Asia not ready for security pact<\/p>\n
Simon S.C. Tay, The Straits Times, Asia News Network, Singapore<\/p>\n
There has been recent talk of an Asian military alliance,
\nequivalent to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
\nThere are also suggestions for an ASEAN security community.
\nBeyond the particulars of these trial balloons, one common theme
\nemerges: Even as many Asian economies post their strongest growth
\nfigures since the 1997 crisis, questions remain whether they are
\nindeed secure and politically resilient.<\/p>\n
Flash points abound. Some are longstanding, like North Korea
\nand relations between Beijing and Taipei. Others are more recent,
\narising from post Sept. 11 concerns about terrorism. Still
\nothers, like Myanmar, stem from internal instabilities.<\/p>\n
These issues test the ability of states to maintain stability,
\ncooperate closely and resolve differences by dialogue rather than
\nthe use of force.<\/p>\n
Asia has known conflict even during its periods of high
\ngrowth, most notably the Vietnam War. But the non-communist
\nstates of the region benefited during that Cold War era from the
\nguarantees provided by an American security umbrella. In the
\nabsence of an Asian NATO, bilateral arrangements between the U.S.
\nand Asian allies ensured the presence of American troops in the
\nregion.<\/p>\n
The U.S. has been the essential actor in Asia, the center of a
\nhub and spoke arrangement which saw Asian countries enjoying
\ncloser relationships to the American center than to each other.<\/p>\n
The United Nations was, by contrast, far away, or mostly a
\nconvenient flag to rally a multilateral coalition during the
\nKorean conflict or in rebuilding peace in Cambodia.<\/p>\n
Following the end of the Cold War and fears of American
\ndisengagement from this region, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)
\nemerged as the leading multilateral security dialogue forum in
\nAsia. This is led, not by the U.S. or the other major powers, but
\nby the mid-sized and smaller countries of Southeast Asia.<\/p>\n
The ARF is no military alliance; it instead emphasizes
\ncooperation in security, developing confidence and understanding
\namong potential rivals. It aims to prevent and settle differences
\nby peaceful and diplomatic means.<\/p>\n
But while the ARF has shown some progress along this path, it
\nhas been unable to respond to regional crises, like East Timor,
\nor to play a significant part in handling problems like North
\nKorea.<\/p>\n
What is clear is that political will, military capability and
\nAmerican attention remain essential to the equation of peace in
\nthe region.<\/p>\n
For these reasons, most Asian governments have welcomed
\nrenewed U.S. interest and engagement in the region after the
\ntragic events of Sept. 11. American unilateralism and policies on
\nIraq and other issues may have rankled, but some like the
\nPhilippines have closely aligned their interests with America's
\nand others have at least sought to limit their differences and to
\nmanage ties with Washington.<\/p>\n
But there are some security issues in the region on which
\nAmerica is not engaged, like Myanmar. There, a road map to
\ndemocracy announced by the ruling regime is being facilitated by
\nThailand, on behalf of ASEAN and with representation by Japan and
\nother countries. Mixed reports are still emerging from different
\nobservers, but the broader challenge is whether there can be
\nsubstantial progress without American engagement, or at least
\nacceptance.<\/p>\n
What then of the talk of an Asian security mechanism?<\/p>\n
Proponents of an Asian NATO suggest that India, Japan and
\nChina take the lead as a concert of major regional powers. Yet,
\nwhile ties between these Asian giants are improving, each of
\nthese still has differences with one another. The many historical
\nand on going rivalries between Japan and China are especially
\nnotable. Each of these Asian giants remains closer to the U.S.
\nthan they are to each other.<\/p>\n
Further, smaller nations and ASEAN may not be sufficiently
\ncomfortable with these Asian powers to be confident they will not
\nseek to dominate them. Currently, there is little reason for them
\nto accept these new and still uncertain arrangements, in contrast
\nto an American influence that has been seen as relatively
\nbenevolent in these past decades.<\/p>\n
Suggestions for an ASEAN security community do not go so far
\nas to seek to displace America. Rather, proposals for the ASEAN
\nsecurity community can be seen as a progression from the habits
\nof dialogue and conciliation that ASEAN has developed in these
\ndecades to keep peace among themselves.<\/p>\n
Differences remain to be debated over the pace and direction
\nof these efforts, including whether an ASEAN peacekeeping force
\nshould be established.<\/p>\n
But the general idea that the regional issues should be
\naddressed, where possible, through regional cooperation is
\ngaining acceptance.<\/p>\n
Are Asians ready and able to provide for their own security?
\nThe present answer is clearly, no. Very different processes exist
\ntoday in addressing issues like North Korea, Myanmar and
\nterrorism, and in the ARF and ASEAN. These do not point to any
\nsingle security organization or mechanism emerging to meet all
\nchallenges. But they may point to emerging changes in the ways
\nAsians act in future on security, both among themselves, and with
\nthe U.S.<\/p>\n
The writer is chairman of the Singapore Institute of
\nInternational Affairs.<\/p>",
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