ASEAN's China-Taiwan policy<\/p>\n
By Jusuf Wanandi<\/p>\n
JAKARTA (JP): Questions are being asked about ASEAN's
\n(Association of Southeast Asian Nations) policies on China-Taiwan
\nrelations, because ASEAN member countries (except Singapore) have
\nsaid almost nothing about the tensions across the Straits at the
\nheight of Chinese military exercises during Taiwan's presidential
\ncampaign last March. Last month, several ASEAN countries received
\na visit from John Chang, Taiwan's foreign minister, when he made
\na swing through southeast Asia. This adds to the curiosity of
\nobservers regarding ASEAN's stand on the China-Taiwan
\nrelationship, because it looks contradictory, while in fact it is
\nnot. Here is why.<\/p>\n
First, as a matter of principle in guiding the relationship
\nbetween ASEAN and China, ASEAN countries strictly adhere to the
\npolicy of "one China" and that Taiwan is an integral part of
\nChina. This policy is not likely to change in the future.<\/p>\n
There are several reasons why this is a matter of principle to
\nASEAN. All ASEAN members have their irredentist movement and they
\nall understand how vital and emotional this issue is for their
\nown people and leaders. Indonesia, for instance, almost went to
\nwar against the Dutch in its efforts to regain the last part of
\nthe former Netherlands Indies, West Irian, in 1962. It was
\npresident Kennedy's intervention and ambassador Elsworth Bunker's
\nmediation at the UN that prevented a war between Indonesia and
\nthe Netherlands from breaking out.<\/p>\n
ASEAN members do not want anybody to intervene in their
\nproblems of irredentist movements, and therefore, they can
\ncompletely understand and sympathize with China on the Taiwan re-
\nunification problem. China also poses the most important
\nstrategic challenge, especially for ASEAN as its neighbor,
\nbecause it is an emerging great power in the region and the
\nworld. The challenge for the region is to establish peaceful and
\ncooperative relations with China and to get it positively
\ninvolved in the region as a responsible member and leader of the
\nregion.<\/p>\n
Of course, this is not only ASEAN's challenge, but ASEAN's
\nrole in forging positive relations with China could be a real
\ncontribution for a peaceful Asia Pacific region. Therefore, while
\nTaiwan's economic role in the region is well-appreciated, it is
\nno comparison with China's strategic importance to ASEAN and the
\nregion.<\/p>\n
Third, while some countries, especially the West, have been
\nsupportive of Taiwan because of its emerging democracy, ASEAN's
\nposition is that this domestic development will not influence
\nASEAN's foreign policies towards Taiwan.<\/p>\n
The tensions around the presidential elections last March in
\nfact began earlier, resulting from Taiwan's changes on the status
\nquo in her relations with China. This partly results from
\ndomestic pressures, and is partly due to the ending of the Cold
\nWar. Efforts by Taiwan to create what China has called a "two-
\nChina" or a "one China and one Taiwan" policy by applying for
\nmembership in the UN at the end of 1993 and "private" visits by
\nthe president, premier or ministers from Taiwan to Southeast
\nAsia, the Middle East and Europe (culminating in President Lee
\nTeng Hui's visit to the U.S. in May 1995) produced the tensions
\nwith and retaliation by China.<\/p>\n
ASEAN understands that the Chinese military exercises during
\nTaiwan's presidential election in March were intended to send a
\nvery serious warning to Taiwan and were not a preparation for
\nwar, which China at this stage could not afford and would not
\nwin. The missile testing around Taiwan could be a real mishap,
\nand China was privately informed about ASEAN's concerns on that.
\nThat act by China also interfered with the freedom of navigation
\naround the island. Despite the international media hype, most
\nASEAN members kept their heads cool.<\/p>\n
John Chang's visits to ASEAN member nations were mainly
\nTaiwan's own initiative and were handled very carefully by ASEAN
\ngovernments: first, so as not to give an official status to the
\nvisits and second, not to encourage similar visits in the future.
\nIn some instances, they also indicate that there are inter-agency
\nproblems of coordination in the ASEAN country visited.<\/p>\n
But in the future, ASEAN should be very cautious not to repeat
\nthis, because ASEAN members themselves would not like to face
\nreciprocal acts in the future from China. Rather, exchanges
\nbetween Taiwan and ASEAN countries should involve sub-cabinet
\neconomic officials.<\/p>\n
In the meantime, the heat across the Straits has subsided, but
\nthe problem remains far from being solved. While Taiwan has
\nlessened its "provocation" towards China in order not to anger a
\npowerful neighbor, Taiwan is still following the same basic
\npolicies on Straits relations. The unwillingness of Taiwan to
\ndevelop direct links with China, and the recent move by the
\ngovernment in Taipei to discourage Taiwanese private investments
\nin China are rather worrying. The Chinese, while being quiet, are
\nobserving Taiwan's policies very closely. ASEAN should make clear
\nto both sides that an increase of tensions -- or worse, a
\nconflict in the region -- is against the region's interest to
\nachieve a dynamic and peaceful region in the Asia Pacific in the
\nfuture. Therefore, any provocation from either side and any
\nconflict arising from those actions should be looked upon
\ndisapprovingly by the region and acted upon together, especially
\nby ASEAN.<\/p>\n
In the meantime, efforts by ASEAN to encourage more dialogues
\nand confidence building between the two parties have to be
\nenhanced, while reunification should be postponed into the
\nfuture, maybe for a further 10 or 20 years. Dialogues and
\npolitical negotiations on matters other than reunification could
\ntake place. These could involve such issues as confidence
\nbuilding measures (CBMs), the three direct links (post, air and
\nshipping services, and trade), the content of a one-China policy,
\nTaiwan's international space problem, Taiwan's political status,
\nas well as on the specific arrangements for ending hostilities.
\nThis will be a difficult and an arduous task for both sides, but
\ncould be done if there is enough political will on both sides.
\nBut first, it is important for Taiwan to recognize the "one
\nChina" principle now and not only in the future.<\/p>\n
If Taiwan commits itself to abide by the "one China" principle
\nand really implements it with other CBM measures towards China,
\nthen it could be expected that China will make reciprocal
\nconcessions, such as a commitment to not use force against Taiwan
\nso long as Taiwan sticks to the "one China" principle, adopting a
\nflexible policy toward Taiwan's international space problem;
\nnegotiating with Taipei on an equal footing, and settling
\nproblems related to Taiwan's interests after Hong Kong's return
\nto China.<\/p>\n
At the end of difficult negotiations, one could expect that a
\npeaceful agreement to end the hostilities could be reached and
\nStraits relations will enter a completely new stage.<\/p>\n
Window: The Chinese, while being quiet, are observing Taiwan
\npolicies very closesly. ASEAN should make clear to both sides
\nthat an increase of tensions -- or worse, a conflict in the
\nregion -- is against the region's interest.<\/p>",
"url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/aseans-china-taiwan-policy-1447893297",
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