ASEAN wise in deferring Cambodia's entry<\/p>\n
JAKARTA (JP): On July 24, 1997, Cambodia was to become a
\nmember of ASEAN. Just two weeks before that date ASEAN foreign
\nministers decided to defer Cambodia's membership because the
\npolitical disputes between the two co-prime ministers and their
\nparties were being solved by the use of force.<\/p>\n
ASEAN's decision reflects the apprehensions on the part of
\nASEAN's public opinion and the concern on the part of its
\nofficials that unless a peaceful resolution is reached,
\nCambodia's membership would create major problems for ASEAN. A
\nnew time frame is given for Cambodia's admission. Internal peace
\nmust be established first and ASEAN governments have made the
\noffer to assist the conflicting parties to resolve the problem.<\/p>\n
A commission consisting of three ASEAN foreign ministers has
\nbeen established and is being tasked to meet with King Norodom
\nSihanouk and the two co-prime ministers. ASEAN continues to
\nrecognize Prince Ranaridh as Cambodia's first co-prime minister.<\/p>\n
What are the prospects for a peaceful outcome of this internal
\ndispute?. It should be borne in mind that Cambodia has always
\nbeen a "problem nation" for its neighbors. At times this had been
\ncaused by external factors such as during the Vietnam War and the
\nAmerican invasion of Cambodia in 1970 which had dragged this
\ncountry unwillingly into the war. At other times, the problem
\noriginated from within such as created by the rise of the Khmer
\nRouge into power in 1975 and the subsequent genocide.<\/p>\n
ASEAN, or at least some of its members, has been actively
\ninvolved since the early 1970 in efforts to help Cambodia
\nestablish an internal peace, but these have been largely
\nunsuccessful. ASEAN stepped up its diplomatic efforts following
\nVietnam's invasion of Cambodia in 1979. The first aim was to draw
\nthe world community's attention to Cambodia's plight. The second
\naim was to affect a Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia, and
\nlastly, to help resolve the internal conflict through a political
\ncompromise between the parties involved.<\/p>\n
Admittedly, it was only with the ending of the Cold War in
\n1989 and with the support of permanent members of the UN Security
\nCouncil and the international community at large that a
\nresolution to the internal conflict was possible, leading to the
\nParis Agreement of 1991. On the basis of this Agreement a general
\nelection was held in 1993 which resulted in the establishment of
\na government headed by the two co-prime ministers. This
\ngovernment emerged as a compromise that was based on the results
\nof the general election and the prevailing political situation in
\nthe country. The Paris Agreement continues to provide the only
\nacceptable basis for reaching a political solution to the present
\nconflict.<\/p>\n
It has been clearly recognized that ASEAN's enlargement to
\ninclude Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar would create new challenges
\nfor ASEAN. Deferring Cambodia's membership does not make life
\neasier for ASEAN. ASEAN has to continue to get involved in
\nrestoring internal peace in Cambodia, and Cambodia's internal
\ndevelopments affect the region's stability and security because
\nit is in the heart of Southeast Asia.<\/p>\n
The outbreak of internal conflict and the postponement of
\nCambodia's membership of ASEAN constitute a setback for the
\nimplementation of the ideals of ASEAN's founding fathers. This
\nwas to create one Southeast Asia in which all 10 countries in the
\nregion live in peace and jointly decide their own future,
\nwithstand pressure from without, and contribute to the
\nstrengthening of a regional order in the Asia-Pacific.<\/p>\n
However, ASEAN's decision to defer the membership of Cambodia
\nis a correct and wise decision. It does not make sense to have
\nCambodia as a member if it is not ready to adopt ASEAN's spirit,
\nprinciples, customs and tradition based on deliberations and
\nconsensus building. The use of force by one party toward the
\nother is an implicit and explicit violation of that spirit.<\/p>\n
ASEAN's decision has opened up the question of whether that
\ndecision entails an interference in Cambodia's internal affairs.
\nIn their statement, the foreign ministers stated that ASEAN
\nupholds the principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs
\nof its members. However, ASEAN cannot ignore developments in its
\nmembers which could destabilize the region. The clear precedent
\nfor this was during the last days of the Marcos regime in the
\nPhilippines. The likelihood of a civil war that could destabilize
\nthe region has led the ASEAN foreign ministers, for the first
\ntime, to make a public a statement to appeal to the parties
\ninvolved to restrain themselves.<\/p>\n
It is clear that ASEAN's involvement in Cambodia's internal
\naffairs should be based on the principles of the Paris Agreement,
\nwhich include the support for the coalition government and
\nparliament that resulted from the 1993 elections. ASEAN and the
\ninternational community have invested a lot in helping Cambodia
\nrebuild a viable national and in promoting its national
\ndevelopment. Neither should give up hope.<\/p>\n
But most important is Cambodia's own understanding and
\nappreciation that the world has changed and the strategic
\nenvironment in Southeast Asia has also changed. If they opt for
\nbeing left out, they will only bring deprivation, misery and
\npoverty to themselves and risk being marginalized all together.<\/p>\n
The writer is Chairman of the Supervisory Board of the
\nJakarta-based Centre for Strategic and International Studies<\/p>",
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