ASEAN Security Cooperation<\/p>\n
Undoubtedly, the signing of what the 10 leaders of the
\nAssociation of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) refer to as Bali
\nConcord II is an impressive achievement in terms of solidifying
\nthe sense of community in the region. Former foreign minister Ali
\nAlatas, who is now President Megawati Soekarnoputri's special
\nenvoy, presented a clear picture of the state of cooperation
\namong the organization's member countries when he addressed a
\nconference of ASEAN editors last Monday in Bali. He figuratively
\ndescribed the Bali Concord II documents as signaling the
\nemergence of a more cohesive regional community in this region,
\nwith the accord's three main components as supporting pillars. He
\nrightly stated that economic integration was not possible without
\nthe forging of a common perception of security issues.<\/p>\n
Given the complex recent history of Southeast Asia, which was
\ngreatly affected by the intense power rivalry of the Cold War
\nafter the end of World War II in 1945, the forging of such a
\ncommon perception on security issues is easier said than done.
\nHowever, in the last 27 years since Bali Concord I was signed,
\nhistorical turning points have taken place that were previously
\nregarded as impossibilities. We are referring to the end of the
\nVietnam War, from which a global superpower, the United States,
\nmanaged to extricate itself with a minimum loss of face.<\/p>\n
Since 1975, we have witnessed not only the emergence of a
\nunited Vietnam as envisaged by Ho Chi Minh, but a Vietnam that is
\nalso gradually liberalizing its economy and that politically
\nstrikes an open posture. Vietnam's active membership in ASEAN
\nshows that qualitative changes have taken place in the political
\nmakeup of Southeast Asia. Today's Cambodia, despite its domestic
\npolitical squabbles, is more proof that historical miracles can
\noccur in this region.<\/p>\n
However, the last 27 years have also shown how Indonesia, the
\nlargest ASEAN member, has become a weakened power because of its
\ninability to stem political decay and spur political development.
\nIf Indonesia's role as \"the prime manager of regional order\" --
\nto borrow a phrase coined by the late Prof. Michael Leifer of the
\nLondon School of Economics and Political Science -- can be
\nconsidered as its natural position in the wake of Bali Concord I
\nin 1976, in the coming years after the signing of Bali Concord II
\na more realistic stance is dictated.<\/p>\n
On the one hand, the key points reiterated in the ASEAN
\nSecurity Community document must be implemented because of the
\nvolatile nature of the current global situation. What is
\ncataloged as transnational crimes, especially acts of terrorism,
\nwhich are technically becoming more sophisticated, must be
\ntackled jointly and vigorously in order to prevent a slide toward
\nanarchy. We also welcome the call for consultation and
\ncooperation between ASEAN members and between ASEAN and its
\nfriends and partners to be fostered.<\/p>\n
On the other hand, however, to achieve the desired goals as
\nlisted in the ASEAN Security Community document, the governments
\nof the ASEAN member countries must first demonstrate their
\nability to effectively manage their domestic situation and
\ndisplay their determination to solve intra-regional conflicts in
\naccordance with the spirit of Bali Concord II.<\/p>\n
Can we hope, for example, now that the ink has dried on the
\nASEAN Security Community document, Malaysia and Singapore will
\nresolve their raw water supply argument in a more civilized
\nmanner? Can we hope that based on the understanding reached
\nbetween Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong and President Megawati
\nduring their meeting on Batam Island last August, Singapore and
\nIndonesia will now try to resolve -- in a systematic, intensive
\nand forthright manner -- several bilateral issues that have so
\nfar been left pending?<\/p>\n
We are not being motivated by an ingrained cynical inclination
\nwhen we say that we would like to see the real implementation of
\nBali Concord II in the coming years. However, the global social
\ndynamics and the changes affecting international politics are at
\npresent taking place so rapidly that ASEAN has no choice but to
\nalso step up its working rhythm.<\/p>\n
The message regarding a rapidly changing global situation
\nshould be clearly and succinctly conveyed to the military junta
\nin Yangon that for the sake of Myanmar's survival and ASEAN's
\ncredibility, they too have to change.<\/p>\n
As Ali Alatas has already conveyed to the junta the message
\nthat it is \"counterproductive\" to the implementation of their own
\npolitical program to continue to detain Aung San Suu Kyi. Now,
\nafter the signing of Bali Concord II, it should also be clearly
\nstated to the aging military junta in Yangon that their
\nundemocratic heavy-handed rule is counterproductive to ASEAN.<\/p>\n
We laud the hard work that has been done by the numerous
\ndiplomats and experts in the preparation of the ASEAN Security
\nCommunity document and the vigorous determination of Indonesia to
\nachieve this significant milestone in ASEAN's development.
\nHowever, the relevant historicity of the Bali Concord II must
\nstill be proven with concrete achievements in resolving the
\nvarious disputes that still encumber relations between the member
\ncountries of ASEAN and between ASEAN and the outside powers.<\/p>",
"url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/asean-security-cooperation-1447893297",
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"sponsor": "Okusi Associates",
"sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com"
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