Australia, Indonesia starting again<\/p>\n
By Damien Kingsbury and Scott Burchill<\/p>\n
SYDNEY (JP): As a consequence of Indonesia's slaughter of the
\ncivilian population of East Timor, Australia now faces its
\ngreatest diplomatic and defense crisis in living memory.<\/p>\n
Three decades of work developing closer economic, political
\nand defense ties in an effort to enhance the security and
\nprosperity of both countries has been destroyed within
\none week. Australia now stands poised to commit troops to a
\nterritory which since 1985 both Canberra and Jakarta have
\nregarded as legally belonging to the latter.<\/p>\n
Australia's leadership of an imminent multilateral
\npeacekeeping force in East Timor will completely change the
\nfundamental basis of its bilateral relationship with Indonesia.<\/p>\n
Perhaps what has most shocked Australians, at both a popular
\nand elite level, is that despite guaranteeing security, the
\nIndonesian Military (TNI) has actively engaged in a campaign of
\nmass slaughter and social dislocation in East Timor.<\/p>\n
This was initially undertaken by the so-called militias in
\nEast Timor, which were proxies established by the TNI following
\nPresident Habibie's announcement earlier this year of a
\nreferendum on self-determination for the territory.<\/p>\n
However, it had been clear for months that these
\nmilitia were trained, led and supplied by TNI, while the police
\nentrusted with maintaining law and order turned a blind eye to
\ntheir atrocious behavior. Any pretense of the situation being
\notherwise was abandoned in the days following the announcement
\nthat the people of East Timor had overwhelmingly rejected
\nJakarta's offer of special autonomy within the Republic of
\nIndonesia.<\/p>\n
Chief among the TNI's reasons for its bloody response to the
\nballot is the Army's loss of face over the clear rejection of its
\n24 years of involvement in East Timor. East Timor is also being
\nused as a lesson to other provinces considering independence, a
\npolicy which is linked to the TNI's self-proclaimed role in
\nmaintaining the unity of the state.<\/p>\n
And finally, both TNI and Indonesia's political elites retain
\nmajor economic interests in the territory, which they are loath
\nto relinquish.<\/p>\n
The actions of TNI in East Timor show that, following the
\nupheavals associated with the resignation of president Soeharto,
\nit is again a unified force intent on imposing its will in
\ndomestic politics. It also shows up the weakness of Habibie as
\nPresident, reflecting TNI chief Gen. Wiranto's own \"nationalist\"
\nvision for political development in Indonesia -- perhaps we are
\nwitnessing a replay of the events of 1957?<\/p>\n
Such a vision appears to include the appointment of
\nMegawati Soekarnoputri, head of the most popular party from the
\nrecent elections, as a figurehead president, with Wiranto
\nexercising real political control.<\/p>\n
Despite the spectacle of democratization in the June
\nelections, the idea of a genuinely representative or reformist
\ngovernment in Indonesia clearly has shallow foundations.
\nReflecting the history and style of the major political players,
\nIndonesia remains the political playground of its elites.<\/p>\n
The country's political underdevelopment leaves little space
\nfor meaningful public participation in the political process, and
\ndoes not welcome any regional assertions of separation.<\/p>\n
Little has changed in Indonesia since the 1950s. Ordinary
\nIndonesians remain excluded from political participation, while
\nthe unitary state, which is tightly controlled from the center,
\nremains a precarious construction.<\/p>\n
Separatist ambitions continue in Aceh, West Papua,
\nAmbon, Riau and elsewhere -- even among some in Bali! By denying
\ngroups in the outer provinces any right to determine their own
\npolitical destinies, the Javanese are ensuring that Indonesia
\nremains a fragile entity.<\/p>\n
The slaughter in East Timor also represents an enormous moral
\nand strategic failure for Australia. Three decades of obsequious
\nfawning and appeasement toward Jakarta have resulted in the
\ncomplete collapse of Canberra's foreign and defense policy.<\/p>\n
Closer military ties between Australia's armed forces and TNI,
\nsymbolized by joint training exercises and the secretly
\nnegotiated 1997 Australia-Indonesia Security Agreement, have
\ngiven Australia no influence whatsoever -- civilizing or
\nstrategic -- over Indonesian security forces. Indonesia's
\ngenerals are no longer acceptable partners in any security
\nalliance, a situation unlikely to change until TNI forswears it's
\ndual function and is firmly placed under civilian control.<\/p>\n
The undue influence of the Jakarta lobby within the foreign
\naffairs bureaucracy must also come to an end. By placing a
\npremium on \"stability\" within the Indonesian archipelago and
\ndeeper economic relations with Jakarta, Canberra ignored the
\nethical implications of close ties with a repressive
\ndictatorship.<\/p>\n
The lobby's \"big picture\" meant ignoring Jakarta's human
\nrights abuses and public concern about them, distorting the
\nhistory of Soeharto's rise to power, and subjugating the legal
\nrights of the East Timorese.<\/p>\n
A normal bilateral relationship now depends on an honest
\nreview of this unfortunate history and the realization that
\npolitical and territorial boundaries, even in this part of the
\nworld, are never immutable.<\/p>\n
In any account of Australia's future regional relations, it
\nwill have to factor in dealing with what will soon become an
\nindependent East Timor. Australia will sometimes need to tread
\nlightly in this new relationship for fear of confronting
\nIndonesia, yet provide as much friendship and financial
\nassistance as possible. Blood cannot be measured in dollars or
\ngoodwill, but the responsibility born of complicity is great.<\/p>\n
Canberra will have an important role to play in brokering
\nrelations between a shattered East Timor and its suspicious giant
\nneighbor. This will call on Australia's best diplomatic skills
\nand, if handled poorly as in the past, could lead to further
\ntragedy in East Timor, not to mention major problems between
\nAustralia and Indonesia.<\/p>\n
Handled well, however, it could showcase the more
\nsophisticated diplomacy Australia deployed in bringing to
\nfruition the UN settlement of Cambodia's civil war.<\/p>\n
It is clear that Australia's relationship with Indonesia has
\nirrevocably changed. In steering a new direction, one based on
\nhonesty, realism and morality, Australia cannot afford to slip
\nback into the sycophancy, appeasement and analytical poverty
\nwhich characterized the last 25 years.<\/p>\n
Dr. Damien Kingsbury is executive officer of the Monash Asia
\nInstitute. Dr. Scott Burchill is an expert on Australian foreign
\nrelations from the school of Australian and International Studies
\nat Deakin University.<\/p>",
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"sponsor": "Okusi Associates",
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