ASEAN considers Yangon's entry<\/p>\n
By Meidyatama Suryodiningrat<\/p>\n
JAKARTA (JP): Foreign ministers of the Association of
\nSoutheast Asian Nations (ASEAN) convene in Kuala Lumpur tomorrow
\nto weigh up one of the most momentous decisions in the
\norganization's history.<\/p>\n
The special meeting will likely decide whether in its 30th
\nyear the association will realize the dream of an ASEAN-10 which
\nincludes Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar.<\/p>\n
For many the core issue is Myanmar.<\/p>\n
The ruling Stability, Law and Order Restoration Council
\n(SLORC) has been a target of intense criticism for alleged human
\nrights abuses and suppression of the pro-democracy movement.<\/p>\n
Despite the public condemnations and pleas to delay admission,
\nASEAN remains oblivious and continues to pursue a policy of
\n\"constructive engagement\" with SLORC. For ASEAN, it is a mere
\nquestion of fulfilling requirements before it admits Myanmar.<\/p>\n
United States Secretary of State Madeline Albright's comment
\nin front of a Senate committee last week reflected the mood of
\ninternational exasperation toward ASEAN's stance: \"I have written
\nto various (ASEAN) leaders... We have tried very hard to get
\nASEAN countries to follow in our footsteps but they don't seem to
\nbe interested.\"<\/p>\n
Despite Yangon's political malady, ASEAN and in particular
\nIndonesia, base their decision on allowing immediate membership
\non pragmatical and strategic reasons of self-interest.<\/p>\n
The first reason is of geostrategic nature.<\/p>\n
It is no secret that ASEAN military circles are preoccupied
\nwith the possibility of dealing against Chinese hegemony in the
\nregion. Questions on the South China Sea, natural resources and
\nChina's desire to build a blue water navy remain lingering
\nconcerns.<\/p>\n
While diplomatic ties between ASEAN and China are amiable,
\nregional suspicions remain high.<\/p>\n
The admission of Myanmar in ASEAN is a direct move to pull
\nMyanmar away from China's sphere of influence.<\/p>\n
Kent E. Calder in his book Asia's Deadly Triangle wrote of
\nChina's discreet but steady influence on Myanmar. China, Calder
\nwrote, has provided military assistance and helped upgrade
\nMyanmar's navy.<\/p>\n
Sandwiched between the Chinese province of Yunnan and the
\nIndian Ocean, Myanmar is a strategic passage to the south Asian
\nseaways. China has been active repairing roads and railways from
\nYunnan southward to the Indian Ocean.<\/p>\n
In 1992, satellites detected a new 50-meter antenna on
\nMyanmar's Coco islands, near the Andaman Islands north of
\nIndonesia's Sabang Island.<\/p>\n
It is suspected that Yangon is allowing China to use it as a
\nlistening post for the Malacca Straits which is just 1,000
\nkilometers away.<\/p>\n
Head of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies'
\ndepartment of international relations, Bantarto Bandoro,
\nacknowledges security is a major consideration for granting
\nmembership.<\/p>\n
\"Even though it isn't stated in public, containment of China
\nis a crucial factor,\" he said. \"If Myanmar is accepted this year
\nI believe this will be a primary reason.\"<\/p>\n
The second reason is a combination of history and Indonesia's
\nown keenness.<\/p>\n
It is well known that ASEAN's forefathers envisioned a
\ngrouping encompassing all 10 southeast Asian states. What is
\noften forgotten is that Indonesia, as one of the primary
\ninitiators of the group, actually invited Myanmar, then still
\nBurma, and Cambodia to join in 1967.<\/p>\n
For various reasons, born out of Cold War politics of the
\ntime, the two countries refused but they indicated they were not
\nadverse to this new grouping.<\/p>\n
Thirty-years later Indonesia is again showing the same
\nkeenness in inviting the two countries along with Laos, evident
\nin President Soeharto's visit to the three countries earlier this
\nyear.<\/p>\n
It would be an extraordinary accomplishment for Soeharto as
\nthe only surviving statesman from the grouping's birth to preside
\nover an ASEAN which began as a humble five nation gathering in
\n1967 to a 10 member association in 1997 which commands genuine
\ninternational respect and attention.<\/p>\n
While decisions in ASEAN are made by consensus, Indonesia as
\nthe protagonist in the grouping carries a lot of weight in
\nswaying decisions.<\/p>\n
Given that Soeharto made no hesitation in expressing his
\nsupport during his trip, the political will to include them this
\nyear is already there.<\/p>\n
Bantarto highlights Soeharto's visit as a key development in
\nthe membership process. \"If they are accepted this year it can be
\nseen partly as the success of Pak Harto's diplomacy,\" he said.<\/p>\n
The third reason for immediate admission is economic. Soeharto
\nhas publicly envisaged the economic potential of an ASEAN-10 with
\na market of 500 million people, a market bigger than Europe or
\nNorth America.<\/p>\n
Presently Indonesian investment to Myanmar is low with just
\nover US$210 million mostly in manufacturing and construction.<\/p>\n
Indonesia only has five projects, far behind Singapore and
\nMalaysia who are involved in 50.<\/p>\n
Nevertheless, the wheeling and dealing has begun.<\/p>\n
The most recent Indonesian venture is by Citra Lamtoro Gung
\nPersada, a company owned by one of Soeharto's daughters, which
\nwill lend assistance in the development of Myanmar's food and
\nfertilizer industry along with the construction of power plants
\nand roads.<\/p>\n
PT Semen Cibinong will also have a 70 percent stake in a
\nUS$210 million cement factory being built there. Once completed
\nin the year 2000, the factory is expected to capture a third of
\nthe Myanmar market.<\/p>\n
Another ASEAN member which has strong economic interests is
\nThailand which has a 30-year gas supply project with Myanmar
\nthrough the Yadana project in the Andaman Sea.<\/p>\n
From an administrative point of view, Myanmar is also
\nsufficiently ready to join ASEAN's economic mechanisms.<\/p>\n
ASEAN officials have often said that Yangon should have no
\nproblem integrating into the ASEAN Free Trade Area. In addition,
\nMyanmar is also a member of the World Trade Organization,
\nsomething Cambodia and Laos are not.<\/p>\n
The fourth reason for admission is a symbolic one. The
\nmomentum and significance of a united southeast Asia during
\nASEAN's 30th anniversary celebrations should not be brushed aside
\nlightly.<\/p>\n
But more than that, accepting Myanmar serves as a vehicle in
\nestablishing ASEAN's independence. It is also a calculated move
\nto deflect criticism from the West. As Western criticism becomes
\nfiercer, ASEAN's resolve is sturdier.<\/p>\n
\"It is clearly hitting back at the West,\" Bantarto said, \"in
\nthe end they'll (the West) probably keep quite because they have
\ntheir own economic interest in the region and don't want to
\ndamage it.\"<\/p>\n
He said ASEAN has also remained consistent to its policy of
\nrespecting the political pluralism of the region and hallowed
\nnon-domestic interference.<\/p>\n
Human rights and democracy has never been a consideration for
\nASEAN membership and, to the ire of the pro-democracy movement
\nthere, neither will it for Myanmar.<\/p>\n
As Indonesian foreign minister Ali Alatas said: no
\norganization in the world has put such demands as a prerequisite
\nfor membership, not even the United Nations, so why should ASEAN?<\/p>",
"url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/asean-considers-yangons-entry-1447893297",
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"sponsor": "Okusi Associates",
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