{
    "success": true,
    "data": {
        "id": 1133515,
        "msgid": "australia-and-the-united-nations-1447893297",
        "date": "2005-06-03 00:00:00",
        "title": "Australia and the United Nations",
        "author": null,
        "source": "JP",
        "tags": null,
        "topic": null,
        "summary": "Australia and the United Nations Adil Hilman, Jakarta By all accounts, Australia can be proud to be a model international state that in the past has pulled its weight in international affairs by playing an important role in the United Nations for more than five decades. It participated in the drafting of the UN Charter, and was keen to ensure that the interests of medium and small powers were taken into account. At the insistence of the then Australian external affairs minister, H.V.",
        "content": "<p>Australia and the United Nations<\/p>\n<p>Adil Hilman, Jakarta<\/p>\n<p>By all accounts, Australia can be proud to be a model<br>\ninternational state that in the past has pulled its weight in<br>\ninternational affairs by playing an important role in the United<br>\nNations for more than five decades. It participated in the<br>\ndrafting of the UN Charter, and was keen to ensure that the<br>\ninterests of medium and small powers were taken into account.<\/p>\n<p>At the insistence of the then Australian external affairs<br>\nminister, H.V. Evatt of the Labor Party and the representatives<br>\nof other medium and small states, Articles 10 and 12 were<br>\ninserted in the UN Charter authorizing the UN General Assembly to<br>\ndiscuss any matter and make recommendations to the Security<br>\nCouncil. This gave medium and small powers an opportunity to<br>\ndebate security issues.<\/p>\n<p>Evatt was elected president of the UN General Assembly in 1948<br>\nwhen the UN adopted the Universal Declaration on Human Rights<br>\nwhich is generally regarded as the source of subsequent human<br>\nrights instruments, such as the 1996 International Covenant on<br>\nCivil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on<br>\nEconomic, Social and Cultural Rights. Australia went on to play<br>\nhigh profile roles in promoting human rights, environmental<br>\ninitiatives, the Chemical Weapons Convention, and the Cambodian<br>\npeace process, among other things.<\/p>\n<p>When the Labor government under Prime Minister Chifley was<br>\ndefeated in the 1949 general elections, Robert Menzies of the<br>\nLiberal Party became prime minister. His foreign policy was<br>\nfirmly grounded in realism and hence his view on the function of<br>\nthe UN and international organizations in general, sharply<br>\ncontrasted with those of Evatt. He thought that reliance on<br>\nmorality and justice to prevent international disputes from<br>\nerupting into war, could not be effective in international<br>\npolitics.<\/p>\n<p>After World War II, there was a widespread feeling against a<br>\nrepetition of the League&apos;s failure and a desire to find some<br>\neffective instrument to maintain international peace. To that<br>\neffect, the UN Charter was given teeth by the insertion of<br>\nArticle 43 which calls on its members to make available to the<br>\nSecurity Council the armed forces necessary for the purpose of<br>\nmaintaining international peace and security. Menzies, however,<br>\nbelieved that Article 43 could not serve its purpose.<\/p>\n<p>First, the extensive membership of the UN would militate<br>\nagainst an effective application of that article in a crisis<br>\nsituation.<\/p>\n<p>Second, the interpretation by UN members of the obligation<br>\nimposed upon them by the Charter would vary from country to<br>\ncountry. In other words, it is the behavior of states reflecting<br>\na nationalist state of mind and not any defect of the Charter<br>\nwhich makes enforcement of international action impossible.<\/p>\n<p>The differences in the views of Evatt and Menzies on the<br>\nfunction of the UN were revealed during the Suez crisis in 1956.<br>\nMenzies&apos; position was that Australia should not decide its stance<br>\nin terms of whether the UN condemned or approved the British-<br>\nFrench action. Australia should support Britain, according to<br>\nMenzies because it was in its own interests to do so, in spite of<br>\nthe fact that such a decision would be against the expressed<br>\nopinion of the UN. Evatt, on the other hand, maintained that<br>\nenforcement action by Britain and France should not be taken<br>\nwithout the UN&apos;s approval.<\/p>\n<p>Several decades later, Menzies&apos; views on the function of the<br>\nUN were in large measure adopted by the present Liberal<br>\ngovernment under Prime Minister John Howard. From his accession<br>\nto power in early 1996, Howard has shown little interest in the<br>\nUN. He believed that the previous Labor government under Paul<br>\nKeating had paid too much attention to UN peacekeeping and other<br>\nmultilateral issues at the expense of bilateral relations.<\/p>\n<p>On the other hand, the Howard government&apos;s record on human<br>\nrights, the environment and refugees has been criticized by the<br>\nrelevant UN agencies. The Australian government&apos;s long-term<br>\nvision on foreign policy can be discerned from its position on<br>\nspecific issues which is reflected in the White Papers of 1997<br>\nand 2003 related to international affairs both firmly grounded in<br>\nrealism, based on the belief that war is essentially a matter of<br>\npower, self-interest, and necessity, largely making moral<br>\nanalysis irrelevant. From the titles alone -- In the National<br>\nInterest (1997) and Advancing the National Interest (2003) -- one<br>\ncan assume that the UN is of little significance except in the<br>\npursuit of national interests.<\/p>\n<p>This implies that if going to war with Iraq was in Australia&apos;s<br>\nnational interests, then the government should have used its<br>\nresources to ensure that it was a member of the Security Council<br>\nto provide the vote the U.S. and the UK needed.<\/p>\n<p>The legal basis provided by international law for going to war<br>\nwith Iraq has been debated among members of the UN. The U.S., the<br>\nUK, Australia, and several other countries have argued that the<br>\nwar was legal on the basis of Security Council Resolutions: 678,<br>\n687, and 141. It is their interpretation of Resolution 1441 of<br>\nNov., 8, 2002, in particular, which reveals the basic weakness of<br>\ntheir arguments. This resolution gives Iraq one final chance to<br>\ndisarm and warns of severe consequences should it fail to co-<br>\noperate and to fully comply fully and immediately with the terms<br>\nof the resolution.<\/p>\n<p>Whatever the differing interpretations of Resolution 1441,<br>\nwhich clearly needed the Security Council approval of any action<br>\ntaken, the resolution did not give any country the right to wage<br>\nwar outside the UN framework. It says that the Security Council<br>\nwould &quot;convene immediately upon receipt of a report&quot; on weapons<br>\ninspections&quot; in order to secure international peace and<br>\nsecurity&quot;.<\/p>\n<p>Australia&apos;s support of American unilateralism will hurt rather<br>\nthan advance Australia&apos;s national interests. Without vast<br>\nmilitary and economic resources, it would benefit more from an<br>\ninternational order based on respect for international law, norms<br>\nand institutions, than on one predicated on the military<br>\npreponderance of one super power. The violation of international<br>\nlaw and support for preemptive actions are not in Australia&apos;s<br>\ninterests.<\/p>\n<p>The writer is an observer of international affairs.<\/p>",
        "url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/australia-and-the-united-nations-1447893297",
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    "sponsor": "Okusi Associates",
    "sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com"
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