ASEAN needs to improve its principles<\/p>\n
By Eddi S. Hariyadhi<\/p>\n
JAKARTA (JP): The Association of Southeast Asian Nations
\n(ASEAN), which celebrates its 31st anniversary today, is
\nconsidered the most successful subregional grouping, whose
\neconomic growth outstrips that of developed countries and other
\ngroups of countries.<\/p>\n
The success did not come from a void. Built on a politically
\nworrisome setting, ASEAN countries must go through difficult
\nperiods of getting used to each other and treating each other
\nmore as friends than foes. The slow progress during the first
\ndecade owed much to the efforts to achieve common understandings.<\/p>\n
The modest economic cooperation for more than two decades has
\nbecome more substantial, especially after 1992, when it felt
\ncertain that such political stability was obtained.<\/p>\n
The ASEAN Free Trade Area agreement is a confirmation that
\nASEAN's economic success is due more to members' individual
\neconomic programs and external relations rather than to the
\nCommittee on Trade and Tourism's gain.<\/p>\n
The fact is, however, that the world reckons ASEAN as a very
\nimportant player in the region. The making of the world's new
\ntriangular map cannot be estranged from ASEAN's role within the
\nAsia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum and Asia-Europe Meeting.<\/p>\n
Major countries accept it and agree to play their global role
\nusing ASEAN's platform. Its existence and roles are well
\nrecognized because it is ASEAN's undertakings which are able to
\nsummon the world's major countries to annual meetings -- Post
\nMinisterial Conferences (PMC) since 1980 and ASEAN Regional
\nForums since 1994.<\/p>\n
Yet, the past year has been witness to how Asia can suffer a
\ndramatic reversal of fortune. ASEAN's reputation has plunged to
\nis deepest point. Opinions, seminars and books are attempting to
\nfind out what went wrong; why and how. It is ASEAN's shortcoming
\nto stop the crisis from happening and from worsening.<\/p>\n
Even before the financial and economic crises, there were
\nissues of new character, global in nature, that could not be
\nsettled satisfactorily by existing mechanisms. Haze and labor are
\ntwo examples.<\/p>\n
Out of economic bankruptcy, the other impact becomes real.
\nMalaysian Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim aired a
\nconstructive intervention, followed by Malaysian Minister for
\nForeign Affairs Surin, who proposed a flexible engagement.<\/p>\n
Thwarted by Indonesia as well as other countries at the last
\nASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM), however, there is already a
\nfeeling of unease among members to preserve the principle of
\nnoninterference that has long been believed as pillaring ASEAN's
\nbuilding.<\/p>\n
It is far from the intention to judge that he ASEAN way is no
\nlonger correct but it is valid to question why ASEAN's existing
\nmechanism could not give precise remedies to the ailments. Then
\nagain, thinking of new possible mechanisms that are more
\nresponsible to contemporary problems is just a sequential
\nprocess.<\/p>\n
The main strength of ASEAN, that has become its character, as
\ntouted, is the so-called ASEAN way, or Asian way, of doing
\nthings. This implies a values system which is totally different
\nfrom the West's.<\/p>\n
These values, the so-called Singapore school, base relations
\non harmony. ASEAN does not have a clean-cut mechanism on
\ndecision-making. Existing institutions -- summits, the AMM or the
\nASEAN Standing Committee -- function to provide opportunities for
\nleaders to find consensus and cover up dissension. The following
\ncomparison between the European Union (EU) and ASEAN is aimed at
\ngiving a sharper portrait.<\/p>\n
There are three characteristics of EU's integration that led
\nto its present appearance.<\/p>\n
* It is very legalistic. Treaties of Rome, Maastricht and
\nAmsterdam are thick and detailed documents that regulate every
\nsingle arrangement of the subjects covered, that should be
\ntransposed into national legislation of the member states.<\/p>\n
* Institutionally, it has powerful institutions -- the European
\nCommission, the European Council and the European Parliament,
\namong others -- to implement the agreements.<\/p>\n
* There is supranationality, a continuing transfer of national
\nsovereignty from member states to the above institutions located
\nin Brussels.<\/p>\n
On the other hand, ASEAN has two principles of cooperation.<\/p>\n
The first is informality-consensus-flexibility. Except for the
\nTrade Agreement Committee (1976) and Bangkok Treaty (1995), ASEAN
\nhas not based its cooperation on international treaties. It was
\nestablished in 1967 through a declaration. The document is short
\nand concise and charts the principles. The elaboration is left to
\nthe leaders to carefully decide on consensus basis, while the
\nimplementation should be followed through in a flexible way.<\/p>\n
The second is minimalism, which can be seen from the very rare
\nformal undertakings. For 30 years, it has only conducted five
\nformal and two informal summits and annual ministerial meetings,
\nwhile the EU has had three-monthly (1975 to 1985) summits and
\nsix-monthly (1986 to present) summits. ASEAN's Jakarta-based
\nsmall secretariat is manned by less than 40 people, compared to
\nthousands of employees in the EU's Commission alone.<\/p>\n
Again, it is not the aim to judge that one is better than the
\nother, and it is not fair to simply put them in contrast. For
\none, they are different in character -- integration on the one
\nhand and cooperation on the other.<\/p>\n
What matters is the fact that the EU has so far been able to
\nsurvive various difficulties in pursuing its integration process,
\nwhile ASEAN is struggling to unscramble its biggest problem.<\/p>\n
Although it is true that the results are yet to be seen,
\nASEAN's failure to handle new issues and new-fashioned statements
\nfrom its political figures reveals an inadequacy on the other
\nside of its strength.<\/p>\n
The next question is, therefore, how should ASEAN transform
\nitself into a stronger and more reliable organization, capable of
\naddressing current and forthcoming problems in entering the next
\ncentury?<\/p>\n
Is ASEAN working on it? AMM's \"enhanced interaction\" tries to
\nattune ASEAN's traditional principle into new reality. Yet, can
\nthe fact that Indonesia's affirmation that ASEAN has maintained
\nits principle, and Thailand's claim that it has successfully
\ngotten through its message, be regarded as the emergence a new
\nregulation? One can appraise these different interpretations of
\nthe one consensus as echoing the same concept.<\/p>\n
The ASEAN Regional Forum and PMC attested last July that ASEAN
\nis still a highly respected group. But the message carried by its
\ndialog partners also bears witness to their concern for ASEAN to
\nwisely adapt itself to new challenges. As more nonconventional
\nsecurity matters, including like environmentally or population-
\nrelated issues, move increasingly higher on the agenda, the need
\nfor ASEAN to adopt new businesslike mechanisms and regulations
\nbecomes more imperative than ever.<\/p>\n
Should ASEAN still consider that bettering existing principles
\nis taboo, it surely is not for ASEAN to learn from others'
\nexperiences to translate them into technicalities. The world is
\nchanging and the days ahead are carrying this message.<\/p>\n
The writer is a staff member of the Ministry of Foreign
\nAffairs. He has written this article in a private capacity.<\/p>",
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