ASEAN as a security community<\/p>\n
Amitav Acharya
\nDeputy Director
\nInstitute of Defense
\nand Strategic Studies
\nNanyang Technological University
\nSingapore<\/p>\n
Unlike Europe, Southeast Asia does not aspire to be what
\nRobert Kagan in his best-selling book Of Paradise and Power,
\nwould call a \"Kantian paradise\". Southeast Asians have not
\nforsaken military power in dealing with domestic and external
\nthreats, although they have avoided resort to force to settle
\nintra-ASEAN conflicts. Strategic competition on matters of
\nnational interest has not been abandoned. Yet, Southeast Asia is
\nalso a far cry from a Hobbesian world of anarchy ruled by fear
\nand power.<\/p>\n
The main reason why Southeast Asia is not a Hobbesian world or
\na \"Balkans of the Orient\" it could have easily become is the
\nAssociation of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). To be sure, other
\nfactors have helped. Some would say the benign hegemony of the
\nUnited States is the key factor. But hegemony can be divisive as
\nwell as stabilizing. Southeast Asia would have been worse off for
\nits security without two major contributions by ASEAN since its
\nestablishment in 1967.<\/p>\n
ASEAN's first contribution is moderating inter-state tensions
\nin Southeast Asia, especially between Indonesia and its
\nneighbors, Singapore and Malaysia. Indonesia's role was vital in
\nthis process. As the region's largest nation, its decision to
\naccept restraint in dealing with its neighbors for the sake of
\ntheir common security and development is a remarkable achievement
\nnot found in other parts of the world with a comparable disparity
\nin size and relative power. The stability in inter-state
\nrelations offered by ASEAN helped its members to overcome
\ninternal challenges such as the communist insurgency and focus on
\neconomic development through foreign investment.<\/p>\n
ASEAN's second contribution has been to provide a political
\nand psychological cushion to shield the non-communist Southeast
\nAsian countries in the wake of the British withdrawal from East
\nof Suez and American withdrawal from Indochina. This
\ncontribution, not so easily remembered today, but becomes
\napparent if we take a look back at the late 1960s and the 1970s.<\/p>\n
Instead of weathering under pressure, ASEAN became the
\ndeveloping world's closest approximation to a security community.
\nA security community is defined as a group of states which have
\ndeveloped a long-term habit of managing their disputes without
\nresort to violence.<\/p>\n
Three main forces contribute to a security community:<\/p>\n
First, common threats and common vulnerabilities can be an
\ninitial trigger, although these are not sufficient conditions.<\/p>\n
Second, economic and functional interdependence produce a
\nspill-over effect in creating peaceful relationships.<\/p>\n
Third, states can create and consolidate security communities
\nthrough deliberate effort at building multilateral institutions.
\nMultilateral institutions spread common values and contribute to
\na common sense of identity, help to develop habits of cooperation
\nand provide mechanisms for peaceful settlement of disputes.<\/p>\n
In the 1970s, these three factors combined to help ASEAN make
\nits journey towards a security community. This quest was helped
\nby the threat of communist insurgency, by emphasizing economic
\nand cultural cooperation, and by developing a habit of conflict
\navoidance through socialization and identity-building.<\/p>\n
For a long time, this effort turned out to be quite
\nsuccessful. But the political climate for regional cooperation in
\nSoutheast Asia and Asia Pacific has changed considerably even
\nsince the late 1990s.<\/p>\n
Three main problems combined to undermine ASEAN's stock in
\nworld affairs:<\/p>\n
First, membership expansion increased ASEAN's complexity and
\ndiversity, underscoring intar-regional economic disparities,
\ncreated expectations among new members which could not be filled,
\nand strained ASEAN's relations with the West over Myanmar's
\nmembership despite its lack of political reform and
\nliberalization.<\/p>\n
Second, ASEAN was confronted with a regional currency crisis.
\nThe problem was not whether ASEAN could have prevented the
\ncrisis. It was that ASEAN seemed to be a house divided in
\nfighting a common danger which undermined ASEAN's credibility.<\/p>\n
Third, ASEAN saw a debate over non-interference. While
\nconsensus was preserved in the end, it created the perception of
\nan organization unwilling to change. Hence, doubts about its
\ncapacity to deal with non-traditional threats: environment,
\nterrorism and now disease.<\/p>\n
Today, ASEAN is confronted with new challenges. In the past
\ntwo years, first terrorism and then SARS have emerged as the new
\ntransnational security threats which have undermined confidence
\nin the stability of Southeast Asia. A terrorist attack like Bali
\nin October 2002 or the outbreak of SARS are in some ways more
\ndevastating than a conventional military attack on ASEAN members.<\/p>\n
Second, the relative power of the U.S. has never been more
\npronounced. American hegemony today is a double-edged sword for
\nASEAN. Balance of power thinking sees it as a stabilizing force,
\noffering reassurance against a rising China and keeping peace in
\nthe Korean Peninsula. But dependence on American power also
\nraises questions about ASEAN's own autonomy and relevance.<\/p>\n
ASEAN's intra-mural quarrels are a huge distraction. A
\nstricter definition of a security community would preclude
\nmutually threatening arms races, moving to a stage when fortified
\nborders are no longer necessary.<\/p>\n
ASEAN is in some danger of being divided by the divergent
\nresponses of its members to American ascendancy. America's
\nresources and leadership are vital for ASEAN if it is to succeed
\nin its war on terror.<\/p>\n
In dealing the U.S., China, India, and other major powers, it
\nis important to bear in mind that ASEAN's assets are not just or
\neven mainly physical, such as its markets and resources, but also
\nideational. Its unity and credibility is its most vital asset,
\nwhich is not to be squandered for selfish national
\nconsiderations.<\/p>\n
ASEAN does not need to abandon all its principles and
\npractices to stay relevant. But it must adapt its non-
\ninterference doctrine to the changing realities. ASEAN should not
\nshy away from engaging Myanmar in ways that results in an
\nimproved political climate, which in turn will enhance ASEAN's
\ninternational credibility and reputation.<\/p>\n
First, an ASEAN security community should not be inward-
\nlooking. It should seek the constructive involvement of outside
\nactors and channels their resources for the benefit of the
\nregion. ASEAN works best by pooling sovereignty, rather than
\ndiluting it.<\/p>\n
Second, urgent measures are needed to promote the
\ninstitutional development of ASEAN. ASEAN has created a Troika,
\nbut it remains unused.<\/p>\n
Third, ASEAN needs to take firm charge of the ASEAN Regional
\nForum (ARF) process. The ARF needs new institutional mechanisms
\nas well, including a secretariat. The ARF's approach has been
\nmethod-driven, emphasizing process over the product. It needs to
\nbecome more problem-driven approach, addressing concrete common
\nchallenges such as terrorism and proliferation.<\/p>\n
Fourth, ASEAN needs to develop new responses to terrorism and
\ndisease. Combating terrorism could be helped by creating a
\nregional conduct on terrorism.<\/p>\n
While its remarkable openness to outside ideas and influences
\nis remarkable, ASEAN is a project conceived for Southeast Asians
\nby Southeast Asians themselves.<\/p>\n
If this identity is allowed to wither away through neglect or
\nlack of political will, ASEAN's states and societies will be
\nconfronted with the Hobbesian nightmare where the strong get what
\nthey want and the weak suffer what they must.<\/p>",
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