Eastern Indian Ocean, have now been settled in
\na treaty of major practical and symbolic important signed March
\n14, 1997 in Perth by Alexander Downer and Indonesia's Foreign
\nMinister, Ali Alatas.<\/p>\n
The Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) -- those areas of the sea
\nbeyond each country's 12 nautical mile territorial sea out to
\n2000 nautical miles from their coastlines -- over which each
\ncountry has sovereign rights to explore, exploit and manage
\nnatural resources -- have now also been settled.<\/p>\n
Signature in Perth was appropriate because of its proximity to
\nIndonesia, the opportunities Indonesia's ongoing economic growth
\noffers Western Australia and because the sea boundary covered by
\nthe treaty is situated to the north-west of that capital.<\/p>\n
The treaty has yet to be ratified by both the Australian and
\nIndonesian House of Representatives but I do not anticipate any
\nproblems with this process. Meanwhile, its signature is a
\nmilestone in our relations with our large and important neighbor
\nto our immediate North which stretches a distance from Broome in
\nWestern Australia to Christchurch in New Zealand.<\/p>\n
The signed treaty completes a lengthy negotiating process
\nwhich began in the late 1960s, shortly after the collapse of the
\nSukarno administration and the advent of Soeharto's New Order
\ngovernment in 1966. The three previous treaties, dealing with
\nother parts of what is one of the longest and most complex seabed
\nboundaries in the world, covered the areas:<\/p>\n
* from west of Cape York to the north of Arnhem land, signed in
\n1971.<\/p>\n
* from the north of Arnhem Land to a point south of West Timor,
\nsigned in 1972 (but leaving a gap south of East Timor, then still a
\nPortuguese colony); and<\/p>\n
* the Timor Gap Treaty, signed in 1989 by Gareth Evans and Ali
\nAlatas in an aeroplane over the Timor Sea, delineating provisionally
\nthe gap not covered by the 1972 treaty.<\/p>\n
Disputes over land and sea boundaries have been -- and still
\nare -- the cause of conflicts and tensions between sovereign
\nstates and this penultimate step in settling the sea border
\nbetween Australia and Indonesia is of substantial political
\nimportance. I used the word penultimate because the Timor Gap
\ntreaty, mentioned above, which came into force in 1991, unlike
\nthe other three treaties is a "provisional" settlement due for
\nreview in 2031.<\/p>\n
One question which will be asked is why it has taken more than
\n25 years to settle the maritime boundary between the two
\ncountries. Negotiations about borders, whether about land or sea,
\nbetween neighboring nations with conflicting claims have,
\nhistorically, usually been a long, complex and, in many cases, an
\nunresolved process. Countries' national pride and economic
\ninterests are involved. It took the Netherlands and neighboring
\nBelgium twenty five years to negotiate a double taxation
\nagreement, a simple matter compared to delineating a seabed
\nboundary.<\/p>\n
I recall the former minister of foreign affairs of Indonesia,
\nprofessor Mochtar Kusumaatmadja, who spoke excellent colloquial
\nEnglish, asking me to his residence on a Sunday morning in 1977
\nin Jakarta, when I was Australian Ambassador to Indonesia, to
\ndiscuss the timing for resuming negotiations about the seabed
\nboundary. Foreshadowing a tough negotiating position, he said we
\nhad "taken Indonesia to the cleaners' in the 1972 treaty. This
\nwas somewhat overstated but real interests were involved and some
\nIndonesian lawyers were critical of the outcome of that treaty.
\nIn fact, the discussion turned to other issues because, on
\nconsulting his horoscope, Mochtar decided it was not a good day
\nfor negotiation!<\/p>\n
Such negotiations are never easy but the eight rounds of
\nconsultations preceding the signing of the treaty which started
\nin April 1993 were according to our chief negotiator, Tony
\nVincent, "fair and amicable". My reading of the treaty is,
\nindeed, that it is fair to both sides. There was a window of
\nopportunity to conclude the seabed agreement before the
\nlegislators' elections in Indonesia next May and the presidential
\nelection next year and while President Soeharto, who is keen to
\nresolve Indonesia's outstanding sea boundary matters during his
\npresidency, is in office. Indonesia is now more interested in
\n"engaging South". Both countries wanted to complete the seabed
\nboundary and were willing to make concessions to achieve a fair
\noutcome. It is sound diplomacy that the opportunity has been
\ntaken.<\/p>\n
One issue which arises is how the new treaty might affect the
\nprovisional Timor Gap treaty. The answer is that it does not
\naffect this treaty. It would, however, be timely to clarify
\nseveral matters related to the Timor Gap treaty, which have
\nimpacted on our relations with Indonesia. In 1995 there was
\nconsiderable and often inaccurate media comment related to
\nPortugal's case before the International Court of Justice against
\nAustralia for signing the treaty. It was stated that our
\ninternational reputation was on the line, our relations with
\nIndonesia were under threat and that, if the judgment went
\nagainst Australia, exploration leases in the Timor gap would be
\ninvalid.<\/p>\n
None of these assertions were true and, in any case, Portugal,
\nwhich had argued that Australia should have negotiated with it
\nas, legally, the "administrating power" in East Timor and not
\nwith Indonesia, lost its case in a 14 to 2 judgment. The
\nPortuguese claim to be the administering power was fatuous since
\nthe Portuguese Administration led by Governor Pires abandoned
\nDili and the mainland of East Timor in conditions of civil war in
\nAugust 1975, taking with them not only a colonial legacy of
\nmaladministration but the Governor's stock of French Champagne.
\nThe validity of the legislation which implements the treaty in
\nAustralia had also been challenged by the East Timor lobby in
\n1994. The validity of the Treaty, domestically, was, however,
\nupheld by the High Court.<\/p>\n
East Timorese activists and members of the anti-Indonesian
\nlobby in Australia, however, were able to gain some community
\nsupport for their assertion, despite its inaccuracy, that
\nAustralia had been motivated by greed in negotiating the Timor
\nGap treaty. "Blood for oil" was their slogan. But this slogan,
\nwhile eye catching on television, when painted in red with drops
\nof blood dripping from its letters, is based on the false premise
\nthat East Timorese blood has been sacrificed so that Australia
\ncould benefit under the treaty from any oil in the Timor Gap
\nwhich they said rightly belonged to the East Timorese. The fact
\nis, however, that the northern boundary of the Zone of
\nCooperation established under the treaty is based on Australia's
\nlong held claim to this area of the seabed.<\/p>\n
It is important that the wider community understands that any
\nresources in this Zone are, in the eyes of the government, the
\nOpposition, and their legal advisers, Australian resources; not
\nthose of Portugal or a possible independent East Timor. None of
\nthis is changed by the Timor Gap treaty. Moreover, successive
\nAustralian governments have recognized Indonesian sovereignty
\nover East Timor de jure, since 1979. (Over thirty other
\ngovernments have recognized Indonesian sovereignty, explicitly or
\nimplicitly, over East Timor despite occasional assertions in our
\nmedia that Australia alone has done so).<\/p>\n
How does this latest treaty impact on the bilateral
\nrelationship? If our relations with Indonesia are to be a soundly
\nbased partnership in the future -- and not a means of masking
\ninherent differences and tensions -- then they need to rest on a
\nfirm foundation of shared national goals and interests,
\nunderpinned by public support. Despite our different backgrounds
\nand cultures, we do have shared national goals and I believe the
\ntreaty is another important building block underpinning the
\nrelationship. Mutually agreed boundaries between neighboring
\ncountries not only contribute to avoiding potential tensions over
\nthe exploitation of resources, including fish, but they also
\ncontribute to the notion of shared security.<\/p>\n
The Agreement on Mutual Security, signed in December 1995, the
\nAgreement on the Australia Indonesia Development Area (known as
\nAIDA) which resulted from the Australia Indonesia Ministerial
\nForum last year and yesterday's treaty completing the sea bed
\nboundary are three major bilateral agreements reached in the last
\nfifteen months which have, collectively, added further and
\nconsiderable substance to the bilateral relationship.<\/p>\n
Indonesia is an emerging tiger economy and a nation of
\nincreasing influence. It still awaits the author of its next
\nchapter and its politics may be quite volatile during the next
\nthree years. In this context also it serves Australia's national
\ninterests to have the seabed boundary settled.<\/p>\n
Helping reduce potential tensions and to promote a stable,
\nprosperous and peaceful Indonesia, as well as a wider Southeast
\nAsian region in which we are fully engaged is a task of enduring
\nimportance for Australia. The agreed delineation of the seabed
\nboundary between Australia and Indonesia, finalized in Perth in
\nthe middle of this month, is a valuable and important step in
\nthis direction apart from its likely substantial economic
\nbenefits to this country.<\/p>\n
The Writer is a Consultant on Asia-Pacific to the legal firm
\nAllen Allen and Hemsley and has been a Consultant to BHP
\nPetroleum on seabed matters. He is a former ambassador to
\nIndonesia.<\/p>\n
-- The Australian.<\/p>\n
Window A:<\/p>\n
One issue which arises is how the new treaty might affect the
\nprovisional Timor Gap Treaty. The answer is that it does not
\naffect this treaty.<\/p>\n
Window B:<\/p>\n
The signed treaty completes a lengthy negotiating process
\nwhich began in the late 1960s, shortly after the collapse of the
\nSukarno administration and the advent of Soeharto's New Order
\ngovernment in 1966.<\/p>",
"url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/australia-ri-seabed-boundaries-now-settled-1447893297",
"image": ""
},
"sponsor": "Okusi Associates",
"sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com"
}