ASEAN forum and preventive diplomacy<\/p>\n
By C.P.F. Luhulima<\/p>\n
JAKARTA (JP): Apparently the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)
\ninnaugural meeting, held in Bangkok yesterday, was not structured
\nin the sense that it could be effective in fostering dialogs on
\npolitical and security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region.<\/p>\n
There was no specific agenda although preparations had been
\nmade by the senior officials in Bangkok last May. In fact,
\nAustralia, Canada and South Korea had made written contributions
\ntowards institutionalizing the forum.<\/p>\n
Yesterday's three-hour session enabled its participants (the
\nsix ASEAN countries, their seven dialog partners, Australia,
\nCanada, the European Union, Japan, Korea, New Zealand and the
\nUnited States, the \"consultation partners\" China and Russia, and
\nthree observers, Laos, Papua New Guinea and Vietnam) to exchange
\nviews on diverse security issues in the region and the contiguous
\nareas. This was done in order to familiarize them with the
\nvarious views and interests in efforts to head off nascent
\nsecurity flash points, particularly in the South China Sea and
\nthe Korean Peninsula.<\/p>\n
There were no substantive discussions. The fate of the ARF
\nwill most probably not differ substantially from the ASEAN
\napproach to tackling border and territorial issues among the
\nmember countries. Taking priority over problem solving will be:
\npreventive diplomacy in the sense of building peace through
\npreventing disputes and threats from escalating into armed
\nconflicts; trust-building proposals formulated to provide mutual
\nreassurance by promoting openness about defense matters, and
\nconflict diffusion.<\/p>\n
The U.S.and Australia brought up the issue of human rights
\nviolations by the SLORC (State Law and Order Restoration Council)
\nin Myanmar to force the Myanmarese junta to return to their
\nsenses and formally recognize the outcome of the 1990 elections.
\nNo less than U.S. President Bill Clinton has agreed that the
\nSLORC has one of the most dismal human rights records. The U.S.
\nwants ASEAN to push the Myanmarese government to talk to Aung San
\nSuu Kyi, the Nobel Peace Prize winner, whose party won the above
\nelection. Winston Lord, U.S. assistant secretary of state, has
\nsaid that the ARF should begin by encouraging \"transparency\" in
\ndefense matters and building mutual trust.<\/p>\n
Two broad topics might have come up in the ARF discussion: an
\noverview of security-related \"challenges and opportunities\" (Zone
\nof Peace, Freedom and Neutrality and the Nuclear Weapons Free
\nZone) the Asia-Pacific region faces, and confidence building
\nmeasures to preempt disputes between potential antagonists.<\/p>\n
The question remains as to whether ASEAN is capable of
\nproviding enough leadership in such discussions to manage
\nregional security issues effectively. This very much depends on
\nthe question this author raised one year ago on the issue: \"Will
\nASEAN be cohesive enough in its political and security views to
\neffectively manage political and security issues in the region.\"<\/p>\n
ASEAN is still not fully cohesive on the realization of ZOPFAN
\nand the SEANWFZ despite the fact that the ASEAN foreign ministers
\nagreed long ago, in April 1972, on 14 guidelines for implementing
\nZOPFAN, and in July 1993, on the Program of Action of ZOPFAN.<\/p>\n
If the ASEAN members have not reached complete agreement on
\nthe need and timing of its implementation, how will ASEAN be able
\nto produce a cohesive and harmonious view on the presence and the
\nrole of the major powers in the region and agree on the
\ninstruments that should structure their behavior and their
\nlegitimate mediation?<\/p>\n
The code of conduct to regulate their behavior in the form of
\nprotocol has yet to be finalized. ASEAN is not agreeable to
\napplying the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) in Southeast
\nAsia, ZOPFAN's legal instrument, as an international code of
\nconduct even though it was amended in 1987 by two articles that
\nallow non-Southeast Asian countries to become party to the
\nTreaty. The reason is not entirely clear except for the argument
\nthat allowing outside countries to become party to the Treaty
\nwill enable them to intervene in Southeast Asian affairs.<\/p>\n
This argument is untenable for two reasons. First, the
\nProtocol Amending the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation of Dec.
\n15, 1987, allows for accession of states outside Southeast Asia
\nonly \"by the consent of all the States in Southeast Asia which
\nare signatories to this Treaty and Brunei Darussalam.\"<\/p>\n
Hence, ASEAN would have to stipulate on what terms that
\nconsent could be provided.<\/p>\n
To formulate a separate protocol as a code of international
\nconduct in Southeast Asia for non-Southeast Asians will not have
\nthe legal power of the Treaty and will not bind the major powers
\nlegally to their commitments.<\/p>\n
Secondly, ASEAN has been successful in obtaining concessions
\nfrom the United States in its preference for cultural relativism
\nin its stance on human rights issues. In a recent Worldnet Dialog
\n(July 20, 1994) Winston Lord acknowledged that the United States
\nrecognized that while it would carry on with its policies on
\nhuman rights \"there are many other interests -- economic,
\nsecurity and environmental -- and we have to take different
\napproaches to various countries, depending on the nature of the
\nproblems and the other interests that are included.\"<\/p>\n
If ASEAN is cohesive and adamant enough to back up their
\nstance on a certain issue, big countries will eventually
\ncompromise.<\/p>\n
ASEAN should keep projecting itself at a higher profile, an
\nattitude Dr. Mahathir keeps proclaiming, particularly vis-a-vis
\nthe economically advanced countries. This can also be applied to
\nTAC as the code of international conduct in Southeast Asia.<\/p>\n
The most crucial question will have to be answered in the
\naffirmative: Yes, ASEAN is cohesive and adamant enough in its
\npolitical and security views to effectively manage, guide and
\nseek solutions to political and security issues in the region.<\/p>\n
Yes, ASEAN is cohesive in its stance on ZOPFAN and the NWFZ as
\nthe foremost trust-building instruments in Southeast Asia and the
\ncontiguous areas.<\/p>\n
Only in such a way will ASEAN be able to call the shots in
\npolitics and security in the region and hence give meaning to the
\nASEAN Regional Forum. Otherwise, the ARF will be transformed into
\na forum dominated and managed by the big powers in the region.<\/p>\n
ASEAN will thus have to come up with a background paper on
\npractical proposals for the realization of ZOPFAN and the NWFZ,
\nfor security cooperation in the wider region and on preventive
\ndiplomacy and conflict management. This should entail proposals
\nfor exchange of information among members on arms procurement
\nplans, military exercises and intelligence, joint programs to
\nmonitor Asia-Pacific sea lines of communication, cooperation on
\nlimiting weapons proliferation and others. And the question still
\nremains as to how to develop the ARF in order that by the Jakarta
\nmeeting in 1996, the institutionalizing of the forum will have
\nbeen completed.<\/p>\n
ARF meetings will by then have transparently annotated agendas
\nfor talks which are prepared far in advance so that the
\nnegotiations can proceed efficiently and effectively, such as is
\nthe case with the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting and the ASEAN-Post
\nMinisterial Conference.<\/p>\n
The writer is a senior researcher at the Indonesian Institute
\nof Sciences (LIPI).<\/p>",
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