Atambua tragedy may not be the last<\/p>\n
By Aboeprijadi Santoso<\/p>\n
AMSTERDAM (JP): Disarming the militias without breaking up
\ntheir masters' local networks may be too little and too late.
\nXenophobic nationalism in response to the international
\ncondemnation of the Atambua killings reveals a syndrome common
\nafter a painful decolonization.<\/p>\n
The issue is no longer to free East Timor from Indonesia, but
\nto free Indonesia from East Timor.<\/p>\n
One year on, the Army backed militias remain active,
\nattempting to keep control of thousands of \"refugees\" they forced
\nto East Nusa Tenggara.<\/p>\n
The killing of United Nations workers in Atambua was a direct
\nconsequence of last year's violence in East Timor. It was a
\ncontinuation of New Order type actions, which President
\nAbdurrahman Wahid's administration should urgently reform.<\/p>\n
The militias could have been disbanded much earlier if Army
\ncommanders had had the political will to do so.<\/p>\n
Any colonial occupation army has to rely on parts of the local
\nsociety. In East Timor, the Indonesian Army relied on the
\ntraditional landlords or chiefs (liurai) and rallied support by
\nsponsoring pro-Indonesia political parties.<\/p>\n
But once UDT, the party of Mestizos deportados, came into
\nbloody conflict with the popular, nationalist, left wing,
\nFretilin group in the mid-1970s, the civil war was instrumental
\nto control the territory.<\/p>\n
The mobilization efforts, however, failed to sustain political
\nstrength as the two other land owning classes -- the deportado
\nand the Church -- were increasingly alienated to Indonesian rule.<\/p>\n
As the old social structure was virtually destroyed in the
\ncourse of war and occupation up to the early 1980s, some
\ndeportado became allies and were placed as governors and
\nbureaucrats, while others turned to the resistance.<\/p>\n
As a result, the civil war lost its real base and changed into
\nan opposition against foreign oppression. Despite this changing
\nreality, the myth of \"civil war\" was maintained to justify
\nJakarta's rule and resist a referendum.<\/p>\n
It was this ongoing failure that provided the need for the
\n\"pro-Indonesia militias\".<\/p>\n
By the late 1970s, the Army started to recruit local youths as
\ncivil defense members, carrying munitions to the jungles and
\nmountains. They witnessed persecution, massacre and starvation of
\ntheir compatriots, including their own families, in operations in
\nthe Matebian area.<\/p>\n
Many survivors went to study in Java, joined the underground
\nresistance, protesting at embassies in Jakarta from 1994 to 1997.
\nOthers ended up in Europe and some returned home and have become
\nleaders of the new nation.<\/p>\n
Indonesia, in a very short time, turned a whole generation of
\nIndonesian educated East Timorese into independence fighters.<\/p>\n
Since the economic boom of the mid-1980s, former president
\nSoeharto's military in East Timor had plenty of time and
\nresources to mobilize recruits.<\/p>\n
Other recruits were trapped in patron-client relationships
\nwith wealthy generals, who -- like Javanese aristocrats, Chinese
\nwarlords or mafia bosses before them -- tended to aggrandize
\ntheir might and prestige by maintaining followers.<\/p>\n
By the mid-1980s, as neither side could win the war, political
\nefforts were intensified. With networks of clandestine resistance
\ngrowing, the need to penetrate local society and to Timorize
\nlocal Army units was recognized, so the fiction of \"civil war\"
\ncould be maintained.<\/p>\n
Gen. Prabowo Subianto, previous commander of the Army's
\nspecial forces, built the Gardapaksi militia and there were
\nreports of \"ninja\" units operating at night.<\/p>\n
Maintaining the militia was no longer simply to keep power,
\nbut a part of the state terror operations. But it was not until
\nlate 1998, as the autonomy proposal was negotiated, that former
\npro-integration militias were revived.<\/p>\n
The liurai families with landed interests of chief Joao
\nTavarez, the Army's old allies of the 1970s, resumed their role
\nas warlord gangs, which included younger thugs like Eurico
\nGuterres.<\/p>\n
Except for these specific groups, there seems to be few
\nsignificant links between the Army and the militiamen.<\/p>\n
The greater part of the present-day militias was created only
\nlast year and, in contrast to the youths who later joined the
\nresistance, they were mostly little educated, unemployed and
\ndrunken men.<\/p>\n
\"We just want to live in peace and enjoy gambling,\" Guterres
\ntold this writer last year. So they easily became a tool of their
\nmasters.<\/p>\n
Next, president B.J. Habibie's much hated \"second option\" was
\nsoon followed by Tavarez's inauguration in Batugade as commander
\nof a new front covering all militia units.<\/p>\n
With counterfeit money made available, the next step was to
\ntrain and arm a few hundred new militiamen in all 13 districts.<\/p>\n
By some calculation, it was thought possible to ensure a small
\nvictory at the voting. So optimism grew that East Timor would
\nstay with Indonesia.<\/p>\n
In July, a public show welcoming Megawati Soekarnoputri in
\nDili was impressive. By mid-August the Red-White flag was visible
\nall across East Timor as if the people enthusiastically joined
\nthe celebration of Indonesia's Independence Day.<\/p>\n
But the reality was exactly the reverse. Deception en masse on
\nthe part of the East Timorese, as this writer witnessed, was
\nmassive. Presumably, it became necessary as it was feared since
\nthe attack in Liquisa in April, that Army elements and the
\nmilitias wanted to ensure victory by intensifying the violence.<\/p>\n
Indeed, one expert on Indonesia, Ben Anderson, recently argued
\nin the Portuguese journal Politica Internacional that the
\nresistance might have instructed the public to participate in
\nIndonesia's general election in June, to convince some generals
\nin Jakarta that the East Timorese were loyal, so as to secure the
\nself-determination vote in August.<\/p>\n
The disappointment was great as the East Timorese cast their
\nvote for independence. \"The (East Timorese language) Tetum
\nvocabulary does not have words for 'thank you' and 'sorry',\" one
\nJakarta TV station commented with regret, reflecting the
\nincomprehension among the political elite.<\/p>\n
It sounded like the Dutch colonial ideology, blaming the
\ncolonized natives as ondankbaar (disgraceful).<\/p>\n
But most hurt were the militias and their masters. It must
\nhave been very painful for Army intelligence officers to have
\nbeen humiliated, Anderson argues, explaining the anger and the
\ndestruction in September 1999.<\/p>\n
The decolonization of East Timor created shame and bad losers
\nas the masters of the militias felt their honor had been
\nbesmirched. Never had the Army been humiliated, its interests
\nthreatened and its esprit de corps injured as when foreign troops
\nin the name of the United Nations arrived.<\/p>\n
Thus began the post-colonial pain for Indonesia -- manifested
\nin the Atambua attack and xenophobic nationalism. Last year,
\njingoism targeted Australia, now the UN. One minister, not a
\nTimor war veteran, even dreams of East Timor returning to
\nIndonesia.<\/p>\n
Unfortunately, war veterans usually carry their trauma for too
\nlong. In the Netherlands, debates on the painful decolonization
\nof Indonesia have gone for years as former colonial soldiers
\ndenied any war crimes; traumatic as they are, they still refuse
\nto recognize Aug. 17 as Indonesia's Independence Day and to
\nwelcome J.\"Poncke\" Princen, a former Dutch soldier who turned
\ninto Indonesia's independence hero.<\/p>\n
Many American Vietnam war veterans went through social dramas,
\ninspiring Hollywood Rambo films.<\/p>\n
Problems of post-war trauma can be resolved through lobbies
\nand political parties -- not by revenge on humanitarian workers.<\/p>\n
As East Timor has never been part of Indonesian nationalism
\nand is now free, the Indonesian Army needs to free itself from
\nits decolonization crisis, which apparently has gone beyond
\ncontrol.<\/p>\n
Hence, the Atambua tragedy may not be the last. It highlights
\nthe necessity for an international tribunal to prosecute those
\nguilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity in East Timor
\nback to 1975.<\/p>\n
The writer is a journalist, based in Amsterdam, the
\nNetherlands.<\/p>",
"url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/atambua-tragedy-may-not-be-the-last-1447893297",
"image": ""
},
"sponsor": "Okusi Associates",
"sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com"
}