{
    "success": true,
    "data": {
        "id": 1194367,
        "msgid": "asean-summit-yields-major-results-1447893297",
        "date": "1995-12-22 00:00:00",
        "title": "ASEAN summit yields major results",
        "author": null,
        "source": "",
        "tags": null,
        "topic": null,
        "summary": "ASEAN summit yields major results By Jusuf Wanandi JAKARTA (JP): The fifth ASEAN summit in Bangkok on Dec. 14-15, 1995 has ended with more practical results than expected before. ASEAN's Leaders Meetings have not been held frequently and their results have been uneven. The first one in Bali (1976) was basic, following a period of consolidation of almost 10 years and the changed strategic circumstances after the fall of Saigon in 1975.",
        "content": "<p>ASEAN summit yields major results<\/p>\n<p>By Jusuf Wanandi<\/p>\n<p>JAKARTA (JP): The fifth ASEAN summit in Bangkok on Dec. 14-15,<br>\n1995 has ended with more practical results than expected before.<br>\nASEAN's Leaders Meetings have not been held frequently and their<br>\nresults have been uneven.<\/p>\n<p>The first one in Bali (1976) was basic, following a period of<br>\nconsolidation of almost 10 years and the changed strategic<br>\ncircumstances after the fall of Saigon in 1975.<\/p>\n<p>These two challenges were responded to, respectively, by two<br>\ntreaties: the ASEAN Concord on ASEAN's cooperation in the future<br>\nand the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC).<\/p>\n<p>The second summit in Kuala Lumpur (1977) worked out the<br>\naspects of economic cooperation in the ASEAN Concord, and began<br>\nhigh-level consultations with other leaders in the Asia Pacific,<br>\nespecially Japan.<\/p>\n<p>The third Summit in Manila (1987), ten years after Kuala<br>\nLumpur, was held mainly to support President Corazon Aquino's<br>\nregime in the Philippines which was challenged by insurgencies<br>\n(both Communist and religious) as well as insubordination and<br>\ncoup attempts by the military. It also stressed the importance of<br>\nfunctional cooperation and promoted new ideas of economic<br>\ncooperation through ASEAN's private sector.<\/p>\n<p>The fourth summit in Singapore (1992), the first after the end<br>\nof the Cold War, was a significant one. It created the ASEAN Free<br>\nTrade Area (AFTA) regime for trade liberalization and agreed on<br>\nASEAN's political-security cooperation and endorsed the setting-<br>\nup of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), an institution for CBM and<br>\npreventive diplomacy that in the longer term hopefully will<br>\nbecome a conflict resolution mechanism for the entire Asia<br>\nPacific region.<\/p>\n<p>The recent summit in Bangkok also produced significant<br>\nresults. The highlights of the summit were: (1) a first meeting<br>\nof the leaders of the ten South East Asian countries including<br>\nVietnam as the youngest ASEAN member and the three non-ASEAN<br>\ncountries: Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar (the so-called CLM<br>\ncountries). This is the most important and strategic achievement<br>\nof this summit, because it opened up a real possibility that the<br>\nidea of an ASEAN-10, as conceived by ASEAN's founding fathers,<br>\ncould become a reality before the end of the century.<\/p>\n<p>Cambodia and Laos will become members in 1997 and Myanmar<br>\npossibly in 1999. All three acceded to the TAC and were observers<br>\nof ASEAN in 1976. Question have been raised in the media and<br>\namong academics whether it is good for ASEAN to have a \"widening\"<br>\nof membership before \"deepening\" of cooperation, among others<br>\nthrough AFTA. This is the same challenge faced by the European<br>\nUnion in implementing the Maastricht Treaty first, before Central<br>\nEurope and the Baltic state can be considered to become the next<br>\nmembers of the EU.<\/p>\n<p>For ASEAN, the chance of establishing an ASEAN-10 is of<br>\nparamount importance not only because it was a romantic dream at<br>\nthe creation of ASEAN in 1967, but also because it is of<br>\nstrategic importance, for the promotion of peace and welfare of<br>\nthe Southeast Asia region in the future. The main objective is<br>\ndefinitely to prevent the division of Southeast Asia into two<br>\nparts: one rich (ASEAN) and one poor (CLM countries). Such a<br>\ndivision will be the surest source of future instabilities in the<br>\nregion, which could be \"exploited\" by outside powers.<\/p>\n<p>On a practical level, the CLM countries could accelerate their<br>\neconomic development and strengthen political stability with<br>\nASEAN's help. ASEAN's assistance could include human resource<br>\ndevelopment and the sharing of development experiences. ASEAN<br>\ncould also become an interlocutor in mobilizing financial<br>\nassistance from third countries.<\/p>\n<p>The welcoming of the CLM countries into ASEAN will definitely<br>\ncreate some strains on the process of decision-making and on the<br>\nunique \"style\" of ASEAN's tolerance, consensus and political<br>\nculture. ASEAN leaders have recognized this and therefore have<br>\nencouraged the granting of assistance to help the CLM countries<br>\nimmediately and not to wait until they become members of ASEAN.<\/p>\n<p>If the experiences of ASEAN ISIS (Institutes of Strategic and<br>\nInternational Studies) for the last five years with all ten<br>\nSoutheast Asian countries in political-security and economic<br>\ncooperation (two series of conferences) could give some guidance,<br>\nwhere understanding and goodwill have been created and gradually<br>\nincreased over the years, then the difficulties that ASEAN will<br>\nundoubtedly have to face will not be insurmountable.<\/p>\n<p>In the longer term ASEAN-10 will be an important factor for<br>\npeace, stability and dynamism for Southeast Asia and an important<br>\nplayer in the development of the Asia Pacific region.<\/p>\n<p>The second important decision in Bangkok was the signing of<br>\nthe Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (SEANWFZ) by the 10<br>\nSoutheast Asian nations. This is Southeast Asian's contribution<br>\nto strengthening the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and<br>\nsupporting the Complete Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) which is to be<br>\nfinalized in 1996. Basically SEANWFZ follows the Rarotonga Treaty<br>\non the South Pacific nuclear free region which forbids the<br>\nsignatories to posses, produce, store or test nuclear weapons<br>\nwithout limiting the shipments of nuclear weapons or nuclear<br>\npowered vessels, including port calls.<\/p>\n<p>The only difference is the delineation of the region which in<br>\nSEANWFZ includes the continental shelves and Exclusive Economic<br>\nZone (EEZ) of the Southeast Asian countries in accordance with<br>\nthe UN Treaty on the Law of the Sea. This has been questioned by<br>\nthe nuclear powers, especially the United States that has<br>\nwithheld her consent to sign the attached protocol.<\/p>\n<p>China has a special case due to her claims on part of the<br>\noverlapping EEZ and continental shelves of the Southeast Asian<br>\ncountries in the South China Sea area. Despite the fact that the<br>\nnuclear powers are not willing to support the Treaty as it stands<br>\nnow it is hoped that the technical-legal objections could be<br>\naccommodated in the near future. And since this is not political<br>\nin nature as it was before in the U.S. case, this should be<br>\nrelatively easy.<\/p>\n<p>The Chinese objection could be more complicated, and should be<br>\nstudied more carefully.<\/p>\n<p>In the meantime it is heartening to note that the Chinese<br>\nwould like to base her claims in the South China Sea on the Law<br>\nof the Sea. Based on the law, it will not be impossible to find a<br>\nsolution to China's objection. Anyhow, the leaders have gone<br>\nahead with signing the Treaty in Bangkok while recognizing that<br>\nthe attached protocol  could be reviewed after consultations with<br>\nthe nuclear powers to find a resolution to their reservations. It<br>\nis hoped that this can be achieved before the ratification by the<br>\nseven signatories which will make the Treaty operational.<\/p>\n<p>The summit also decided to: (1) develop the ARF into a more<br>\nmeaningful process to ensuring Asia Pacific security; (2) look<br>\nfor an early and peaceful resolution of the South China Sea<br>\ndisputes; (3) take an active part in the first (Asia-Europe<br>\nMeeting) ASEM next March, to build a new partnership between both<br>\ncontinents for greater growth.<\/p>\n<p>The third major decision is to hasten the pace of AFTA's<br>\ncompletion, from 2008 (15 years) to 2003 (10 years), with<br>\nvoluntary efforts to be made by the year 2000, on a large number<br>\nof items.<\/p>\n<p>In addition, there are other important decisions: (1) a<br>\nframework for the liberalization of trade in services, such as<br>\nfinance, maritime transport, aviation, telecommunications,<br>\ntourism and construction; (2) cooperation on intellectual<br>\nproperty rights issues; (3) promotion of an ASEAN investment<br>\nregion, to make it attractive and competitive for direct<br>\ninvestment; (4) implementation of a new industrial cooperation<br>\nscheme to boost investment in technological and value-added<br>\nindustries; (5) cooperation in investments and transfer  of<br>\ntechnology; (6) greater involvement of the private sector, in<br>\nASEAN policy-makings; (6) playing an active role in shaping<br>\nglobal issues through such fora as the WTO and APEC; (7)<br>\ncontinuing efforts to advance the East Asia Economic Caucus; (8)<br>\nadoption of a general dispute settlement mechanism to deal with<br>\nproblems arising from ASEAN economic arrangements; (9) setting up<br>\nof a customs \"green lane\" for quick clearance of products in the<br>\nCEPT.<\/p>\n<p>Fourth, is its emphasis on the importance of functional<br>\ncooperation, particularly in social areas, since this provides<br>\nthe guarantee that the main objective of ASEAN cooperation,<br>\nnamely to improve the status, income and participation of ASEAN<br>\ncountries citizens, especially the underprivileged and most<br>\ncommon people are not being forgotten. In this context the<br>\nproposal from the Thai Foreign Minister Kasem Kasemsri at the<br>\nlast ASEAN Ministers Meeting (AMM), in July in Brunei Darussalam,<br>\nhas to be noted. He proposed that a way in ASEAN has to be found<br>\nto make the people more aware of ASEAN by encouraging their<br>\nparticipation in ASEAN's activities and at the same time<br>\nproviding a feed-back to the bureaucrats and officials, who up<br>\ntill now have been the most involved in ASEAN's programs. While<br>\nthe EU has an European parliament, ASEAN on its part could<br>\ndevelop a more informal participatory mechanism.<\/p>\n<p>As an example, during APEC's Ministers and Leaders Meetings<br>\nin Jakarta and Osaka, non-governmental organizations such as PECC<br>\n(Pacific Economic Cooperation Council) and PBEC (Pacific Basin<br>\nEconomic Council) organized a large-scale meeting for<br>\nbusinessmen, academics and the media with government officials<br>\nand leaders, giving some sense of participation to the non-<br>\nofficials. This in the meantime has become an important tradition<br>\nwhich will be continued next year in Manila.<\/p>\n<p>In Bangkok, between the Ministers and Leaders Meeting, the<br>\nASEAN CCI, also organized a big seminar for ASEAN business<br>\nleaders in future ASEAN economic cooperation and business<br>\nparticipation. These type of meetings around the Summit or AMM<br>\ncan be organized by the most important and active ASEAN NGOs<br>\nregistered at the ASEAN Secretariat. They could meet separately<br>\nbut at the end they should come together with government<br>\nofficials.<\/p>\n<p>This idea still has to be worked out in detail, but it is<br>\nvital to make ASEAN more viable in the future because of the<br>\nimportance of ASEANs people's participation and commitment. This<br>\nis especially true because ASEAN's future cooperation in the<br>\nvarious fields will be more intensive and will have a much<br>\ngreater effect than now. Especially in the social field,<br>\ncooperation has been stressed in: (1) raising awareness of ASEAN<br>\namong citizens, especially the young generation; (2) upgrade<br>\nhuman resources through education and technology transfers; (3)<br>\npromote strong family values; (4) effective participation for<br>\nwomen and enhance ASEAN programs on children and youth; (5)<br>\ncreate a drug-free ASEAN; (6) strengthen teamwork on fighting<br>\nAIDS; (7) strive towards technological competitiveness.<\/p>\n<p>During the Southeast ASEAN-10 Leaders meeting more items<br>\nhave been discussed, among others the Mekong Delta development in<br>\ncooperation between the ten nations. There will also be an<br>\ninformal summit of Southeast Asian Leaders every year, starting<br>\nin Jakarta at the end of next year, where other leaders from East<br>\nAsia such as Japan, China, and Korea will also be invited. These<br>\nideas are all very exciting and is a sure sign that ASEAN is not<br>\nonly alive, but expanding with new ideas, plans and programs. It<br>\ndefinitely is not true that a summit only produces prepared<br>\nideas.<\/p>\n<p>The writer is chairman of the supervisory board of the Centre<br>\nfor Strategic and International Studies.<\/p>\n<p>Window: For ASEAN, the chance of establishing an ASEAN-10 is of<br>\nparamount importance not only because it was a romantic dream at<br>\nthe creation of ASEAN in 1967, but also because it is of<br>\nstrategic importance, for the promotion of peace and welfare of<br>\nthe Southeast Asia region in the future.<\/p>",
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    "sponsor": "Okusi Associates",
    "sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com"
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