Asia needs China's transparency<\/p>\n
By Rizal Sukma<\/p>\n
JAKARTA (JP): During the recent ASEAN Foreign Ministerial
\nMeeting in Bangkok, Thailand, China once again reiterated its
\ncommitment to stability and security in the Asia-Pacific region.<\/p>\n
China's Foreign Minister Qian Qichen stated during the
\nhistoric ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) meeting that, \"China is not
\ninvolved in aggression and expansion, or in seeking hegemony.\" He
\nalso said that China was not interested in looking for a sphere
\nof influence.<\/p>\n
The same commitments have been repeated by Chinese leaders
\nover the years, starting long before China was granted the status
\nof \"consultative partner\" of ASEAN. Nonetheless, China still
\nfeels that it is necessary to emphasize the point whenever the
\nopportunity arises.<\/p>\n
The reiteration implies that China is fully aware that
\nregional countries are still suspicious of its intent. The
\nquestion is: Why does the suspicion persist? How can it be
\novercome?<\/p>\n
The question of the \"China threat\" has always been a major
\nconcern to China's neighbors. It is related to the historical as
\nwell as strategic aspects of Chinese engagement in the Asia-
\nPacific region since 1949. During the 1960s, for example, China
\nwas an active supporter of almost all internal communist
\ninsurgences in Southeast Asian countries.<\/p>\n
During the height of its rivalry with the former Soviet Union
\nin the 1970s, China's military attack and later coercive
\ndiplomacy against Vietnam symbolized the country's inclination to
\nuse force to achieve its security interests.<\/p>\n
More recently, China's strategic claim in the South China Sea
\nhas also disturbed regional countries. All of these activities
\nhave resulted in a deep suspicion of China's intentions toward
\nSoutheast Asia which persists even until now.<\/p>\n
In the post-Cold War era, the misgivings over China's
\nintentions in the region have become more complicated due to the
\nlack of transparency in China's defense policy. No matter how
\nuntenable the theory of a regional \"power vacuum\" is, this theory
\nremains attractive to regional policy makers, defense planners,
\nand analysts.<\/p>\n
In this regard, China's military build-up is often referred to
\nas an obvious evidence of China's intention to fill the \"vacuum\".
\nConsequently, the military aspects of the so-called \"China
\nthreat\" have increasingly assumed a greater significance in some
\nASEAN countries' perception and policies.<\/p>\n
To overcome security challenges in the region, which are in
\npart characterized by the unpredictability of China's behavior,
\nit has been proposed that all countries should work toward a
\ngreater military transparency among the ARF participants.<\/p>\n
The proposal constitutes an important element of the ongoing
\nprocess of Confidence Building Measures (CBM) in the region.<\/p>\n
However, it seems that China has some reservations about the
\nidea, and its attitude on this matter remains an obstacle to a
\nspeedy CBM process.<\/p>\n
Why does China have some reservations toward the idea of a
\ngreater military transparency in the region?<\/p>\n
The Chinese attitude can be understood by putting it within
\nthe larger picture of China's policy towards regional
\nmultilateral security arrangements in the Asia-Pacific. In
\nChina's view, a multilateral approach towards security, if not
\nmanaged carefully, could have some negative impacts on the
\nindependence of its defense strategy and policies.<\/p>\n
Even though \"complex security interdependence\" has become a
\nreality of the post-Cold War international politics,
\n\"independence\" remains the \"code word\" of China's security
\npolicy.<\/p>\n
Nonetheless, China is fully aware that the trend towards
\nmultilateral security arrangements cannot be resisted. Therefore,
\nwhile still preferring bilateral arrangements, China has stated
\nthat it would not refuse to participate in multilateral security
\nforums.<\/p>\n
This implies that China has opted for some kind of selective
\nengagement. For example, in some cases, such as in the recent ARF
\nmeeting, China has been an active participant. But, in some other
\ncases, such as in the South China Sea disputes, China has
\nmaintained that it prefers a solution through bilateral
\nnegotiations rather than multilateral talks.<\/p>\n
In fact, one of the objectives of the multilateral approach
\ntowards security in the region is to defuse tensions in the South
\nChina Sea, a matter which is multilateral in nature.<\/p>\n
As a result of its reservations, it is likely that China might
\ndiscourage any attempt at establishing region-wide security
\narrangements.<\/p>\n
It is very likely that the Chinese reservations are also due
\nto the perceived threat to China's national security that might
\ncome from Japan and the United States. In China's strategic
\nassessment, only Japan and the U.S. are capable of posing a
\nmilitary threat to its national integrity and security.<\/p>\n
Perhaps, one still remembers the importance Chinese leaders
\nhave put on the perceived U.S. attempts to change China through a
\n\"peaceful evolution\".<\/p>\n
If China approaches the question of a multilateral security
\narrangement with caution, it can be expected that China might
\nalso have some apprehension about the idea of greater military
\ntransparency in the region.<\/p>\n
For example, China is not very enthusiastic with regard to the
\nexchange of defense information through the publication of a
\n\"defense white paper\", even though it understands that such
\nactivities would help reduce mutual suspicion between China and
\nSoutheast Asian countries.<\/p>\n
For China, revealing its military strength means exposing its
\nweakness vis a vis the U.S. and Japan. Moreover, \"secrecy\" is
\nstill an important aspect of China's defense strategy, as it has
\nbeen since the era of Sun-tzu.<\/p>\n
If China remains committed to the stability and security in
\nthe region, it should gradually change its attitude. Without its
\nsupport of the idea of greater military transparency, it would be
\ndifficult for China to convince countries in Southeast Asia that
\nit has no military ambition in the region.<\/p>\n
Similarly, ASEAN should also appreciate China's cautious
\npolicy in the matter. In this regard, joint efforts to formulate
\nan \"acceptable degree of transparency\" can be a starting point
\nfor both sides.<\/p>\n
Without a common perception between ASEAN and China on this
\nissue, the task of establishing a lasting peace in Southeast Asia
\nwill be difficult indeed.<\/p>\n
The writer is a researcher at the Centre for Strategic and
\nInternational Studies, Jakarta, and a Ph.D. candidate at The
\nLondon School of Economics and Political Science, the United
\nKingdom.<\/p>",
"url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/asia-needs-chinas-transparency-1447893297",
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"sponsor": "Okusi Associates",
"sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com"
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