ASEAN: Moving on the right track (1)<\/p>\n
By Vitit Muntarbhorn<\/p>\n
This is the first of two articles examining the path the
\nAssociation of Southeast Asian Nations has taken thus far. The
\n1995 ASEAN Summit will take place at the end of this month.<\/p>\n
BANGKOK: The roots of regionalism in the Post-World War II
\nperiod can be traced back to the United Nations Charter which
\nprovided for the possibility of regional approaches and
\narrangements.<\/p>\n
However, the components of regionalism were left undefined,
\nindicating much leeway for evolution after 1945. History has proved
\nsince then that regionalism can take many forms for a variety of
\npurposes, varying between political and security pacts to economic,
\nsocial and cultural cooperation. Regional mechanisms range from
\nintegrated and closely knit entities verging on a union of the
\nmember states to looser conglomerations, such as an association
\nbased upon a specific set of objectives subject to gradual
\ncooperation.<\/p>\n
A recent publication of the United Nations identifies the
\nfollowing ingredients of regionalism, evident at this point in time.<\/p>\n
\" -- three or more geographically proximate states<\/p>\n
-- mutual dependence arising from common interests<\/p>\n
-- defined by an ad hoc problem<\/p>\n
-- and interrelated units whose activities are significant
\ndeterminants of each other's policies.\"<\/p>\n
The path towards regionalism in Southeast Asia has
\noscillated between a variety of regional approaches. In the post
\nWorld War II period, the rise of the Cold War and conflictual
\nundercurrents between the Western bloc and the
\ncommunist\/socialist bloc were deeply felt in the region, and the
\nearly alliances in Southeast Asia were of a political and
\nsecurity kind. This was exemplified by the formation of the South
\nEast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) which was a security pact
\ninvolving not only the countries of Southeast Asia but also their
\n\"guarantors\" from the West who saw it innately as a defense
\norganization against communist threats in the region.<\/p>\n
Various politico-economic alliances, with less of a focus on
\nsecurity matters, were experimented with before 1967, for
\nexample, Maphilindo (between Malaysia, Philippines and Indonesia)
\nand the Association of Southeast Asia (between the non-communist
\ncountries of the region). However, these failed to materialize,
\nand it was only in 1967 that there emerged the Association of
\nSoutheast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Initially, there were five
\nmember countries, namely Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand
\nand the Philippines. Much later, Brunei joined, and in 1995
\nVietnam is set to become the seventh member country.<\/p>\n
Interestingly, at the outset ASEAN did not set out expressly
\nto be a regional organization of a political mold. The 1967
\nfounding instrument -- the Bangkok Declaration -- did not even
\nuse the term \"political\" in its objectives. The seven specific
\naims of ASEAN were as follows:<\/p>\n
-- acceleration of economic growth, social progress and
\ncultural development in the region;<\/p>\n
-- promotion of regional peace and stability through abiding
\nrespect for justice and the rule of law in the region and
\nadherence to the principles of the United Nations Charter;<\/p>\n
-- collaboration and assistance on matters of common interest
\nin the economic, social cultural, technical, scientific and
\nadministrative fields;<\/p>\n
-- mutual assistance in the education, professional, technical
\nand administrative fields;<\/p>\n
-- collaboration in regard to agriculture, industries,
\ntrade, services and improved standards of living;<\/p>\n
-- promotion with other international and regional
\norganizations of a similar nature.<\/p>\n
Throughout the years, ASEAN has placed great emphasis on
\nconsensus-building (Mushyawarah\/Mufakat). There is no
\nsupranational ASEAN institution with powers to override national
\nsovereignty. However, there are various annual ministerial
\nmeetings and sporadic Heads of Government Summits to propel
\nactivities, assisted by the ASEAN Secretariat situated in
\nJakarta. The administrative structure is replete with committees
\ncovering an array of issues.<\/p>\n
It is in the political field that the weight of ASEAN has
\nbeen felt most strongly in recent decades. While the political
\nimpact of ASEAN has been significant, its other initiatives in
\nthe economic, social and cultural areas have lagged behind.<\/p>\n
In this light, its \"successes\" have often been in its
\n\"extra-regional\" interaction with outsiders rather than its
\n\"intra-regional\" interaction between the ASEAN member countries
\nthemselves, with the political domain benefiting most from this
\ninteraction. A continual question is whether it can broaden the
\nbenefits of cooperation beyond the political field.<\/p>\n
As ASEAN approaches the next century, it is intriguing to
\nprospect whether it will innovate and reinvent itself in a more
\ncomprehensive manner or be relegated to a degree of obsolescence
\nwhen faced with other emerging regional systems in its proximity.<\/p>\n
At this juncture, the roots of cooperation in the political
\nand security field deserve closer attention.<\/p>\n
At its inception in 1967, there were already present many
\nbilateral disputes between the member countries of ASEAN, for
\nexample a territorial dispute between the Philippines and
\nMalaysia over Sabah. The advent of ASEAN helped to accommodate
\nthese disputes and to reduce bilateral conflicts by means of
\nregional cooperation.<\/p>\n
During the late 1960s and the first half of the 1970s, the pre-
\noccupation of Southeast Asia was the war in Indochina, seen by many
\nas a war between communism and capitalism in the region. Outside
\npowers were involved directly and indirectly, witnessed by the
\npresence of U.S. and other western forces supporting one polarity
\nin Indochina, on the one hand, and the policy of the Soviet Union
\nand China supporting the other polarity, on the other hand. ASEAN
\ncountries were part and parcel of the former and spent most of
\ntheir energy countering what they perceived to be a communist
\nthreat in the region. In 1971 the foreign Ministers of ASEAN met
\nto adopt the notion of Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality as a
\nmeans of neutralizing Southeast Asia in the midst of this
\nconflict. Cooperation between ASEAN countries at the regional
\nlevel, beyond the area of politics and security, was almost non-
\nexistent.<\/p>\n
The ASEAN heads of government did not meet at a Summit until
\n1975 in Bali. Significantly, this was the year when the U.S.
\nwithdrew its troops from Indochina, and the governments of
\nVietnam, Laos and Cambodia changed hands; communism prevailed in
\nthese countries. The withdrawal of the U.S. from the region must
\nhave created nervous jitters in the ASEAN regional which felt
\nthat the security umbrella previously accorded by the U.S. could
\nno longer be relied upon. It was this crisis that led to a closer
\nalignment between ASEAN countries as a political umbrella for
\nthemselves with implications for their security, even though they
\ndid wish to go as far as to convert ASEAN into a military bloc.<\/p>\n
The instrument for closer cooperation was a series of
\ninitiatives taken at the Bali Summit. The Declaration of ASEAN
\nConcord was adopted outlining new areas of cooperation,
\nespecially in the economic and commercial field, paving the way
\nto programs for cooperation. ASEAN also concertized its first
\ntreaty -- the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation which highlighted
\nvarious yardsticks for peace and security derived from the United
\nNations Charter, with a clear message for ASEAN and its neighbors
\nas follows:<\/p>\n
* mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty,
\nequality, territorial integrity and national identify of all
\nnations;<\/p>\n
* the right of every State to lead its national existence
\nfree from external interference, subversion or coercion;<\/p>\n
* non-interference in the internal affairs of one another;<\/p>\n
* renunciation of the threat of use of force.<\/p>\n
The treaty also provided for the possibility of a dispute
\nsettlement mechanism in the form of a High Council. However, the
\nlatter has never been established.<\/p>\n
Window A: Interestingly, at the outset ASEAN did not set out
\nexpressly to be a regional organization of a political mould.<\/p>\n
Window B: It is in the political field that the weight of ASEAN
\nhas been felt most strongly in recent decades.<\/p>",
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