Asia: The past and next 50 years<\/p>\n
This is the second of two articles based on a paper presented
\nby Robert A. Scalapino, a Robson Research Professor of Government
\nEmeritus at the University of California, Berkeley, U.S.A. at a
\nseminar on Sept. 18, 1996 to commemorate the silver anniversary
\nof the Centre for Strategic and International Studies.<\/p>\n
JAKARTA: What lies ahead? Predictions concerning the future
\nshould be made with great trepidation, given the many variables,
\nnot least of which are the decisions that will be made by
\nindividuals and groups in leadership roles. Those who assume that
\nall such decisions will be based upon accurate data, or be
\nrational in terms of national interests are optimists in the
\nextreme.<\/p>\n
In the political field, differences of system are virtually
\ncertain to continue. The thesis that liberal democracy will carry
\nall before it is untenable. First, democracy like other systems
\nfaces a number of problems: money-politics with its attendant
\ncorruption; striking a balance between the right to oppose and
\nthe right to govern and between freedom and responsibility; the
\nspecial issue of the media, now a part of governance in an open
\nsociety by virtue of shaping public attitudes; and finally, the
\ncapacity to maintain sufficient stability to enable further
\neconomic growth. Most of these issues, it should be reiterated,
\nare by no means unique to the democratic system, but whatever the
\nsystem, they must be faced. No system is guaranteed permanence,
\nincluding democracy.<\/p>\n
One system, however, seems likely to disappear, namely,
\nLeninism. Already, one sees many signs of its demise. Leninism
\nwas only practicable in societies desperately behind in
\ndevelopmental terms and thus prepared to seek the total
\nmobilization of resources via economic policies stressing
\ncentralization and exclusiveness, enforced by a political
\ndictatorship. Yet with interdependence now surging forward, such
\npolicies are highly unrealistic, a fact almost universally
\nrecognized. The fall of Leninism, however, does not guarantee the
\ntriumph of democracy. More likely, the old Leninist societies
\nwill be transformed into authoritarian-pluralist systems, as now
\nseems underway.<\/p>\n
Thus, for the foreseeable future, Asia will continue to have
\nsignificant political variations rather than a uniform political
\norder. Irrespective of system, certain critical political issues
\nlie ahead. First, how is power to be allocated within the state
\nas among center, region and locality? The demand for greater
\nauthority at local and regional levels is certain to grow as a
\nresult of an expanding diversity and the demand for a greater
\nshare of governmental resources to handle local problems.
\nDecentralization, occasionally challenged, will be the dominant
\ntrend.<\/p>\n
The state will face another internal competitor in the form of
\nthe civil society. As economic, social and religious
\norganizations acquire additional resources and membership
\ncommitment, pressures on the political system will multiply.
\nValues, including political values, will increasingly be supplied
\nby sources other than the state, often creating a struggle for
\nauthority. The state will respond by seeking to uphold the
\nbanners of nationalism against both domestic competitors and the
\nencroachments of internationalism.<\/p>\n
In this setting, political instability will be recurrent, but
\nit will rarely reach a regime-threatening level. Whether the
\nsystem be authoritarian or democratic, a greater degree of
\nflexibility will exist, enabling adjustment to crisis. However,
\nthe role of personalities will remain important as institutions
\nonly slowly gather legitimacy. In authoritarian systems, times of
\nsuccession will often evoke crises. In democratic systems,
\ngridlock will be a threat. The premium will be upon leaders able
\nto convey complex issues to their citizenry in understandable
\nterms, and political parties that are inclusive, broadening
\npolitical participation at the grass-roots.<\/p>\n
The prospects for the economic future of Asia are no less
\ncomplex. Increasingly, political legitimacy will be measured in
\nterms of performance in the economical realm, and it is
\nappropriate to have high hopes for most Asian societies. Growth
\nwill be dominant feature, albeit, at gradually reduced rates. An
\nincreasing number of Asian states will enter the ranks of
\nadvanced industrial nations -- South Korea and Taiwan, followed
\nby certain members of ASEAN. By the mid-21st century, Asia will
\nbe at the center of global economic activity. Advances in science
\nand technology, wherever their source, will quickly be applied by
\nleading Asian societies. Internationalizing industrial
\nproduction, the transition of advanced societies to a service
\norientation, and an intense competition for external capital will
\nremain dominant trends. Urbanization will also accelerate.
\nMegacities will grow in size and in numbers, bringing serious
\nproblems to one's doorstep -- congestion, crime, housing.<\/p>\n
Most importantly, despite obstacles, regional and global
\neconomic institutions will be strengthened, with more decision-
\nmaking authority vested in them together with monitoring and
\nenforcement mechanisms of greater potency. NETs will also
\ncontinue to proliferate. Asianization will thus move ahead. These
\ndevelopments will pose serious problems in the allocation of
\nauthority between nation-state, region, and globe, and one can
\nexpect recurrent crises over this issue.<\/p>\n
Nor will the rich-poor gap be close despite general
\nimprovements in livelihood. Indeed, it is probable that both
\nwithin given state and among them, that gap will increase even
\nthough various measures will be taken to reduce poverty. Further,
\nthe recognition of environmental and resource problems has come
\nat a late point in Asia as elsewhere. Population increases will
\ncontinue over the next fifty years in most parts of Asia despite
\nthe introduction of various measures for control. Japan is the
\nfirst exception and it will be followed by a few others, but not
\nby the largest nations of the region, China, India and Indonesia,
\nin coming decades.<\/p>\n
The combination of continued rapid economic growth and
\npopulational gains will make energy and food central problems
\nalong with that of environmental preservation. Indeed, these
\nissues will be paramount security as well economic concerns and
\nones to which there are no easy answers. For example, in very few
\ncountries is agriculture a preferred occupation today. Another
\nproblem certain to grow is that of migration, both within and
\nacross national borders.<\/p>\n
With respect to social conditions, several trends, somewhat
\ncontradictory in nature, seem likely. First, within and among
\ncountries, cultural homogenization will accelerate, product of
\ngreater access and mobility. At he same time, ethnic divisions
\nare likely to remain strong and may even take more militant form.
\nThere are no signs of a diminution of ethnic consciousness. On
\nthe contrary, it is on the rise, partly as an answer to the
\nquestion, \"Who am I?\"<\/p>\n
Literacy will continue to increase as education reaches an
\never larger portion of the population. By 2050, Asia should have
\na literacy rate above 90 percent. Generational differences will
\nbecome more pronounced, complicating familiar relationships.<\/p>\n
In sum, most of Asia is still at a relatively early stage of
\nits domestic revolution. As the revolution advances, it will
\nshare an increasing number of characteristics -- and problems --
\nwith the advanced nations despite certain cultural differences,
\namong them the loneliness embedded in a materialistic society;
\nuncertainties concerning the role of the state versus that of the
\nsociety; and the conflict between the economic logic of
\ninterdependence and the psychological appeal of separateness.<\/p>\n
The latter issue relates to the broader question of future
\ninternational relations. Almost certainly, the nation-state will
\nbe forced to share sovereignty in increasing measure with
\ninstitutions above it -- regional and global. Indeed, a network
\nof agreements -- strategic, political and economic -- will
\nexpand, and the signatories to those agreements will be expected
\nto abide by them, or face penalties. Further, as noted earlier,
\ngreater decision making authority will be given to existing and
\nfuture regional and international organizations.<\/p>\n
At some point in the not distant future, an official Northeast
\nAsian Security Dialogue will come into being, and that
\nassociation will gradually acquire the right to make decisions.
\nMeanwhile, ASEAN and its adjunct, the Asian Regional Forum (ARF),
\nwhich seeks to encompass Pacific-Asia as a whole, will move in a
\nsimilar direction. However, we shall remain strongly dependent
\nupon the system of ad hoc coalitions described earlier together
\nwith bilateral negotiations to resolve or contain certain issues
\nthat threaten conflict.<\/p>\n
As is well known, Asia confronts a number of dangerous,
\ndivisive issues relating to divided states and territorial
\ndisputes. There is no likelihood that most of these will be
\nresolved quickly or easily. Fortunately, however, the odds
\nagainst a major power conflict in Pacific-Asia are high. Given
\nthe advances in weapons of mass destruction on the one hand, and
\nthe growth of economic interdependence on the other, the
\ndestructiveness of a major war to all parties, victor and
\nvanquished alike, would be enormous.<\/p>\n
This certainly does not mean that we have seen the end of
\nmilitary conflict. The highest probability of conflict, however,
\nlies in civil strife within certain states. The further risk is
\nthat some such conflicts may become regionalized, as was the case
\nin connection with Cambodia in the late 1970s. Thus, one central
\nsource of danger is that of failed or failing states. Another
\nrisk is that of accident, or an escalating incident, especially
\namong neighbors. Another form of violence, terrorism, may well
\nincrease, given the ease with which destructive weapons can come
\ninto the hand of individuals or groups so inclined.<\/p>\n
Even with the caveats set forth, is the scenario painted above
\ntoo optimistic? No true balance of power in Pacific-Asia exists
\ntoday. The United States is the sole global power, and its
\ncommitments in Asia are extensive, but will they continue? At
\npresent, the major states are contending with significant
\ndomestic issues and all have made economic growth the highest
\npriority. But what of the future? In three or four decades at
\nmost, a major shift in power is likely. China, and in all
\nprobability, Russia will have emerged as major powers in every
\nsense of the term. The United State will continue to be a major
\nforce, but in relative terms, its power will have declined. Given
\nits domestic circumstances, will Japan have the desire -- or the
\ncapacity -- to take on a stronger leadership role in the region?<\/p>\n
At some point, a central question relating to stability or
\nupheaval in Asia will be how the major states view their \"lost
\nempires\". As it acquires greater military and economic strength,
\nhow will China handle a range of issues, from Taiwan and the
\nSouth China Sea atolls to Mongolia and Eastern Siberia,
\nterritories it also claimed in the not distant past? How will a
\nreinvigorated Russia relate to the new states of Central Asia and
\nthose on its west -- all parts of the USSR until recently? Will
\nJapan, having acquired its Greater East Asian CoProsperity Sphere
\nat vastly less cost than the effort of the 1930s and 1940s, seek
\nto add political and strategic increments to its economic role,
\nand in what form? The American \"lost empire\" is a different type.
\nAs noted earlier, U.S. alliances have shifted from those
\ninvolving patron-client relations to those demanding partnership
\nand flexibility. How will the United States adjust to this fact
\nin the years ahead?<\/p>\n
Let me conclude by briefly making the case for cautious
\noptimism regarding the Pacific-Asian future. For reasons outlined
\nabove, the risks of a major power conflict now or in the
\nforeseeable future are at their lowest point in the 20th century.
\nThe priority for all nations is upon economic growth, and to this
\nend, interdependence is rising rapidly. Experimentation with a
\nwide range of regional and international institutions and
\nmechanisms in both the economic and the security-political fields
\nis continuing. Thus, there are a growing number of alternatives
\nto resolving controversies by force.<\/p>\n
Limited wars and domestic conflicts will certainly be a part
\nof the future. It is legitimate to worry about an intensification
\nof ethnic divisions and a rising role for militant religions in
\npolitics. These are by no means uniquely Asian phenomena, but
\nthey are a part of the Asian scene. Yet the ascendancy of
\nextremist leaders or the resort to military coups seems on a
\ndownward slope. And in such events as the Philippine government's
\naccord with the Moro movement and the willingness of the Indian
\ngovernment to permit elections in Kashmir, one sees signs of
\nprogress.<\/p>\n
Window A: Almost certainly, the nation-state will be forced to
\nshare sovereignty in increasing measure with institutions above
\nit -- regional and global.<\/p>\n
Window B: Limited wars and domestic conflicts will certainly be a
\npart of the future. It is legitimate to worry about an
\nintensification of ethnic divisions and a rising role for
\nmilitant religions in politics.<\/p>",
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