Australia: Responding to RI's transformation<\/p>\n
This is the second of two articles based on an address by
\nAustralian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer in the Australia-
\nAsia Institute's 1999 Australia in Asia Lecture Series State
\nLibrary of New South Wales, Sydney, on March 1, 1999.<\/p>\n
SYDNEY: The Australian government made a major shift in its
\npolicy approach to East Timor when the prime minister wrote to
\nPresident B.J. Habibie last December emphasizing the importance
\nof Indonesia talking directly with East Timorese about the
\nprovince's future status. He suggested long-term prospects for
\nreconciliation would be best served by East Timorese holding an
\nact of self-determination at some future time, following a period
\nof autonomy for East Timor. The Australian government has also
\nmade clear its support for the release of Jose Alexandre \"Xanana\"
\nGusmao in light of the important role he must play in the
\nnegotiations on East Timor's future.<\/p>\n
As both President Habibie and Xanana Gusmao have made clear to
\nme, these suggestions were a catalyst inside Indonesia that
\nhelped produce the policy announcement on Jan. 27 concerning
\npossible independence for East Timor and the transfer from prison
\nof Xanana. Australia welcomed Indonesia's stated willingness to
\ntake account of the wishes of the East Timorese people, and the
\nlater decision to move Xanana Gusmao from prison to house arrest.<\/p>\n
The resignation of president Soeharto last May cleared the way
\nfor a resolution of the East Timor question. Before that, the
\nfall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War took away
\na key rationale for Australia's quiet acceptance of Indonesia's
\nincorporation of East Timor. Successive Australian governments
\nendorsed Indonesian sovereignty over East Timor because Australia
\ndid not want to see the balkanization of Indonesia with the
\ngranting of independence fanning separatist sentiment elsewhere
\nin the archipelago. The Portuguese left East Timor in a state of
\ncivil war with little prospect of stability, and there were
\nconcerns that an independent East Timor would be economically
\nweak and susceptible to interests inimical to Australia's and
\nIndonesia's interests.<\/p>\n
I believe those considerations to be totally understandable in
\nthe historical context in which they were made. The Whitlam
\ngovernment was understandably concerned at the prospect of a
\nfiercely left-wing government sympathetic to the Soviet Union
\ncontrolling East Timor at a time when the Cold War perhaps came
\ncloser to Australia's shores than ever before with the fall of
\nSaigon and Phnom Penh to communist forces in 1975. With the
\ndeparture of Portugal, East Timor's infrastructure was in an
\nappalling state and its literacy rate was less than 10 percent.
\nIn those circumstances, the acquiescence of the Whitlam
\ngovernment followed by the Fraser and Hawke governments to
\nIndonesia's integration plans was not unremarkable.<\/p>\n
There remains to this day keen public interest in the
\ndecisions taken by Australian governments around the time
\nimmediately preceding, during and soon after that integration. It
\nwas, after all, one of the major Australian foreign policy
\ndecisions of recent times. To help provide the public with a
\nclear understanding of the development of Australian policy
\nduring this period, I have asked my department to prepare the
\nearly release of records covering Indonesia's incorporation of
\nPortuguese Timor between 1974 and 1976. This period covers
\ndecisions taken by both Labor and Coalition governments.<\/p>\n
The records will also cover the period from the announcement
\nby Portugal in 1974 that it was decolonizing East Timor through
\nto Soeharto's signing of the bill integrating East Timor with
\nIndonesia in July 1976. The records will be released as part of
\nmy department's historical records series. As part of this
\nexercise, the department will accelerate the release of records
\nrelated to the deaths of five Australian-based journalists at
\nBalibo in October 1975.<\/p>\n
But the Australian government is not obsessed about the past.
\nWe are looking to the future and having made our policy shift
\nmust now respond to developments currently concerning East Timor.
\nThe next round of UN-sponsored tripartite negotiations on East
\nTimor, which will take place on March 8 and March 9, could see an
\nautonomy package finalized. When I met him last week in Jakarta,
\nPresident Habibie repeated to me his intention to resolve the
\nquestion of East Timor's status by Jan. 1, 2000, and to have the
\nEast Timorese make a decision on autonomy before the June 7
\nelection.<\/p>\n
What Australia has consistently stressed -- and what I
\nconfirmed in my talks with the President and in Bali with foreign
\nminister Ali Alatas -- is that whether the eventual outcome is
\nfor autonomy or full independence, the transition must take place
\nin a peaceful and orderly manner and the East Timorese people
\nmust be fully consulted at all stages.<\/p>\n
Australia has welcomed Indonesia's commitment not to abandon
\nEast Timor in any transition to full independence. We have also
\nexpressed the hope that any transition could be handled in such a
\nway that UN or other peacekeeping forces would not be necessary.
\nThe responsibility for managing the transition process and
\nmaintaining order in East Timor lies with the parties involved,
\nnot with Australia or the international community. That said, we
\nhave committed ourselves to assisting Indonesia and the East
\nTimorese where possible, including through considering future
\nlevels of development assistance.<\/p>\n
While the prime minister, other ministers and I have indicated
\nour preference for a long transition period before a decision is
\ntaken on East Timor's final status, we have always made it
\nabundantly clear that it is for the East Timorese themselves to
\ndecide. Whether they want independence instead of autonomy,
\nwhether they want a quick or a prolonged transition, we will
\nrespect their decision. As I told Xanana Gusmao as we sat in his
\nJakarta house, Australia will be there to help the East Timorese
\npeople whatever course they eventually take.<\/p>\n
In all our considerations of the issues that are involved in
\nEast Timor's future, our primary motivation is the welfare of the
\nEast Timorese people. We have not forgotten the contribution they
\nmade to the security of Australia and the well-being of
\nAustralian servicemen in World War II.<\/p>\n
As the largest bilateral aid donor to East Timor by far,
\nAustralia has already budgeted over $6 million in development
\nassistance for the 1998\/1999 financial year. We are also one of
\nthe largest contributors to the International Committee of the
\nRed Cross in East Timor, having provided more than $5 million to
\nthe ICRC since 1982\/1983. Through our Human Rights Fund, we
\nprovided assistance in the area of legal aid and human rights
\nmonitoring, dissemination of information on human rights issues,
\nand support for addressing specific human rights cases. We are
\ncurrently looking at developmental and humanitarian requirements
\nfor an autonomous or independent East Timor.<\/p>\n
Events have moved with breathtaking speed in the past few
\nmonths. But they have not passed us by. Australia has and will
\ncontinue to play an active role as developments unfold. Let me
\ntake a few moments to outline some of our recent initiatives.<\/p>\n
Over the last week I have conducted extensive consultations on
\nEast Timor with President Habibie and Indonesian ministers, with
\nIndonesian opposition leaders Megawati Soekarnoputri and Amien
\nRais, and with East Timorese leaders, most notably Xanana Gusmao.
\nThis morning I arrived back in Australia from Lisbon where I
\nspent Saturday meeting with the Portuguese foreign minister and
\nofficials.<\/p>\n
At the same time I sent the secretary of my department, Dr.
\nAshton Calvert, to New York and Washington to talk with the UN
\nsecretary-general and other senior United Nations officials and
\nrepresentatives of the American administration.<\/p>\n
There are now a series of high hurdles for East Timor to jump.
\nFirst, negotiations on the autonomy package between the
\nIndonesians and the Portuguese in New York will be concluded next month.<\/p>\n
Secondly, the people of East Timor will be consulted on
\nwhether they accept the package or they would rather have full
\nindependence. We all accept -- including Xanana Gusmao -- that
\nthe consultative process will be less than a full referendum but
\nwe and the others have insisted that the methodology used is seen
\nby the East Timorese themselves as credible. One possible option
\nis for a consultative assembly to be elected by the East Timorese
\nand for that assembly to make the decision. There are other ideas
\nbeing considered, all of which involve very wide participation by
\nthe East Timorese.<\/p>\n
Thirdly, once the decision is made on East Timor's future,
\nthere will be the task of managing a smooth transition to either
\nwide-ranging autonomy or independence. The Indonesians have given
\nme a firm commitment they will not just walk out and leave East
\nTimor in a state of chaos if independence is chosen. That is good
\nnews. But Indonesia does not want to bear the financial burden
\nfor East Timor once it separates from Indonesia, should that
\nhappen.<\/p>\n
Instead, it will be happy to make security and administrative
\nresources available to the territory provided the cost is borne
\nby the United Nations. Obviously, in those circumstances, other
\ncountries -- including Australia and Portugal -- would assist. I
\nhave been pleased at the breadth of commitment to helping East
\nTimor that exists around the world.<\/p>\n
The fourth and most difficult issue of all is how to manage
\nthe security environment within East Timor while all these
\nchanges are taking place. In our view, there will almost
\ncertainly have to be some international confidence-building and
\nadministrative presence in East Timor from an early stage. This
\nwould have to operate under the auspices of the United
\nNations and would, without doubt, involve some Australians.<\/p>\n
At this stage, we do not favor a United Nations peacekeeping
\nforce of the kind involved in Cambodia. Indeed, none of the
\nactors in this drama are calling for that. After all Indonesia
\nand the East Timorese must bear the primary responsibility for
\nworking out arrangements that not only provide for a peaceful
\ntransition, but which lay the groundwork for a peaceful and
\nproductive long-term relationship.<\/p>\n
What would be more realistic would be the provision of United
\nNations-based administrative support, a confidence-building
\npresence and -- if independence is the preferred choice of the
\nEast Timorese -- some police presence alongside the East Timorese
\npolice.<\/p>\n
The process of East Timorese reconciliation is crucial to the
\nmanner in which the whole East Timor issue evolves over the next
\ncouple of years. It is necessary now to prevent bloodshed. It is
\nnecessary to allow the process of testing East Timorese opinion
\non the autonomy package to work. It is necessary to enable the
\nEast Timorese to work out in the end what sort of country they
\nwant. As part of this reconciliation process, we believe it is
\ncrucial that East Timorese leaders of all factions sit down
\ntogether to work on a way forward, especially on a transition to
\na new status. We have told East Timorese leaders we will provide
\nsupport for a representative gathering.<\/p>\n
Finally, there is the question of who will run East Timor from
\nnext year if East Timor opts for independence. Obviously, the
\nEast Timorese themselves will in time take full control of East
\nTimor but probably after a period of a couple of years, during
\nwhich the United Nations would play a role in the territory's
\nadministration.<\/p>\n
Indonesia, the East Timorese, Portugal and Australia have all
\nput a lot of work already into how the East Timor issue could
\nevolve.<\/p>\n
The Indonesia we see today is so changed from that of only a
\nyear ago that it can truly be said to have gone through a
\ntransformation.<\/p>\n
Some of the change has been for the bad, but some --
\nparticularly political change -- has been for the good.<\/p>\n
The task for Australia is to help Indonesia make the shift in
\nas smooth a manner as possible; to ensure that the winds that
\nare blowing through Indonesia make the tree of state stronger,
\nand do not blow it down. It is up to us to be supportive in
\nthat process, and to encourage it wherever we can.<\/p>",
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